Fuentes v. Panella
| Decision Date | 11 September 1953 |
| Citation | 260 P.2d 853,120 Cal.App.2d 175 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | FUENTES et al. v. PANELLA et al. Civ. 15526. |
Harret W. Mannina, San Jose, Charles R. Wayland, Los Altos, for appellants.
Campbell, Hayes & Custer, Alfred B. Britton, Jr., San Jose, W. R. Dunn, Burlingame, of counsel, for respondents.
Plaintiffs are husband and wife. The wife, Margaret C. Fuentes, was injured when the automobile she was driving collided with the truck-trailer operated by defendant Lawrence Gaffin and owned by defendant Frank Panella, doing business as the B. Panella Drayage Co. Plaintiffs brought this action to recover for Mrs. Fuentes' injuries. Judgment based on a jury verdict was entered for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
Defendants concede that at all times here pertinent Gaffin was acting in the course and scope of his employment with Panella. Plaintiffs do not attack the suffciency of the evidence to sustain the judgment, their contentions being that certain instructions were erroneously given and others erroneously refused. The evidence must be reviewed, however, to understand the points in reference to the instructions.
The accident occurred at about 1:00 p. m. on the dry, clear day of August 17, 1950, at the level intersection of McKee Road, which runs east and west, and Bayshore Highway, which runs north and south, in Santa Clara County. Mrs. Fuentes was driving a 1931 Model 'A' Ford west on McKee Road on her way to her work. Gaffin was driving a three-piece tractor, a flat bed semi-trailer and a flat bed full trailer, weighing three tons, and loaded with nineteen tons of boxed pears, north on Bayshore Highway.
At the intersection in question there are three ten-foot lanes on Bayshore, the center lane being there divided by a double line, and with ten-foot shoulders bordering the lanes. McKee is about forty feet wide. A limit line is painted across McKee at the intersection to indicate where cars should stop when required to do so before entering the intersection.
Each of the four corners of the intersection is guarded by projecting overhead signals, of the variety where the lights flash from green, to amber, to red. The signals are of the 'trip' type, that is controlled automatically by the passing traffic. Green lights on McKee would automatically mean the lights on Bayshore were red, and vice versa. There was no testimony at all as to the duration of the signals, and particularly there was no evidence as to the length of the amber or caution light.
Mrs. Fuentes testified that as she approached within half a block of the intersection she noticed that the red light was against her. She brought her car to a stop at the limit line at the intersection, and waited quite a while for the light to turn green. James Hood, driving his cab east on McKee, testified that from the opposite side of the intersection he saw Mrs. Fuentes stop, as he had, for the red light. George Fereira, driving a pickup truck behind Mrs. Fuentes, also testified that Mrs. Fuentes stopped at the intersection, but was most confused as to the condition of the lights then or immediately thereafter. Mrs. Fuentes testified that when the McKee light turned green she started across the intersection, first looking to the right and then to her left, where she first observed defendants' truck approaching at about thirty-five miles an hour, and then about fifty feet from the intersection. She did not look at this truck again, because she assumed that it would stop because the lights were green for Mckee Road traffic and therefore must have been red for Bayshore traffic.
Gaffin, by deposition, directly contradicted this testimony. He testified that when he was forty feet from the intersection he observed the Fuentes' car on McKee also about forty feet from the intersection, and approaching it at the same speed he was traveling, that is, twenty-five to thirty miles per hour; that he maintained this speed as he approached the intersection; that he first noticed the Bayshore traffic light while he was 150 feet from the intersection, and such light was then green; that there were no cars between his truck and the intersection; that the Bayshore light remained green as he entered the intersection.
Hood, the cab driver, estimated that the truck was going about thirty miles and hour and was about seventy-five to one hundred feet from the intersection, or it could have been fifty feet, when the light turned green for McKee traffic, and when he and Mrs. Fuentes, from opposite sides of the intersection, started to cross.
Fereira was most confused as to who was where and what the conditions of the lights were at the critical times involved. He testified on direct and redirect that when he observed the truck forty feet from the intersection it was traveling thirty-five miles an hour, and that the light on McKee was green, but on cross-examination he stated that when the truck 'got pretty near even with the shoulder of McKee Road,' the light on McKee 'said' green.
A similar conflict exists as to the position of the parties after they entered the intersection and at the time of the collision. Mrs. Fuentes testified that after she saw the truck forty feet from the intersection she continued across slowly and did not again look at the truck because she assumed that it would stop. She next observed the truck just before the collision, at which time she had almost reached the dividing line of Bayshore. Although somewhat uncertain, she believed she was still moving when hit by the truck. From the physical facts and other evidence it appears that the tractor and semi-trailer must have passed in front of her and that she hit or was hit by the side of the full trailer at about its rear wheels.
Hood testified that he from one side, and Mrs. Fuentes from the other, had proceeded into the intersection with the green light for McKee traffic about ten or twelve feet when the truck entered the intersection. He then first realized that the truck was not going to stop, stopped himself, and observed the truck speed up and swing out in an attempt to miss the Ford. He could not see the actual collision, but heard it, and, while Mrs. Fuentes was moving when last seen by him, he thought the Ford was stopped when hit.
Fereira also agreed that Mrs. Fuentes, in accordance with the green light, was ten feet out into the intersection when the truck entered it. Although this witness had given a statement after the accident to the effect that Mrs. Fuentes had 'rolled' into the side of the truck, he insisted at the trial that she was stopped when hit.
Gaffin, however, testified that the light was green for Bayshore traffic when he entered the intersection at fifteen to twenty miles per hour. Although he had observed the Fuentes' car while it was forty feet from the intersection, he did not see it again until after the accident. He did not know whether Mrs. Fuentes had or had not stopped at the intersection. He did not apply his brakes or blow his horn. He felt the impact of the collision when his equipment was in the intersection, applied his brakes, crossed Bayshore to his left side, and parked.
The left front and rear of the Ford were badly damaged. The full trailer had a slightly split supporting beam on its right side over the back wheels.
On this evidence the jury brought in an eleven-to-one verdict in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs' major contention, made in various ways, is that since Gaffin testified that he was proceeding in accordance with the green light on Bayshore, and Mrs. Fuentes testified that she was proceeding with the green light on McKee, and neither admitted, claimed or contended that they had violated the law or should be excused from such violation, it was error of a most prejudicial nature to have instructed that circumstances could excuse a departure from the standard of care set forth in the Vehicle Code in reference to traffic signals.
At the request of plaintiffs the trial court instructed, in the words of section 475 of the Vehicle Code, that the driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic signal applicable to him and placed as provided by law.
Plaintiffs object to the following three instructions. The first of these, given at the request of defendants, is as follows:
'I instruct you that Section 476 of the Vehicle Code of the State of California, insofar as it is applicable to this case reads as follows:
The '(F)' portion of this instruction was not given when the instruction was first read to the jury, but when the jury requested...
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