Fuerst v. St. Louis Public Service Co.
| Decision Date | 21 May 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 31150,31150 |
| Citation | 368 S.W.2d 550 |
| Parties | Nellie FUERST, (Plaintiff) Respondent, v. ST. LOUIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, a Corporation, and Howard P. Mullins, and Graybar Electric Company, a Corporation, Defendants, St. Louis Public Service Company, a Corporation, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Don R. Williams, St.Louis, for appellant.
Gregg Wm. Keegan, St. Louis, John E. Bardgett, Clayton, for respondent.
J. MORGAN DONELSON, Special Judge.
Nellie Fuerst brought suit against the St. Louis Public Service Company, Howard P. Mullins, and Graybar Electric Company, for personal injuries resulting from an intersectional collision on December 29, 1960, in the City of St. Louis, Missouri. Plaintiff was a passenger aboard a westbound motorbus operated by defendant St. Louis Public Service Company on Arsenal Street, which runs in an east-west direction. Defendant Mullins was employed by and was driving a northbound automobile, on company business for defendant Graybar Electric Company, on Louisiana Avenue, which runs in a north-south direction. On trial after verdict a judgment was rendered for plaintiff in the sum of $4,500 against defendant St. Louis Public Service Company. The jury found for the other two defendants and against plaintiff. No appeal was taken by plaintiff, but in due time defendant St. Louis Public Service Company, hereinafter referred to as Service Company, perfected its appeal.
Plaintiff's petition for damages pleaded primary negligence and humanitarian negligence, but she submitted her case on only one ground of negligence, that of failure to keep a proper lookout. Defendants, except for some formal matters, which were admitted, separately answered with general denials. No contributory negligence, ordinance or violation thereof concerning any stop sign, street, or right of way, was pleaded in defense by any of the defendants, including Service Company. No affirmative defenses were raised in any of the pleadings.
Evidence presented at the trial justifies the following statement of facts necessary for an understanding of this case and its disposition herein:
There were stop signs which regulated north-south traffic on Louisiana Avenue at the intersection with Arsenal Street. There were no traffic controls on Arsenal Street. The bus was westbound in the traffic lane next to the middle line of Arsenal Street, which is 36 feet wide. A bus stop or zone was located on Arsenal Street across the intersection of Louisiana Avenue and Arsenal Street. Approximately 25 feet east of the east curb line of Louisiana Avenue, the bus started to pull or veer to the right to cross the intersection to the bus zone when the collision occurred. The right front corner of the bus collided in the intersection with the last two feet on the right side of the automobile.
The evidence was in conflict as to whether or not defendant Mullins stopped for a stop sign for northbound Louisiana Avenue traffic at Arsenal Street before entering the intersection. Defendant Mullins said he stopped, but two other witnesses said he did not. There was also conflicting evidence as to distances, speeds, and stopping distances involved.
The evidence presented by plaintiff supports her submission to the jury on the issue of negligence for failure to keep a proper lookout, and that said negligence resulted in injury to plaintiff. These issues are not contested here, and a detailed account of the evidence relative to these issues is not necessary.
During the defense of the case by Service Company, it offered Article V, Sections 33 and 35, of Ordinance No. 46687 of the City of St. Louis, which deal with stop signs, the duty of drivers to obey said signs and to yield the right of way. Counsel for co-defendants objected to its introduction on the grounds that the ordinance was not pleaded and that there was no cross-claim against co-defendants. The trial court sustained the objection. Later, Service Company again offered the ordinance and again, on objection, it was excluded by the court. Still later, Service Company again requested that the ordinance be admitted and read in evidence as a part of its defense. Counsel for co-defendants made the following objection:
Counsel for plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Favela
...Pitts, 105 Ga.App. 147, 123 S.E.2d 708 (1961); Hobbs v. Union Pac. R. Co., 62 Idaho 58, 108 P.2d 841 (1941); Fuerst v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 368 S.W.2d 550 (Mo.App.1963). See also L. & B. Equipment Co. v. McDonald, 58 N.M. 709, 275 P.2d 639 (1954); McKenzie v. King, 14 N.M. 375, 93 ......
-
Hayes v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 17470
...foundation" is too general to warrant sustaining. Mathis v. Glover, 714 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Mo.App.1986); Fuerst v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 368 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Mo.App.1963); 88 C.J.S. Trial § 124c, at p. 252 (1955). As to his relevancy objection, he did not specify why the testimony......
-
Smith v. Hofer, Inc.
...have so held. Birmingham v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 514 (Mo.1967); Hoehn v. Hampton, 483 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.App.1972); Fuerst v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 368 S.W.2d 550 (Mo.App.1963); Coffel v. Spradley, 495 S.W.2d 735 (Mo.App.1973). In Fuerst, that evidence was as to third party's actions claim......
-
Frey v. Barnes Hosp.
...to preserve appellant's argument that the use of the Dennis deposition constituted improper impeachment. Fuerst v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 368 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Mo.App.1963). Its use in the motion is void of meaning. A fair reading of the motion does not reveal whether appellant me......
-
Section 20 Pleadings and Procedural Problems
...(Mo. 1974). In any pleading, however, counsel should always set forth the exact ordinance involved, Fuerst v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 368 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. App. E.D. 1963), particularly when the taxpayer is seeking compliance by mandamus directed to the city. State ex rel. Emerson v. City o......