Fuerste v. Bemis

Decision Date05 March 1968
Docket NumberNo. 52814,52814
Citation156 N.W.2d 831
PartiesWilliam C. FUERSTE, Administrator of the Estate of Alice Georgette Sweeney, Deceased, Appellant, v. Earl BEMIS, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Hart & Hart, Waukon, and Fuerste & Carew, Dubuque, for appellant.

Patterson, Lorentzen, Duffield, Timmons, Wright & Irish, Des Moines, for appellee.

STUART, Justice.

The question presented here is whether the substantive law of Iowa or Wisconsin should apply to this action brought in Iowa by the Iowa administrator of the estate of a deceased Iowan against an Iowa resident for an alleged wrongful death which occurred on the Wisconsin highways.

Defendant and deceased traveled from Dubuque, Iowa to Lansing, Iowa in defendant's automobile to visit deceased's children. Their route took them over Wisconsin highways between Marquette, Iowa and Lansing. On the return trip along the same route this car was involved in a collision with another automobile in Wisconsin. Defendant was driving and deceased was riding as a guest passenger.

The administrator of deceased's estate brought this action in Dubuque County, Iowa alleging Wisconsin substantive law. The conflict between Iowa law and Wisconsin law is of utmost importance. Iowa has a guest statute--Wisconsin doesn't. Iowa has contributory negligence--Wisconsin has comparative negligence.

In ruling on a motion to adjudicate points of law, the trial court used the most significant relationship test and held the substantive law of Iowa, rather than that of the place of the injury, applied. As the petition charged negligence and as a guest under Iowa law can only recover from her host if he is reckless or under the influence of intoxicating liquor, section 321.494, Code of Iowa, the trial court also sustained a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The administrator has appealed.

I. Appellant urges us to adhere to the doctrine of lex loci delicti in determining whether the substantive law of Iowa or Wisconsin should apply. This rule, that the substantive law of the place of the wrong governs regardless of the law of the forum, has been applied to automobile guest statutes. Anno: 95 A.L.R.2d 12. For the past decade it has been subjected to severe criticism by legal writers. Cavers, 'A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem', 47 Harv.L.Rev. 173; Ehrenzweig, 'Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws', 69 Yale L.J. 595; Traynor, 'Is This Conflict Really Necessary?', 37 Texas L.Rev. 657; Leflar, 'The Law of Conflict of Laws', p. 217 et seq.; Weintraub, 'A Method for Solving Conflict Problems--Torts', 48 Cornell L.Q. 215. It has been characterized as being mechanical and charged with bearing no relationship to any relevant consideration for choosing one law over another in a torts--conflicts case. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205, 207. It '* * * ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred may have in the resolution of particular issues.' Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 95 A.L.R.2d 1.

The appellate courts of various jurisdictions are recognizing that the deficiencies of this rigid and often inappropriate rule more than offset the advantage of its relatively simple application and have been abandoning it in increasing numbers. Grant v. McAuliffe (1953), 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162; Emery v. Emery (1956), 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218; Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co. (1959), 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (1961), 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526; Babcock v. Jackson (1963), 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1964), 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796; Kuchinic v. McCrory (1966), 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897; Clark v. Clark (1966), 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205; Reich v. Purcell (1967), Cal., 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (and citations).

The American Law Institute which annunciated the rule of lex loci delicti in the Original Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 378, 384, abandoned it for the rule of 'most significant relationships' in Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, Tenative Draft No. 9, § 379. Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 274--275, 132 N.W.2d 410, 414. This rule is not without its critics. Ehrenzweig, 'The 'Most Significant Relationship' in the Conflicts Law of Torts', 28 Law & Contemp.Prob. 700.

Until 1965, Iowa had without noted exception applied the substantive law of the place of the injury in actions brought in Iowa. Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines National Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 161--162, 98 N.W. 918, 922, 102 N.W. 836; Redfern v. Redfern, 212 Iowa 454, 458--459, 236 N.W. 399, 401; Kingery v. Donnell, 222 Iowa 241, 245, 268 N.W. 617, 619; Fessenden v. Smith, 255 Iowa 1170, 1173, 124 N.W.2d 554, 555.

However in Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 278--279, 132 N.W.2d 410, 416 we discussed the problem of choice of law and concluded: '* * * that the better and more modern rule is that the determination as to the existence of actionable negligence is according to the law of the jurisdiction where the claimed tort occurred * * *. Questions as to who may maintain an action in Iowa, for whom, and the measure of damages are determined by the law of the forum * * *. When an Iowa administrator brings an action in the Iowa courts for the benefit of Iowa people and against an Iowa defendant his standing, his method of procedure and his measure of damages are according to Iowa law. To use the modern term he has made his 'choice of law' and must abide thereby. The Iowa Guest Statute and the dissimilarity with Minnesota law in this particular is not involved in the case before us.'

It should be noted the law of the forum was there applied because all significant relationships were with the forum state. We were not there, nor are we here, confronted with a situation where Iowa as the forum state had no strong interest in the litigation. See Reich v. Purcell, Cal., 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727.

In Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 548--551, 133 N.W.2d 907, 908--910, a wife sought to recover for injuries allegedly sustained by reason of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by her husband in Wisconsin. We held the substantive law of Iowa, the state of the marriage domicile and the forum, rather than the law of the place of the wrong, governed plaintiff's right to maintain an action against her husband for an unintentional tort.

No useful purpose would be served in reviewing the authorities considered in Fabricius and Flogel. Both cases indicate our acceptance of the rule of 'most significant relationships' in resolving the choice of substantive law. However, in Fabricius we specifically refrained from applying the rule to the guest statute. We see no reason why the rule should not be used in determining the substantive law to be applied to each issue in litigation involving a tortsconflicts question. This is particularly true of the guest statute as the legal significance of the relationship should not shift as the automobile passes from state to state. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133.

'The merit of such a rule is that 'it gives to the place 'having the most interest in the problem' paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context' and thereby allows the forum to apply 'the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the outcome of particular litigation ". * * *' Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481--482, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 95 A.L.R.2d 1. See also Reich v. Purcell, Cal., 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727, 730.

We realize the rule will not be easy to apply in instances where the relationships are more complex. See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum.L.Rev. 1212, 1219 et seq. However, this is a rapidly developing field of law and there is no need to anticipate the more difficult problems which...

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