Fujiko Furusho v. Acheson, Civ. No. 967.
| Decision Date | 23 January 1951 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 967. |
| Citation | 94 F. Supp. 1021 |
| Parties | FUJIKO FURUSHO v. ACHESON, Secretary of State. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Wilfred C. Tsukiyama, Honolulu, T. H., A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.
Ray J. O'Brien, U. S. Atty., District of Hawaii, Howard K. Hoddick, Asst. U. S. Atty., District of Hawaii, and Winston C. Ingman, Asst. U. S. Atty., District of Hawaii, all of Honolulu, T. H., for defendant.
Basically, the operative facts in this Nationality Act suit, 8 U.S.C.A. § 903 are of the same nature as those which support the decisions in the several unappealed cases cited in the footnote.1
In other words, this, too, is a case of a girl, a dual citizen (United States and Japan), domiciled in Japan since 1932, voting in elections in Occupied Japan in 1946 and 1947.
Like the courts whose decisions have been cited, this Court is also of the view that these facts did not effect the expatriation of the plaintiff from the United States, for (a) Occupied Japan is not a "foreign state," and (b) the elections were not "political" within the meaning of 8 U. S.C.A. § 801(e). See cases cited under footnote 1.
Additionally, expatriation being a voluntary act involving legal consequences so serious as to be almost a matter of life itself, the evidence that the act specified by the statute was committed intentionally, with knowledge of the consequences, must be, to borrow a phrase,2 "clear, unequivocal, and convincing".3 The evidence here is not of that character.
But, the defendant says, this Court can not enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff because the facts clearly indicate that as a matter of law only the United States District Court for the District of Columbia can authoritatively state whether or not the plaintiff is a citizen of the United States.
This position is based upon the provision of 8 U.S.C.A. § 903 which says suits such as this may be brought in the Federal Court in the District of Columbia, or in such a court in the district where the petitioner "claims a permanent residence". Here the Court has found, and so stated during the trial, that since plaintiff at age twelve moved to Japan with her parents her domicile has been and still is identical with that of her father, to wit, in Japan. Accordingly, the plaintiff's "claim" of her sister's home in Hawaii as her "permanent residence" is a "claim" founded, not upon fact, but upon a wish. From this the defendant argues that plaintiff's "claim" is not only defective as it is not tied to an existing domicile of her own in Hawaii, but also because there stands revealed a lack of good faith by reason of claiming something that plaintiff knew did not exist.
While it is a legal truism that no amount of wishful thinking alone will bring about a change of domicile, I can not agree that this Court is lacking in authority to enter a judgment. The point is one of venue rather than jurisdiction.4 Secondly, the phrase "claims a permanent residence" should be and is given a liberal construction in harmony with the remedial purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, where, as here, such a "claim" is based upon a wholesome wish and desire to re-establish an old domicile, coupled with the intention and ability to carry out that desire as soon as physically and legally possible, the venue requirement of 8 U.S.C.A. § 903 is satisfied. Such a "claim" is of course readily distinguishable from one which is made by a petitioner for no good reason at all and is designed obviously to put the defendant at a disadvantage. Nothing of that sort is in any way here involved.
Finally, for some odd reason, although the State Department's position was solely that the plaintiff lost her United States citizenship by voting in April 1946 in an election in Occupied Japan, the plaintiff, having 8 U.S.C.A. § 801(d) in mind, alleged in her complaint that her teaching in the public schools of Japan did not cause her to lose her United States citizenship because she was unaware of the fact that during the war the now...
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Villarreal v. Horn
...(D.D.C.2010) (granting motion under Rule 12(b)(3) to transfer venue to district of inmate's residence); see Fujiko Furusho v. Acheson , 94 F.Supp. 1021, 1023 (D.Haw.1951) (citing Acheson v. Yee King Gee , 184 F.2d 382 (9th Cir.1950) ) (holding requirement that action be brought where plaint......
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Villarreal v. Horn
...There is authority for the proposition that the residence requirement in the 1940 Act was a venue provision, see Fujiko Furusho v. Acheson, 94 F.Supp. 1021, 1023 (D. Haw. 1951) (citing Acheson v. Yee King Gee , 184 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1950) ) (holding requirement that action be brought where......
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Tanaka v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
...Officer for the first time. Tanaka testified that he first voted in 1946 or 1947 at a national election when elections were first held in Japan after World War II, and at every election thereafter, until 1956, including an election on June 4, 1950.6 Tanaka, answering through an interpreter ......
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Hichino Uyeno v. Acheson
...has developed in the lower courts. The latest published opinion on the subject, — that by Judge McLaughlin in Fujiko Furusho v. Acheson, D. C. Hawaii, 1951, 94 F.Supp. 1021, — contains a complete list of the published opinions. They need not be reviewed here. The aim of the Congress in enac......