Fujiwara v. Clark

• Decision Date: 10 August 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 78-0062.
• Citation: 477 F. Supp. 822
• Parties: Elizabeth FUJIWARA and Ira Vanterpool, Plaintiffs, v. Charles G. CLARK, Individually and in his capacity as Superintendent, Department of Education, State of Hawaii, Thomas Yamashita, Individually and in his capacity as Director, Management Audit and Civil Rights Branch, Department of Education, State of Hawaii, Rev. Darrow L. K. Aiona, Hubert P. Minn, George S. Adachi, Dr. Richard Ando, Marion Saunders, Ruth Tabrah, Howard I. Takenaka, Hiroshi Yamashita and Noburo Yonamine, in their capacities as Members, Board of Education, State of Hawaii, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

477 F. Supp. 822

Elizabeth FUJIWARA and Ira Vanterpool, Plaintiffs, v. Charles G. CLARK, Individually and in his capacity as Superintendent, Department of Education, State of Hawaii, Thomas Yamashita, Individually and in his capacity as Director, Management Audit and Civil Rights Branch, Department of Education, State of Hawaii, Rev. Darrow L. K. Aiona, Hubert P. Minn, George S. Adachi, Dr. Richard Ando, Marion Saunders, Ruth Tabrah, Howard I. Takenaka, Hiroshi Yamashita and Noburo Yonamine, in their capacities as Members, Board of Education, State of Hawaii, Defendants.

Civ. No. 78-0062.

United States District Court, D. Hawaii.

August 10, 1979.

Paul Alston, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Fujiwara.

American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mary Blaine Durant, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Vanterpool.

Lawrence D. Kumabe, Robin K. Campaniano, Deputy Attys. Gen., Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SAMUEL P. KING, Chief Judge.

On February 25, 1977 and June 3, 1977, respectively, plaintiff Vanterpool, an experienced worker in civil rights matters, and plaintiff Fujiwara, the former executive director of the local ACLU affiliate, were hired by the Department of Education hereinafter "DOE" as certified non-probationary temporary employees in the Management Audit and Civil Rights hereinafter "MACR" Branch. Plaintiff Vanterpool, hired as a Staff Specialist II (equal education opportunities coordinator), reported to defendant Yamashita, Director of the MACR Branch; plaintiff Fujiwara, who was classified as a Staff Specialist I (equal education opportunities specialist), reported to plaintiff Vanterpool. Plaintiffs were hired to provide temporary technical assistance for the remainder of the fiscal year 1976-77 in the programing and monitoring of the DOE's compliance with the several applicable federal laws and regulations in the civil rights area, especially Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.

Unbeknownst to defendants, plaintiffs scheduled several press conferences to publicize a Pacific Regional Conference on Civil Rights Compliance in Schools that was to be sponsored by the DOE. Plaintiffs informed the news media that the DOE was not in full compliance with civil rights legislation requiring equal opportunities for students, equal employment opportunities, and nondiscrimination based on race, sex or handicap. Despite defendant Clark's subsequent warning against holding any news conferences without first advising defendant Yamashita, plaintiffs met the press again without defendants' authorization on December 26, 1977 to discuss the civil rights conference. During this press conference, plaintiff Vanterpool predicted that the state would lose $30.5 million in U. S. education funds by failing to comply with equal opportunity laws. Defendant Clark reacted strongly to plaintiffs' publicized opinions and held a news conference to refute plaintiffs' contentions.

On January 30, 1978, defendant Yamashita submitted by letter a Recommendation for Discharge of Mr. Vanterpool and a Recommendation for Discharge of Ms. Fujiwara to defendant Clark, the Superintendent of the DOE, pursuant to Regulation # 5110 of the School Code and Article V, Rights of the Employer of Unit 6 Educational Officers Collective Bargaining Agreement. Each letter set forth "facts leading to my recommendation for discharge" which included, inter alia, that plaintiffs scheduled a news media conference concerning a civil rights conference without advising defendant Yamashita or defendant Clark that they would be discussing matters of statewide concern to the DOE; that plaintiffs subsequently called two other news conferences in which they incorrectly maintained that the DOE would lose $30.5 million in federal funds if equal education opportunity laws were not complied with by July 1978 and that the DOE was not in full compliance with Title IX requirements; and that plaintiffs continued to hold news conferences concerning the civil rights compliance program despite several warnings by defendant Clark against making public statements about the DOE without advising defendants Yamashita or Clark.

Defendant Yamashita related additional reasons for terminating plaintiff Vanterpool: that plaintiff Vanterpool had distributed and incorrectly referred to statistical summaries which erroneously showed that the DOE was not in compliance with Title IX; that he failed to submit to defendant Yamashita an assigned report; that he drafted an unacceptable version of Title IX guidelines; that he performed certain departmental actions, such as hiring an employee and scheduling speakers for the Pacific Regional Conference on Civil Rights, without prior approval from defendant Yamashita in violation of specific instructions from defendant Clark; that he hired an employee without following established department procedures; and that he promised an honorarium to one speaker at the Pacific Regional Conference on Civil Rights in violation of the departmental regulations that govern such payments.

Defendant Yamashita also recited additional reasons to support his recommendation to terminate plaintiff Fujiwara: that she continually used the copy facilities of the DOE law library to copy legal documents for her personal use which were unrelated to her work despite defendant Yamashita's warning against such actions; and that she ignored defendant Yamashita's request that she apprise him of her weekly activities, particularly those of statewide concern.

By letter dated January 31, 1978, defendant Clark notified each plaintiff of his receipt of defendant Yamashita's recommendations and suspended them from employment without pay, effective January 31, 1978, pending final disposition of the recommendation for discharge. Defendant Clark subsequently terminated the employment of plaintiffs, effective February 8, 1978.

Plaintiffs' terminations and the incidents leading up to the terminations resulted in the complaint filed in this court on February 24, 1978. In their claim for injunctive relief and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs allege that they were discharged for exercising rights of free speech guaranteed to them by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, in violation of substantive and procedural rights of due process guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that defendants' wanton and reckless conduct was in complete disregard for their constitutional rights and caused them irreparable injury. Attached to the complaint was plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial of the legal issues pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A temporary restraining order was denied on February 24, but a preliminary injunction was granted on March 8, 1978. As a result, plaintiffs were reinstated in their respective positions but immediately placed on administrative leave.

On March 8, 1978 plaintiffs' Motion for Permanent Injunction was set for hearing by this Court on March 21, 1978. After hearing extensive oral arguments on March 20, April 6 and April 18, this Court issued a "Final Order Granting Permanent Injunction" on June 29, 1978 that restored plaintiffs to their former positions with all accrued employee benefits and enjoined defendants from disciplining, demoting or dismissing plaintiffs primarily because of their statements to the press. Under order of the Court, the injunction was immediately executed. The injunction embodied a memorandum of decision issued on June 8 wherein this Court specifically reserved the issues of damages, attorneys' fees and costs for further determination. The Court also stated that defendants' other reasons for terminating plaintiffs which were set forth in defendant Yamashita's letters of January 30, 1978 had not been brought to plaintiffs' attention in a disciplinary context until they received the letters. The injunction was premised on a finding that plaintiffs had been fired in substantial part for exercising their right to speak on issues of public importance in violation of protection accorded them by the First Amendment.

Subsequent to the issuance of the injunctive order plaintiffs were reinstated with back pay and all accrued benefits.

On February 15, 1979, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability for Damages of defendants Clark and Yamashita. In this motion, plaintiffs contend that because this Court has already determined that defendants wrongfully discharged plaintiffs in substantial part because of their exercise of protected First Amendment rights, they can only evade individual liability for damages by proving that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs further allege that no evidence has been or could be produced to sustain a finding of qualified immunity for defendants.

On March 2, 1979, defendants filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss.¹ Defendants have moved to dismiss all pending claims of the plaintiffs on the grounds that defendants, as state officials, are entitled to qualified immunity from individual liability for damages under § 1983; that plaintiffs, in proceeding to trial on the permanent injunction motion without first pursuing their earlier demand for a jury trial on all legal claims and requesting separate trials on the legal and equitable claims of this action under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, waived all pending legal claims which included the claim for damages; and that the injunctive order, issued after a hearing on the merits, provided full and final relief to the plaintiffs which extinguished their cause of action.

In their respective motions, the parties have asserted that the facts are undisputed and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A hearing on the parties' motions was held on March 14, 1979.

In their Verified Complaint of February 24, 1978, plaintiffs request an award of special, general and...