Fuld v. The Palestine Liberation Org. (PLO)

• Docket Number: 22-76-cv (L),22-496-cv (Con)
• Decision Date: 08 September 2023
• Parties: Miriam Fuld, individually, as personal representative and administrator of the Estate of Ari Yoel Fuld, deceased, and as natural guardian of plaintiff Natan Shai Fuld, Natan Shai Fuld, minor, by his next friend and guardian Miriam Fuld, Naomi Fuld, Tamar Gila Fuld, and Eliezer Yakir Fuld, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The Palestine Liberation Organization and The Palestinian Authority (a/k/a "The Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority," and/or "The Palestinian Council," and/or "The Palestinian National Authority"), Defendants-Appellees.[*] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor-Appellant,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

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Miriam Fuld, individually, as personal representative and administrator of the Estate of Ari Yoel Fuld, deceased, and as natural guardian of plaintiff Natan Shai Fuld, Natan Shai Fuld, minor, by his next friend and guardian Miriam Fuld, Naomi Fuld, Tamar Gila Fuld, and Eliezer Yakir Fuld, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor-Appellant,
v.
The Palestine Liberation Organization and The Palestinian Authority (a/k/a "The Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority," and/or "The Palestinian Council," and/or "The Palestinian National Authority"), Defendants-Appellees.^[*]

No. 22-76-cv (L), 22-496-cv (Con)

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

September 8, 2023

Argued: May 3, 2023

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The plaintiffs, several family members of a United States citizen killed in an overseas terrorist attack, appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Furman, J.) dismissing their claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") and the Palestinian Authority ("PA") for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Government, as intervenor in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(c), also appeals from that judgment. On appeal, both the plaintiffs and the Government argue that the district court erred in finding unconstitutional the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 ("PSJVTA"), Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 903(c), 133 Stat. 2534, 3082, the statute on which the plaintiffs relied to allege personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The PSJVTA specifically provides that the PLO and the PA "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in any civil action pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, irrespective of "the date of the occurrence of the act of international terrorism" at issue, upon engaging in certain forms of post-enactment conduct, namely (1) making payments, directly or indirectly, to the designees or families of incarcerated or deceased terrorists, respectively, whose acts of terror injured or killed a United States national, or (2) undertaking any activities within the United States, subject to a handful of exceptions. Id. § 2334(e). We conclude that the PSJVTA's "deemed consent" provision is inconsistent with the dictates of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

ALLON KEDEM, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, D.C. (Kent A. Yalowitz, Avishai D. Don, David C. Russell, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, New York, NY, Dirk C. Phillips, Stephen K. Wirth, Arnold &Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, D.C., Jeffrey Fleischmann, The Law Office of Jeffrey Fleischmann, P.C., New York, NY, Samuel Silverman,

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The Silverman Law Firm PLLC, New City, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

MITCHELL R. BERGER, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Washington, D.C. (Gassan A. Baloul, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

BENJAMIN H. TORRANCE, Assistant United States Attorney, Of Counsel for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY (Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Sharon Swingle, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for Intervenor-Appellant United States of America.

Tejinder Singh, Sparacino PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Abraham D. Sofaer and Louis J. Freeh in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Intervenor-Appellant.

J. Carl Cecere, Cecere PC, Dallas, TX, for Amici Curiae Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Rep. Claudia Tenney, Rep. Bradley E. Schneider, Sen. James Lankford, Sen. Marco Rubio, Rep. Kathleen Rice, Rep. Lee Zeldin, Rep. Theodore Deutch, and Rep. Grace Meng in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Intervenor-Appellant.

Joshua E. Abraham, Abraham Esq. PLLC, New York, NY, for Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars Philip C. Bobbitt, Michael C. Dorf, and H. Jefferson Powell in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

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Before: LEVAL AND BIANCO, Circuit Judges, AND KOELTL, District Judge. ^[**]

KOELTL, DISTRICT JUDGE

The plaintiffs, several family members of a United States citizen killed in an overseas terrorist attack, appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Furman, J.) dismissing their claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") and the Palestinian Authority ("PA"). The district court dismissed those claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The Government, as intervenor in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(c), also appeals from the judgment.

At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 ("PSJVTA"), Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 903(c), 133 Stat. 2534, 3082, the federal statute on which the plaintiffs relied to allege personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The PSJVTA was enacted for the precise purpose of preventing dismissals based on lack of personal jurisdiction in cases just like this one - civil actions against the PLO and the PA pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act ("ATA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which provides a damages remedy for United States nationals injured "by reason of an act of international terrorism," id. § 2333(a).

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Congress crafted the PSJVTA in response to a series of judicial decisions, all arising out of civil ATA cases related to terrorist activity abroad, which held that federal courts had no general or specific personal jurisdiction over the PLO and the PA. The resulting statute reflects a legislative effort to create personal jurisdiction over those entities based on alleged consent, which, when validly given, may constitute an independent constitutional basis for subjecting a nonresident defendant to litigation in a particular forum. The PSJVTA specifically provides that the PLO and the PA "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction in [any] civil [ATA] action," irrespective of "the date of the occurrence of the act of international terrorism" at issue, upon engaging in certain forms of post-enactment conduct, namely (1) making payments, directly or indirectly, to the designees or families of incarcerated or deceased terrorists, respectively, whose acts of terror injured or killed a United States national, or (2) undertaking any activities within the United States, subject to a handful of exceptions. Id. § 2334(e).

The district court determined that this "deemed consent" provision was an unconstitutional attempt to create personal jurisdiction over the defendants where none existed, and it accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs' civil ATA action for lack

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of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2). Both the plaintiffs and the Government (together, "appellants") challenge that conclusion on appeal, arguing principally that the exercise of this "deemed consent" jurisdiction under the PSJVTA satisfies the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

We conclude that the PSJVTA's provision for "deemed consent" to personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with the requirements of constitutional due process. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment dismissing this case.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs are the widowed spouse and children of Ari Yoel Fuld, a United States citizen who was fatally stabbed during a September 2018 terrorist attack outside a shopping mall in the West Bank. In the aftermath of Fuld's death, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the PLO and the PA, alleging that these defendants had "encouraged, incentivized, and assisted" the nonparty who committed the attack on Fuld. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. The PA, established in 1993 pursuant to the Oslo Accords, is the non-sovereign and interim governing body of parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (collectively referred to here as "Palestine"). The PLO, an entity founded in 1964, conducts Palestine's foreign

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affairs and serves as a Permanent Observer to the United Nations ("UN") on behalf of the Palestinian people. The plaintiffs seek monetary relief from both defendants pursuant to the ATA, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which, as relevant here, provides United States nationals "injured . . . by reason of an act of international terrorism" with a civil damages remedy against "any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance [to]," the perpetrator of the attack. Id. § 2333(a), (d)(2).

Several years before these plaintiffs initiated their case, and prior to the passage of the PSJVTA, this Court decided Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Waldman I"), cert denied sub nom. Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 138 S.Ct. 1438 (2018) (mem.), which arose out of litigation involving civil ATA claims similar in key respects to those asserted here.^[1] The Waldman plaintiffs, a group of United States citizens injured or killed during terror attacks in Israel and the estates or survivors of such citizens, sued the PLO and the PA for money damages pursuant to the ATA, alleging that the defendants had provided material support to the nonparties who carried out

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the attacks. After more than a decade of litigation and a substantial jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants filed their appeal in this Court, where they reasserted their longstanding objection that the claims against them should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

This Court ultimately agreed with the defendants, concluding that dismissal was required because, notwithstanding the "unquestionably horrific" nature of the attacks underlying the plaintiffs' claims, "[t]he district...