Fulfer v. WinCo Holdings
| Decision Date | 24 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:15-cv-00999-TLN-EPG,1:15-cv-00999-TLN-EPG |
| Parties | BRADLEY FULFER, Plaintiff, v. WINCO HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant WinCo Holdings, Inc. (hereafter, "Defendant"). (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff Bradley Fulfer (hereafter, "Plaintiff") filed an opposition. (ECF No. 43.) Plaintiff included with his reply papers numerous objections to the evidence cited in Defendant's summary judgment motion. (See, e.g., ECF No. 43-7; ECF No. 43-8.) Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff's opposition. (ECF No. 46.) Along with that reply, Defendant filed its own evidentiary objections to Plaintiff's declaration (ECF No. 46-3), as well as responses to Plaintiff's evidentiary objections raised regarding Defendant's evidence (see, e.g., ECF No. 46-5; ECF No. 46-6).
The Court has carefully considered this case and reviewed all the materials provided by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 30).
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Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are either explicitly or effectively undisputed by the parties.
Defendant is an employee-owned supermarket with various locations, including one in Modesto, California. (ECF No. 30-3 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff began working at Defendant's Modesto location as a part-time freight stocker in 2011. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 3.) At all relevant times, Defendant's attendance policy applied to Plaintiff's employment. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶¶ 49-50.) That policy stated that Defendant's employees could be disciplined, up to and including termination, in accordance with a system of progressive discipline. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 51.) The exact nature of the progressive discipline that could be imposed in any given employee's situation was set forth in an agreement between Defendant and the bargaining unit known as WinCo Foods #21 Hourly Employee Association, which was titled "Hourly Employee Working Conditions & Wage Agreement." (ECF No. 30-3 at 11.) At all relevant times, Plaintiff was subject to this agreement and Defendant's attendance policy. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶¶ 5-6.)
The agreement that governed Plaintiff's employment with Defendant contained a number of provisions relevant to the instant suit. The agreement generally provided that employees who worked shifts of more than five hours would be provided a thirty-minute meal period (i.e., a lunch break). (ECF No. 30-3 at 15.) The agreement more specifically provided that: (i) if an employee's shift was between six and seven hours long, this lunch break had to be taken between the second and fifth hours of work; and (ii) if an employee's shift was more than seven hours long, this lunch break had to be taken between the third and fifth hours of work. (ECF No. 30-3 at 15.) Defendant's policy was "not to allow employees to skip their lunch period." (ECF No. 30-3 at 15.)
Defendant also maintained a Reasonable Workplace Accommodations Policy. (See ECF No. 32 at 105-09.) In a section labeled, "Process to Request a Reasonable Workplace Accommodation," this policy stated that an employee requesting an accommodation could do so"through various means, including in person, in writing, or by providing a physician's note that denotes that the employee has a need for accommodation." (ECF No. 32 at 107.) Under the "Employee Responsibilities" section of this policy, "employees seeking a reasonable workplace accommodation are expected to provide necessary and appropriate medical documentation, when applicable." (ECF No. 32 at 106.)
Under the progressive discipline system that governed Plaintiff's employment with Defendant, any employee who accumulated nine or more attendance points in a rolling three-month period, or who accumulated fifteen or more points in a rolling twelve-month period, was subject to discipline. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 51; ECF No. 30-3 at 9.) Each absence resulted in three points. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 52; ECF No. 30-3 at 9.) An absence was defined as, "loss of time from work that is approved by management and NOT caused by: vacation, holiday, jury duty or subpoena to court, funeral leave, military leave, industrial injury, State or Federal Family Medical Leaves or an authorized leave of absence beyond seven (7) days." (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 52.) Each incomplete shift or tardy arrival resulted in two disciplinary points. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 53; ECF No. 30-3 at 9.) An incomplete shift was defined as the failure to complete a shift for which the employee was scheduled, while a tardy was defined as punching in three or more minutes after the scheduled shift starting time or return from a lunch break. (ECF No. 30-3 at 9.)
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, a first instance of "inadequate performance or improper activity will be discussed with the individual verbally by the store manager, assistant manager, and/or department manager," with a memorandum of said discussion being placed in the affected employee's file. (ECF No. 30-3 at 11.) "A second instance of the same or any other type will result in written warning which the employee will be asked to acknowledge." (ECF No. 30-3 at 11.) "A third instance of any violation of company policies or any type of inadequate performance can result in termination." (ECF No. 30-3 at 11.)
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On April 2, 2014, Plaintiff received a verbal warning for accumulating twenty-two attendance-related points over a twelve-month period. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 55.) The parties dispute whether this verbal warning was consistent with Defendant's attendance policy, with Plaintiff arguing that he "unjustifiably received" six of these twenty-two points based on his nonappearance for work between September 27 and November 15, 2013. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 55.) Plaintiff asserts that he should not have been assessed disciplinary points for these two instances because he was unable to work on those dates due to stress and panic attacks "as a result of his medical condition." (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 55.)
Plaintiff received another warning — this time memorialized in writing because he had already received a prior verbal warning — on June 19, 2014, for accumulating fifteen attendance-related points over a separate twelve-month period. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 56.) The parties dispute whether this written warning was consistent with Defendant's attendance policy, with Plaintiff arguing that he "unjustifiably received" five of these fifteen disciplinary points based on his nonappearance for work on April 11 and June 3, 2014. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 56.) Plaintiff asserts that he should not have been assessed disciplinary points for these two instances because he was ill on April 11, and he had a staph infection in his nose on June 3. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 56.)
On July 3, 2014, Plaintiff was absent from work and accumulated three attendance-related points as a result, apparently because he was suffering from the stomach flu. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶¶ 57, 58.) Defendant then suspended Plaintiff from July 7, 2014 through July 9, 2014, on the basis that he accumulated seventeen attendance-related points in a twelve-month period. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 58.) The parties dispute whether this suspension was consistent with Defendant's attendance policy, with Plaintiff arguing that he "unjustifiably received 3 points on July 2, 2014 because he was unable to come into work as a result of the stomach flu." (ECF No. 46-1 ¶¶ 57, 58.)
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Plaintiff injured his knee in January of 2015, and sought treatment for that injury from Dr. Tushar Modi. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 59.) On January 22, Dr. Modi wrote a note to Defendant stating that Plaintiff "should be able to do modified duties" at work between January 22 and January 29. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 60; ECF No. 46-2 ¶ 22.) Also on January 22, Plaintiff filled out a form titled and characterized as Defendant's Reasonable Workplace Accommodation Request Form. (ECF No. 46-2 ¶ 26; ECF No. 43-4 at 42.) On this form, Plaintiff indicated that it was difficult for him to walk or kneel, and that he was requesting modified work duties to allow him to avoid having to walk or kneel. (ECF No. 46-2 ¶ 26; ECF No. 43-4 at 42.) Defendant received both the January 22 note and the Reasonable Workplace Accommodation Request Form shortly after they were created. (ECF No. 46-2 ¶¶ 23, 27.)
Defendant did not place Plaintiff on any modified duties in January 2015. (ECF No. 46-2 ¶ 31.) The parties dispute why this decision — or lack thereof — was made. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant — through an employee named Jennifer Amaral to whom Plaintiff explained the extent of the modified duties he was seeking — did not accommodate his request for modified duty because his injury did not occur on the job. (See ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 16; ECF No. 43-6 at 49-50.) Defendant, on the other hand, suggests that it was not required to accommodate Plaintiff's request for "modified duties" because Plaintiff failed to obtain clarification from Dr. Modi about what was meant by that term. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 61.) In any event, Defendant returned to Dr. Modi on January 23, at which point Dr. Modi excused Plaintiff from work entirely through January 29. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶¶ 62-64.)
On January 29, Plaintiff worked a shift that began at 11:30 p.m. on that day and concluded at 6:49 a.m. on January 30. (ECF No. 46-1 ¶¶ 64-65.) During Plaintiff's next scheduled shift that began at 11:30 p.m. on January 30, however, he left work early due to swelling and pain in his injured knee. (ECF No. 46-2 ¶ 37; ECF No. 43-3 at 3.) The parties dispute whether Plaintiff left this scheduled shift early in order to receive additional medical treatment for his knee, or whether he...
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