Fuller v. Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. C 05-92-MWB.,C 05-92-MWB. |
| Citation | 456 F.Supp.2d 1044 |
| Parties | Clara Reece FULLER, Plaintiff, v. ALLIANT ENERGY CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Clara Reece Fuller, Kansas City, KS, pro se.
Karen D. Renwick, Walters, Bender, Strohbehn & Vaughan, P.C., Kansas City, MO, Kelly R. Baier, Laura C. Mueller, Bradley & Riley, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1050
A. Procedural Background ............................ 1050
B. Factual Background ............................... 1051
1. The pertinent record .......................... 1051
2. Background to Fuller's employment ............. 1052
3. Absenteeism ................................... 1052
4. Harassment and disparate treatment ............ 1057
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS .................................... 1058
A. Summary Judgment Standards ......................... 1058
B. Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies ......... 1061
1. Arguments of the parties ...................... 1061
2. Analysis ...................................... 1061
C. Fuller's Sex Discrimination Claim .................. 1063
1. Arguments of the parties ...................... 1063
2. Sufficiency of Fuller's prima facie case ...... 1064
a. Qualification .............................. 1065
b. Different treatment ........................ 1065
3. Pretext and inferences of discrimination ....... 1066
D. Fuller's Race Discrimination Claim ............... 1067
1. Arguments of the parties ...................... 1067
2. Adequacy of Fuller's prima facie case ......... 1068
3. Pretext and inferences of discrimination ...... 1070
E. Fuller's Disability Discrimination Claim ......... 1071
1. Arguments of the parties ...................... 1071
2. Analysis ...................................... 1072
a. Abandonment of the claim ................... 1072
b. Sufficiency of the claim under the. ADA .... 1072
c. Sufficiency of the claim under the FMLA .... 1073
III. CONCLUSION ......................................... 1073
This action involves the plaintiffs claims of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and disability against her former employer. The employer seeks summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff was not disabled; was not qualified for her position or any other position that she sought owing to excessive absenteeism; did not suffer any adverse employment action when her employment ended, because she abandoned her job rather than provide adequate documentation to support her claims for bereavement or other leave; and cannot demonstrate that the employer's explanation for its actions— that the employer was responding appropriately to the plaintiffs abuse of the employer's leave policies—is a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiff counters with a litany of allegations of unfair treatment, which she apparently contends demonstrates a discriminatory animus behind all of the defendant's actions. Thus, the court must determine whether or not the plaintiff has generated genuine issues of material fact on her claims that would preclude summary judgment in the defendant's favor.
Plaintiff Clara Reece Fuller, who is prosecuting this action pro se, filed this action on September 27, 2004, against her former employer, Alliant Energy, in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, Kansas City Division.1 Fuller alleges that she suffered sex, race, and disability discrimination and has identified the categories of discriminatory action, generally, as termination of employment, failure to promote, unequal terms and conditions of employment, reduction in wages, retaliation, and "other acts." Complaint (docket no. 40, Kansas District Court docket no. 4), at 3. After various proceedings, of no consequence to the present ruling, a judge of the Kansas federal court entered an order on May 18, 2005, granting the defendant's Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, Transfer Due To Improper Venue to the extent that this action was transferred to this court.
On March 8, 2006, the defendant moved for summary judgment (docket no. 72), and after an extension of time to do so, Fuller resisted that motion on May 1, 2006 (docket no. 76). On May 3, 2006, the then-presiding judge recused herself on the basis that the defendant had identified in its Local Rule 3.2 and 81.1 Statement of Interest an association between the defendant and an entity listed on that judge's "conflicts list." Therefore, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned. See Recusal Order (docket no. 77).
Upon the undersigned's review of the newly-assigned case, the undersigned noted that, in its motion for summary judgment, Alliant had identified Fuller's claims as discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and illness or disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and that it was apparent that the defendant sought summary judgment on the entirety of the plaintiffs Complaint. The court, recognizing the requirement "that pro se complaints be construed even more liberally than counseled pleadings," Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir.2006), construed Fuller's pro se complaint to attempt to assert a claim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, as well as claims of race discrimination in violation of Title VII and disability discrimination in violation of the ADA. Therefore, by order dated May 5, 2006 (docket no. 78), the court established a schedule for the amendment and briefing of the defendant's March 8, 2006, Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 72), to address all three of the plaintiffs claims, which consist of claims of race and sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII, and disability discrimination, in violation of the ADA.
On May 19, 2006, Alliant filed an Amended Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 80), seeking summary judgment in its favor on all of Fuller's claims. Fuller filed an Amended Resistance To Defendant's Amended Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 85) on June 30, 2006. After an extension of time to do so, Alliant filed a Reply (docket no. 89) in further support of its motion for summary judgment on July 20, 2006. After the fact, Fuller objected to the court's order granting Alliant an extension of time to file its reply, and also objected to the court's May 5, 2006, order (docket no. 78), which had construed her complaint as asserting sex discrimination as well as race and disability discrimination, and which had afforded Alliant the opportunity to amend its motion for summary judgment to address all of Fuller's claims. See Plaintiffs Resistance To Defendant's Motion For Extension To File Reply Pleadings In Support Of Summary Judgment (docket no. 88). The court overruled those objections by order dated July 21, 2006 (docket no. 90).
Neither party requested oral arguments on Alliant's amended motion for summary judgment. Therefore, that motion is now fully submitted.
The court's determination of what facts are actually disputed at the summary judgment stage of these proceedings has been hampered by Fuller's failure to file a response to Alliant's statement of facts as required by the applicable local rule. Local rule 56.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
b. Resisting Party's Documents.
A party resisting a motion for summary judgment must, within 21 days after service of the motion, file contemporaneously all of the following:
* * * * * *
2. A response to the [moving party's] statement of material facts in which the resisting party expressly admits, denies, or qualifies each of the moving party's numbered statements of fact, filed as an electronic attachment to the brief under the same docket entry;
3. A statement of additional material facts that the resisting party contends preclude summary judgment, filed as an electronic attachment to the brief under the same docket entry[.]
N.D. IA. L.R. 56.1(b)(2). Instead of filing both the required response to Alliant's statement of material facts pursuant to N.D. IA. L.R. 56.1(b)(2) and a statement of additional facts" pursuant to N.D. IA. L.R. 56.1(b)(3), Fuller filed only an Amended Statement Of Undisputed Facts In Support Of Plaintiffs Resistance To Summary Judgment, which is apparently intended to comply with N.D. IA. L.R. 56.1(b)(3).
The local rule provides, further, as follows:
A response to an individual statement of material fact that is not expressly admitted must be supported by references to those specific pages, paragraphs, or parts of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, exhibits, and affidavits that support the resisting party's refusal to admit the statement, with citations to the appendix containing that part of the record. The failure to respond, with appropriate citations to the appendix, to an individual statement of material fact constitutes an admission of that fact.
N.D. IA. L.R. 56.1(b) (unnumbered paragraph) (emphasis added). Because Fuller failed to file a response to Alliant's Statement Of Facts as required by N.D. IA. L.R. 56.1(b)(2), the court could treat all of the facts set forth in Alliant's Statement Of Facts as admitted. The court has done just that quite recently in another case in which a responding party failed to comply with N.D. L. L.R. 56.1(b)(2). See Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Services—Iowa Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2006 WL 2848612, *3-*4 (N.D.Iowa Oct.5, 2006). In that case, the court...
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