Fuller v. Birmingham-Jefferson Cnty. Transit Auth.
| Decision Date | 20 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | 1091592.,1090436 |
| Citation | 147 So.3d 907 |
| Parties | Marcus FULLER and Joseph Mitchell v. BIRMINGHAM–JEFFERSON COUNTY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 725 Employees Contributory Retirement Plan et al. Birmingham–Jefferson County Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 725 Employees Contributory Retirement Plan et al. v. Marcus Fuller and Joseph Mitchell. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
James M. Wooten, Birmingham, for appellants/cross-appellees Marcus Fuller and Joseph Mitchell.
Robert M. Weaver of Nakamura, Quinn, Walls, Weaver & Davies LLP, Birmingham, for appellees/cross-appellants Birmingham–Jefferson County Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 725 Employees Contributory Retirement Plan et al.
This appeal and cross-appeal follow the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Birmingham–Jefferson County Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 725 Employees Contributory Retirement Plan (“the Plan”), the Birmingham–Jefferson County Transit Authority Retirement Allowance Committee (“the Committee”), and individual members of the Committee. We dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment.
The Birmingham–Jefferson County Transit Authority (“the Authority”) is a public corporation created by statute and charged with operating a public-transportation system in the City of Birmingham and in Jefferson County. See § 11–49B–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (). Amalgamated Transit Union Local 725 (“the Union”) is a labor organization and the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of certain employees of the Authority. The Authority and the Union have been parties to a series of collective-bargaining agreements (hereinafter “CBAs”) establishing the terms and conditions of employment for bus operators and maintenance employees represented by the Union, including retirement benefits set out in the Plan.
The Plan is a qualified employee retirement plan within the meaning of § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Plan is administered by the Committee. The Committee consists of four members, two of whom are appointed by the Authority and two of whom are appointed by the Union. Benefits paid pursuant to the Plan are funded through the Birmingham–Jefferson County Transit Authority Contributory Retirement Trust (“the Trust”). The Plan is a defined-benefit plan. A defined-benefit plan bases benefits on factors such as years of service, compensation received, and date of retirement. The Trust is funded primarily through contributions by employers and employees.
In October 1996, the Authority notified the Union that it planned to assign management of the Authority's day-to-day operations to Ryder Systems, Inc. (“Ryder”),2 and to terminate the existing CBA, which was set to expire on January 3, 1997. At that time, the Plan provided, with regard to early retirement, as follows:
“9.1(a) Any employee may retire voluntarily at any time after he has attained the age of fifty five (55) years, and shall have completed 30 years service with the [Authority], and upon such early retirement shall be entitled to an immediate benefit computed as of the date of his early retirement with no actuarial reduction because of his age being less than 65 years.”
The Union, the Authority, and Ryder attempted to negotiate a new CBA, but in January 1997 Ryder declared that the parties had reached an impasse in bargaining and unilaterally implemented the terms of its last proposal to the Union. The terms included discontinuing the Plan, discontinuing any contributions to the Plan, and seeking to implement a 401(k) retirement plan for those employees of the Authority covered by the previous CBA. During this same time, the employees of the Authority were discharged and most were rehired by Ryder. No employer or employee contributions were made to the Trust from 1997 to 2000.
In 1997, the president of the Union, who was also chairman of the Committee, discussed with Amalgamated Transit Union International whether employees who were fully vested in the Plan could receive early-retirement benefits (because no contributions were being placed into the Trust) and, at the same time, be employed by Ryder. In 1997, both Marcus Fuller and Joseph Mitchell were vested under the terms of the Plan and sought early-retirement benefits under the Plan while they were employed by Ryder. The Committee unanimously approved their applications for early-retirement benefits.
Shortly after Ryder announced its decision to discontinue the Plan, the Union asserted that Ryder was obligated to submit the dispute between it and Ryder over the unresolved bargaining to “interest arbitration” and filed a grievance to that effect with the Board of Arbitration in accordance with the last CBA that had been in existence between the Authority and the Union. On July 27, 1998, the Board of Arbitration sustained the Union's grievance and determined that, pursuant to the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., neither the Authority nor Ryder could unilaterally implement new terms and conditions of employment. The Board of Arbitration ordered the restoration of the status quo retroactive to January 7, 1997, and ordered the parties to engage in interest arbitration to establish future terms and conditions of employment.
The Union and Ryder proceeded to interest arbitration, and on December 18, 1999, the Board of Arbitration accepted the Union's proposal to continue the Plan and rejected the Authority's and Ryder's proposed implementation of a 401(k) retirement plan. The contributions from 1997 to 2000, required to fund the Plan, were placed in the Trust.
In December 2000, Tom Angell, counsel for the Plan, notified the Committee that the early-retirement benefits paid to Fuller and Mitchell and other employees were illegal because the employees were ineligible to receive such benefits due to their employment with Ryder and that the benefits had to be repaid. From 1997 to 2000, Fuller had received $61,101.25 in early-retirement benefits and Mitchell had received $51,862.74.
Fuller retired in September 2002. The Committee reduced Fuller's calculated benefits in order to account for the early-retirement benefits paid under the Plan while he was working for Ryder. The Committee reduced his monthly benefit by the actuarial equivalent of $61,101.25, which resulted in a monthly benefit of $1,222.33, $528.04 less than he would have received without the reduction. Mitchell subsequently retired and received a reduction in his monthly pension, which was the actuarial equivalent of the $51,862.74 he received in early-retirement benefits from 1997 to 2000. Fuller and Mitchell filed grievances disputing their reductions in benefits, which were subsequently denied.
On June 9, 2005, Fuller and Mitchell (hereinafter collectively referred as “the employees”) sued the Authority, alleging two counts of breach of contract, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith and that the Authority should be stopped from reducing their benefits. Subsequently, the employees amended their complaint and dismissed the Authority and substituted the Committee and the Plan as defendants. On November 2, 2007, the employees amended their complaint a second time to add the individual members of the Committee as defendants. On April 22, 2008, the defendants filed an answer to the second amended complaint and asserted a counterclaim seeking immediate recoupment from the employees along with interest and attorney fees.
On April 30, 2008, the defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment, and the trial court set a hearing. On May 5, 2008, the employees sought written discovery from the defendants. On May 13, 2008, the employees moved to continue the summary-judgment hearing on the ground that they needed the responses to their discovery requests. On May 20, 2008, the trial court granted the motion to continue and set a hearing for August 15, 2008. On August 15, 2008, the trial court set another hearing on the summary-judgment motion for September 19, 2008, after counsel for the employees failed to appear at the August 15 hearing, and directed the employees to respond to the summary-judgment motion by September 12, 2008.
On September 12, 2008, the employees filed a motion to compel discovery. On September 16, 2008, the employees filed a motion to continue the hearing; that motion was never ruled on, and a hearing was held on September 19, 2008. Counsel for the employees did not appear for the summary-judgment hearing. On September 30, 2008, the trial court directed counsel to appear on October 17, 2008, to address the status of the case and the pending motion to compel. On October 15, 2008, the employees filed a motion to continue the October 17, 2008, hearing. Counsel did not appear at the October 17, 2008, hearing, which was held as scheduled. On October 21, 2008, the trial court denied the employees' motion to compel and granted the defendants' summary-judgment motion.
On November 20, 2008, the employees filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment, arguing that the defendants had failed to respond to discovery requests, that the responses they had given to discovery were incomplete, and that they had refused to provide access to material witnesses. On January 9, 2009, the trial court granted the employees' motion, vacated the summary-judgment order, and allowed discovery, including the depositions of eight witnesses. On May 14, 2009, the employees filed a response to the defendants' summary-judgment motion, attaching supporting documents.
On June 22, 2009, the defendants filed a reply to the employees' response. On July 6, 2009, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the employees' claims. The defendants' counterclaim remained pending.
On August 17, 2009, the employees filed a motion seeking to have the trial...
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