Fuller v. Bnsf Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 06-722-GPM.,CIV. 06-722-GPM.
• Citation: 472 F.Supp.2d 1088
• Parties: Patricia FULLER and Anne Fuller, Plaintiffs, v. BNSF RAILWAY CO. and Samuel C. Williams, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

Page 1088

472 F.Supp.2d 1088

Patricia FULLER and Anne Fuller, Plaintiffs, v. BNSF RAILWAY CO. and Samuel C. Williams, Defendants.

No. CIV. 06-722-GPM.

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

January 3, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John G. Simon, Simon, Passanante, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Thomas E. Jones, Thompson Coburn, Belleville, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion for remand to state court brought by Plaintiffs Patricia Fuller and Anne Fuller (Doc. 12). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED. The status conference scheduled to be held in this case on January 4, 2007, at 9:00 a.m. is CANCELLED.

This suit arises from an accident which occurred at a railroad crossing in Franklin County, Missouri, on December 22, 2005, in which an automobile driven by Douglas Fuller was struck by a train owned by Defendant BNSF Railroad Co. ("BNSF") and operated by Defendant Samuel C. Williams. Mr. Fuller was killed and his daughter, Anne Fuller, a passenger in the automobile, was severely injured. Ms. Fuller and her mother, Patricia Fuller, filed this action in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois, asserting claims for wrongful death and negligence under Missouri law in connection with the accident. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were negligent in: failing to sound an adequate, timely, and proper warning of the fact that the train was approaching the crossing where the accident occurred, as required under Mo. Rev.Stat. § 389.900; failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing, as required under 4 C.S.R. § 265-8.018; failing to maintain and inspect the crossing and roadway as required under Mo.Rev. Stat. § 389.610.2; failing to maintain an adequate lookout for motorists at the crossing; and failing to sound a warning at the time and in the manner required under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 389.900. Additionally, the complaint alleges that BNSF failed properly to train its employees and/or servants to notify the railroad of hazardous crossings and failed to warn and advise its agents, servants, and employees of the dangerous condition of the crossing where the accident giving rise to this case occurred. Plaintiffs allege also that Defendants violated various laws and regulations, including 49 C.F.R. § 234.223, so that Defendants' negligence is negligence per se. Defendants timely removed the case from state court to this Court, contending that federal subject matter jurisdiction is proper because this case arises under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Removal of actions from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Thus, "[a] defendant may remove a case to federal court only if the federal district court would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Disher v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 419 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir.2005), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2964, 165 L.Ed.2d 947 (2006). The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993). "Courts should interpret the removal statute narrowly and presume that the plaintiff may choose his or her forum." Id. Put another way, there is a strong presumption in favor of remand. See Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir.1976). See also Littleton v. Shelter Ins. Co., No. 99-912-GPM, 2000 WL 356408, at *1 (S.D.Ill. Mar. 9, 2000) ("The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is construed narrowly, and doubts concerning removal are resolved in favor of remand.").

In general, of course, federal courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The usual test of whether an action arises under federal law for purposes of so-called "federal question" jurisdiction pursuant to section 1331 is the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which provides generally that a case arises under federal law within the meaning of the statute only when federal law appears on the face of a plaintiff's complaint. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). The well-pleaded complaint rule requires generally that a complaint state a claim for relief under federal law. As Justice Holmes explained, "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916). The purpose of restricting federal question jurisdiction to cases asserting claims for relief under federal law is, in addition to preserving a plaintiff's right to choose his or her forum, to "severely limit[] the number of cases ... that may be initiated in or removed to federal district court, thereby avoiding more-or-less automatically a number of potentially serious federal-state conflicts." Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). The well-pleaded complaint rule means of course that a case may not be removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 where federal law merely furnishes a defense to a plaintiff's claims. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392-93, 107 S.Ct. 2425. This is so "even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiffs complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue." Id. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. See also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10, 103 S.Ct. 2841 ("[A] federal court does not have original jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint presents a state-law cause of action, but also asserts that federal law deprives the defendant of a defense he may raise, or that a federal defense the defendant may raise is not sufficient to defeat the claim.") (citations omitted).

As discussed, Plaintiffs' claims are asserted under state law, not federal law. However, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims are completely preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20153 ("FRSA"). In a limited class of cases a complaint may arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 even if a complaint asserts no claim for relief under federal law where state law is "completely preempted" by federal law. Complete preemption occurs when "the preemptive force of a [federal] statute is so `extraordinary' that it `converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'" Nelson v. Stewart, 422 F.3d 463, 466-67 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425). "Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Id. at 467. "In such situations, the federal statute ... not only preempt[s] state law but also authorize[s] removal of actions that sought relief only under state law." Id. Importantly, in this Circuit complete preemption occurs only when a federal statute furnishes an exclusive federal remedy. In Rogers v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 308 F.3d 785 (7th Cir.2002), the court explained,

As this circuit interprets the law, the ... ability to bring suit under [federal law] is an element of ... complete preemption. ... Logically, complete preemption would not be appropriate if a federal remedy did not exist in the alternative. Otherwise, a plaintiff would be forced into federal court with no relief available for ... vindicating the same interest.... Preemption is what wipes out state law, but the foundation for removal is the creation of federal law to replace state law.... Accordingly, ... unless the federal law has created a federal remedy — no matter how limited — the federal law, of necessity, will only arise as a defense to a state law action ... and will thus not give rise to the federal question jurisdiction underlying complete preemption.

Id. at 788. In short, "the existence of a private right of action under federal law is an antecedent of complete preemption." Id.

Turning then to the question of whether the FRSA establishes complete preemption so as to permit removal, it clearly does not. It is true of course that federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the FRSA preempt, that is, extinguish, a variety of state-law tort claims arising from railroad grade-crossing collisions. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (providing that "[a] State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement."); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 353-54, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) (citing 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) and (4)) (if federally-approved warning devices have been actually installed with federal funds at a crossing and are operating at the time of a collision, this mandates dismissal of any claim under state law that the crossing should have been equipped with additional or different warning devices). However, this fact merely establishes conflict preemption, not complete preemption such as to create federal...