Fuller v. Eastman

• Decision Date: 05 February 1889
• Citation: 81 Me. 284,17 A. 67
• Parties: FULLER v. EASTMAN et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

17 A. 67

81 Me. 284

FULLER

v. EASTMAN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 5, 1889.

Exceptions from superior court, Kennebec county.

Assumpsit by Bradstreet Fuller against Lucinda B. Eastman and another. Plaintiff excepted to the pro forma rulings of the presiding justice in admitting evidence of certain payments on the note in suit.

Webb& Webb, for plaintiff. Heath & Tuell, for defendants.

FOSTER, J. Assumpsit on a promissory note secured by a mortgage of real estate in Waldo county. The pleadings are general issue, and plea in bar. On the same day that this suit was instituted in the superior court for the county of Kennebec, the plaintiff brought a writ of entry in the county of Waldo for the purpose of foreclosing the mortgage. At the return term of court in that county, October, 1887, the defendants appeared by counsel, and on the eighth day of the term the action was defaulted by agreement, and judgment as of mortgage entered for the plaintiff. The court, in the presence of counsel for plaintiff and defendants, adjudged the amount due upon the mortgage in accordance with sections 8 and 9, c. 90, Rev. St., and a writ of possession was issued at the expiration of two months after judgment. Subsequently, at the December terra of the superior court in Kennebec county, in this action upon the note, the defendants became defaulted, and at the hearing in damages before the court offered to show that certain payments had been made upon the note long prior to the date of the judgment in the other suit. The plaintiff seasonably objected to the admission of this evidence on the ground that the defendants were concluded by the adjudication of the amount due and payable on the mortgage in the suit in Waldo county. The court overruled the objection, admitted the evidence, and thereupon exceptions were taken.

Was this evidence admissible? We think it was not, and that the exceptions must be sustained. When an action is brought for the purpose of foreclosing a mortgage, the statute contemplates that there shall be two separate and distinct judgments,—the one based upon the title put in issue by the pleadings, and the other as to the amount due upon the mortgage. Ladd v. Putnam, 79 Me. 570, 12 Atl. Rep. 628. The latter follows the conditional judgment upon which the court determines and adjudges the amount due upon the mortgage. The conditional judgment fixes the amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, and is conclusive as to such amount. Merriam v. Merriam, 6 Cush. 93; Burke v. Miller, 4 Gray, 115; Sparhawk v. Wills, 5 Gray, 427, 428; Minot v. Sawyer, 8 Allen, 78, 80; Stevens v. Miner, 5 Gray, 429, note; Freison v. Bates College, 128 Mass. 466; Divoll v. Atwood 41 N. H. 449. It is now the settled law that in such action the same defenses may be made, except the statute of limitations, which might be made in an action upon the note secured by the mortgage. Ladd v. Putnam, supra; Vinton v. King, 4 Allen, 562; Davis v. Bean, 114 Mass. 361. "It opens up any proper matter of defense to the validity of the note, in whole or in part." Minot v. Sawyer, supra. The judgment in the former suit was one required by the statute. It was between the same parties as in the suit now before us, and upon the same subject-matter. The court could not adjudge the amount due upon the mortgage without determining the amount due upon the note secured by it. That note is the identical note in this suit. The evidence related to payments made long prior to the date of that judgment.

It is a principle of law too familiar to require any citation of authorities in support of it that, when a matter in controversy has once been inquired into and settled by a court of competent jurisdiction, it cannot be again drawn in question in another suit between the same parties. Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 439. Nor will it avail the defendants that the facts now offered in evidence did not in fact come in question. If allowed, it would render the rule nugatory, as said by PARKER, O. J., in the case last cited, and where it was held that it was sufficient that the action was of a nature to admit of such a defense, and that the party in the new suit might have availed himself of it. Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray, 365; Sparhawk v. Wills, 5 Gray, 427. In Bigelow v. Winsor, 1 Gray, 301, the doctrine is thus stated: "Whether it be a court of law or equity, of admiralty or of probate, if in the matter in controversy between the parties, with the same object in view, that of remedy between them, the court had jurisdiction to decide, it is a legal adjudication binding on these parties." In addition to the foregoing authorities, the following will be found to...