Fuller v. United States.

• Decision Date: 28 April 1949
• Docket Number: No. 746.,746.
• Citation: 65 A.2d 589
• Parties: FULLER v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

65 A.2d 589

FULLER

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 746.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

April 14, 1949.

Rehearing Denied April 28, 1949.

Appeal from The Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia.

Bastardy proceeding by the United States of America against Guy Hinant Fuller, Jr. From an order for support and maintenance of an illegitimate child based on a verdict of guilty, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Earl H. Davis, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Chester H. Gray, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Washington, D. C. (Vernon E. West, Corp. Counsel and Edward A. Beard, Asst. Corp. Counsel, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

Appellant was charged with being the father of an illegitimate child. Prosecution was had in the Juvenile Court under Title 11, Sections 943-946 of the District of Columbia Code. Trial was by jury and resulted in a verdict of guilty. Based on such verdict the court entered an order for the support and maintenance of the child. Defendant appeals.

Appellant's first allegation of error is that the Juvenile Court should have dismissed the action because the complainant was not a resident of this District. It is true that complainant was a resident of Virginia when she bore the child in a Washington hospital, but this does not preclude the Juvenile Court from taking jurisdiction. The statute reads: ‘Any unmarried woman who is quick with child may go before the clerk of the juvenile court of the District of Columbia, or if therein she has been delivered of a bastard child * * * and accuse any person of being the father of the child. Before issuing a warrant, the clerk shall examine the mother of such bastard child, under oath, concerning her residence and her marriage or single condition when the child was begotten; where and when she was delivered of such child * * *.' ¹ (Emphasis added.) Appellant's counsel has made a thorough search of the authorities and history of similar legislation in other jurisdictions, in support of his contention that residence is a prerequisite to the taking of jurisdiction. But bastardy proceedings are purely statutory ² and our statute is plain and unambiguous on its face; it clearly provides for jurisdiction in the circumstances outlined in this case. The fact that complainant was delivered of her child in the District bestowed jurisdiction on the trial court.

Appellant also argues that there was prejudicial error in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence tending to show that defendant was guilty of the crime of seduction. ³ This objection arises from the prosentation of the full story of the couple's first and subsequent meetings, their first intercourse and relations thereafter, alleged promises of marriage and exchange of gifts, extending back to early 1946. While some of this evidence was probably somewhat irrelevant, we cannot find that there was prejudicial error in its admission. In a proceeding like this, which in this jurisdiction is regarded as quasicriminal in nature, ⁴ it should be expected that the government would have to prove its allegations by evidence of this general nature. The acts in question take place clandestinely and under circumstances which are not easily substantiated. Not only are the couple's sexual relations prior to the period of conception admissible but courts generally also admit evidence of other intimacies, promises of marriage, and gifts. These circumstances are admitted for their probative value and their limit and range are largely within the discretion of the trial court. ⁵ There was no abuse of that discretion here.

Another allegation of error arises from the refusal of the trial judge to allow defendant to see the original affidavit sworn to by complainant before the clerk of the Juvenile Court. This ruling was made on the ground that the affidavit was ‘confidential’ and appellant maintains that he was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine complainant in regard to any inconsistent statements she may have made there. Appellant relies particularly upon the fact that in certain states, the statute makes such affidavits admissible as evidence and also upon the fact that a draft of a new act now pending in Congress contains a similar provision. The present statute, however, is silent on the subject. Irrespective of what merit this argument may have, the affidavit was subsequently included in the record by our order, on motion of the government, and with appellant's consent and is now before us. It contains nothing that was not contained in the information prepared by the government. Consequently its exclusion could not have harmed the defense. With respect to an unsigned and unsworn statement made by the complainant to the Juvenile Court clerk which was also withheld from appellant as ‘confidential,’ this was properly excluded. The rule is clear that a defendant has no absolute right to examine statements made in confidence to a prosecuting officer. ⁶

Appellant's next citation of error relates to a charge by the court allowing the jury to determine the proximate date of conception of the child without prior introduction of medical evidence. Though the case was reported stenographically, the judge's charge is not included in the transcript which appellant has brought here. Nor does the record disclose that the point was raised by appellant at the time of the charge. At most it appears that appellant protested the prosecutor's argument to the jury ‘explaining [the] period of conception in accordance with findings of medical science’ which objection was overruled. ⁷

Thus we have a record which does not reveal what the judge told the jury, or what objections were made to the charge. We cannot consider the objection, for we have been given no basis on which to rule that the charge was erroneous, or otherwise. ⁸

Lastly, it is argued that the court erred in rendering judgment for maintenance and support of the infant without first taking evidence to determine the defendant's financial status and ability to earn. The pertinent statute provides that ‘the court * * * shall make an order for the annual payment,...