Fulton Cnty. v. Andrews

• Citation: 773 S.E.2d 432,332 Ga.App. 473
• Decision Date: 11 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. A15A0712.,A15A0712.
• Parties: FULTON COUNTY, Georgia v. ANDREWS et al.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

332 Ga.App. 473

773 S.E.2d 432

FULTON COUNTY, Georgia

v.ANDREWS et al.

No. A15A0712.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 11, 2015.

R. David Ware, Kaye W. Burwell, Lanna R. Hill, Diana L. Freeman, for appellant.

Parks, Chesin & Walbert, A. Lee Parks, Andrew Y. Coffman, M. Travis Foust, for apppellees.

Opinion

McMILLIAN, Judge.

Appellees are current or former attorneys employed with the Office of the Public Defender, Atlanta Judicial Circuit (the “Public Defenders”) who filed suit against Fulton County, Georgia (the “County”), alleging breach of contract and violation of county laws. In their petition, the Public Defenders assert that, pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1982 (the “Civil Service Act”), they are entitled to the same compensation given to attorneys assigned to the Office of the County Attorney (the “County Attorneys”). They allege, however, that the County increased the salary of the County Attorneys, creating an unlawful pay disparity between the two groups of attorneys. Following discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the County's motion and granted the Public Defenders' motion. The County appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) Fulton County personnel regulations constitute the parties' employment contract, as opposed to the “ offer letters” received by the Public Defenders and (2) the County violated the personnel regulations by paying the Public Defenders less than other attorneys. Finding no error, we affirm.

“In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the undisputed facts warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9–11–56.”

(Citation omitted.) Wright v. IC Enterprises, 330 Ga.App. 303, 303, 765 S.E.2d 484 (2014). And, “[t]he opposing party should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions arising therefrom most favorably toward the party opposing the motion.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

So viewed, the record shows that pursuant to a 1939 amendment to the Georgia Constitution, the General Assembly enacted a civil service merit system for Fulton County. Ga. L. 1943, p. 971. In 1982, the General Assembly passed a law revising the Fulton County civil service system, the express purpose of which was to establish “a high quality merit system of personnel administration based upon accepted merit principles and recognized methods governing the appointment, promotion, transfer, layoff, removal, discipline, and well-being of employees who are governed by this Act, and for related personnel actions associated with Fulton County employment.” Ga. L. 1982, pp. 4896–4897, § 1. Consequently, pursuant to the Civil Service Act, the County implemented a comprehensive set of “Personnel Regulations” that are vested with the “force and effect of law”¹ to create a civil service merit system wherein the County's Personnel Director must develop a “Position Classification Plan” for all positions “based upon similarity of duties performed and responsibilities assumed so that comparable qualifications may reasonably be required for and the same schedule of pay may be equitably applied to all positions in the same class.” PR 200–1. Relevant to the Public Defenders' claims, PR 300–9 provides that the County's Personnel Board and Board of Commissioners “shall establish minimum and maximum salary rates for all employees of Fulton County whose classes and positions are established on salary ranges (Classified and Unclassified).” In addition, PR 300–1 mandates that “[n]o employee shall be paid at a salary rate lower than the minimum or higher than the maximum of the salary range approved and established for the class in which currently serving, unless dictated by a [c]ounty-wide classification and compensation study which has been approved by the Personnel Board and Board of Commissioners.”

In 1995, the County hired Fox Lawson, a private consulting firm, to perform a county-wide study to ensure the development of an appropriate, neutral classification and compensation system. Fox Lawson completed its study in 1997 and proposed a comprehensive pay plan that assigned each County employee to one of approximately 600 job classifications (the “Fox Lawson study”). It also proposed the equitable range of pay for each job classification, using the “Decision Band Method” ranking system (“DBM”).² The Board of Commissioners adopted Fox Lawson's proposed classification and compensation structure in June 1997. Under this structure, the County classified the Public Defenders within the same job classification and DBM pay grade as the County Attorneys. Thus, for example, entry level attorneys in both groups were classified as “606022 Attorney, Staff” and assigned a pay grade of “C42.”³

As part of the compensation structure adopted by the County, “[m]arket premiums” or salary differentials (“premium pay”) could be applied to the salary rate for a particular classification when the average market compensation level, including the private sector, exceeded the County's established salary rate by 15% or more.⁴ Beginning in 1997, the County applied premium pay raises to the County Attorneys⁵ that were substantially more than those given to other attorneys within the same classification, including the Public Defenders.⁶ Thus, a pay differential between the County Attorneys and the Public Defenders was established and carried forward year after year.

In April 2005, pursuant to a request by the Board of Commissioners, the County's Personnel Director reviewed the County's use of premium pay and recommended a “divestiture plan” designed to eliminate premium pay within the County's classification and compensation system. As part of its divestiture plan, the County placed certain employees, including the County Attorneys and most positions within the Public Defender's Office, on a new salary range called “Schedule B.”⁷ However, the salary ranges within Schedule B included the previous premium pay granted to each group of attorneys, thereby perpetuating the pay differential between the County Attorneys and the Public Defenders.⁸ In January 2012, the Public Defenders filed a grievance through the County's civil service grievance procedure, alleging this pay disparity and seeking back pay and a prospective pay adjustment. In response, the County informed the Public Defenders that they would not be permitted to pursue their claims through the grievance process, and the Public Defenders subsequently filed their action in the Superior Court of Fulton County. In granting the Public Defenders' motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the County's Personnel Regulations formed an employment contract between the County and the Public Defenders and that nothing in PR 300–9, which provides for premium pay to a classification under certain market conditions, permits the County to ignore the requirements of PR 300–1 that prohibit the County from paying its employees outside the established salary ranges without a new, county-wide classification study.

1. The County asserts that, in granting summary judgment to the Public Defenders, the trial court erred by concluding that the County's Personnel Regulations “constitute the entire employment agreement” between the County and the Public Defenders. The County maintains that the Personnel Regulations are not specific enough to constitute an employment contract and that only the “offer letters” sent to each Public Defender set forth the terms of employment that should be enforced.

However, nowhere in its order does the trial court conclude that the Personnel Regulations make up the “entire” contract or employment agreement between the parties. Rather, the trial court correctly rejected the County's argument that the terms of the letters supersede the Personnel Regulations, which the County maintains are “but one aspect of the parties' employment agreement.” Under the Civil Service Act, the Personnel Regulations, including the requirement that “the same schedule of pay ... be equitably applied to all positions in the same class,”⁹ have the full force and effect of law. Ga. L. 1982, p. 4896, § 3; PR 100–1(1). It is well established that a statute establishing a retirement plan for government employees becomes a part of an employee's contract of employment. DeKalb County School District v. Gold, 318 Ga.App. 633, 642(2), 734 S.E.2d 466 (2012) (the statute becomes part of the employment contract and is compensation for services rendered, and an amendment to the statute to reduce or eliminate employee benefits would violate our state Constitution's impairment clause); Alverson v. Employees' Retirement System of Georgia, 272 Ga.App. 389, 391 –392(1)(b), 613 S.E.2d 119 (2005) (state employees were parties to a written contract established by statute in effect when they performed services and contributed toward their retirement benefits). And we see no reason why a statute establishing a merit-based compensation structure and regulations promulgated thereunder should be treated any differently than a statute establishing a retirement plan. See Clark v. State Personnel Board, 252 Ga. 548, 550(2)(a), 314 S.E.2d 658 (1984) (holding that the state Merit System Act “create[s] a constitutionally protected contract between the merit system members and the state”); Fulton County v. Lord, 323 Ga.App. 384, 389(1), 746 S.E.2d 188 (2013) (finding the judicial assistants' claim for back pay pursuant to Fulton County's personnel regulations sounds in contract).

Moreover, pretermitting whether the “offer letters” included terms in contradiction with the Personnel Regulations,¹⁰ the County was without authority to override the Personnel Regulations by creating its own terms in an “offer letter” to certain of its employees. See DeClue v. City of Clayton, 246 Ga.App. 487, 491(2), 540 S.E.2d 675 (2000) (“A...