Fulton Iron & Engine Works v. Kimball Tp.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1883
• Citation: 17 N.W. 733,52 Mich. 146
• Parties: FULTON IRON & ENGINE WORKS v. TOWNSHIP OF KIMBALL.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

17 N.W. 733

52 Mich. 146

FULTON IRON & ENGINE WORKS v. TOWNSHIP OF KIMBALL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 20, 1883

In order to recover from a township for damages caused by the breaking of a bridge, the plaintiff must not only show damages from the defect in the bridge, but also fault in the defendant in having a bridge in such condition.

The law as to the repairing of bridges only requires them to be made equal to a new structure of the same plan, and does not require a different structure.

It is not necessary for a township, in building a bridge, to make it adaptable to all possible purposes, even though such purposes be lawful; there is room for some discretion as to the uses it is apparently or really designed to subserve.

Error to St. Clair.

Geo. P. Voorheis, for plaintiff and appellant.

Avery Bros., for defendant.

CAMPBELL. J.

Plaintiff sued defendant for injury to a steam threshing engine, caused by the breaking down of part of a bridge over which it was passing. The jury found for defendant, and plaintiff complains of error in the rulings. The whole circumstances resemble very closely, even to the details of the accident those which were presented in Medina v. Perkins, 48 Mich. 67; [S.C. 11 N.W.REP.810.] Several of the questions are mere repetitions of those raised in that case, and the court below so considered them, and decided in accordance with the views there expressed. We need not, therefore, go further than to examine how far questions arose not already thus disposed of, and in our view the differences are not material.

In order to recover it became necessary for plaintiff to show not only damage from defects in the bridge, but fault in defendant in having a bridge in such condition; and such fault could only exist where there had been failure to repair injuries which defendant either knew, or had such notice of as should have led to the removal of the mischief. This involved questions of fact for the jury, under proper instructions; and inasmuch as the instructions given were in accordance with our own rulings, and left all facts fairly to the jury, there was nothing to complain of on this head, unless, as plaintiff's counsel distinctly claimed on the argument, townships should be held liable at all events as insurers, and not merely for neglect of duty. There is no authority, under the statute or otherwise, for any such extreme view; and we do not see how the various questions could properly have been taken from the jury, as plaintiff claimed they should have been.

Objection is made that the court erred in excluding evidence of a settlement made by defendant with one Bell, who was injured at the same time and who had charge of the engine when it fell. But inasmuch as plaintiff was a stranger to that transaction it could have no bearing on this controversy. A compromise with one person is in no sense legally an admission of any liability to some one else. The court admitted full testimony concerning the exact condition of the bridge at the time of and after the accident. Among this proof was testimony showing that chains and other appliances were fixed upon various parts of the bridge. Plaintiff then proposed to ask witnesses why these chains were used, but this was held irrelevant. This...