Fulton Trust Co. v. Trowbridge

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JENNINGS, Judge.
• Citation: Fulton Trust Co. v. Trowbridge, 126 Conn. 369, 11 A.2d 393 (Conn. 1940)
• Decision Date: 07 February 1940
• Parties: FULTON TRUST CO. v. TROWBRIDGE et al.

11 A.2d 393

126 Conn. 369

FULTON TRUST CO. v. TROWBRIDGE et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 7, 1940

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Arthur F. Ells, Judge.

Proceeding for probate of the will of Gardiner Trowbridge, deceased, by the Fulton Trust Company, executor and trustee of the estate of Gardiner Trowbridge, deceased, opposed by Peter Trowbridge and others. The court of probate for the district of Darien refused to admit the will to probate, and an appeal was taken to the superior court in Fairfield county and tried to the court. From a judgment sustaining the appeal and directing that the will be admitted, Peter Trowbridge and others appeal, and the executor and trustee cross-appeal.

Error on appeal, and no error on cross-appeal, and case remanded with direction.

John M. Comley, of Stamford, for appellants.

William C. Strong, Alan M. MacCracken, and William S Hirschberg, all of Greenwich, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS JJ.

JENNINGS, Judge.

The deceased adopted a son after the execution of his will. The question to be decided is whether that adoption revoked the will under the terms of General Statutes, § 4880.

The finding discloses the following facts: Gardiner Trowbridge and his wife lived together from the time of their marriage in 1915 to the date of Mr. Trowbridge's death in 1938. They had no children. In 1926 Mrs. Trowbridge obtained from an adoption nursery a child ten months old named Carl Houghtaling. A rule of the nursery, known to both Mr. and Mrs. Trowbridge required the adoption of such a child after a year's trial. Both intended at all times to adopt the child, known thenceforth as Peter Trowbridge, but due to procrastination he was not adopted until July 8, 1930. From the time of Peter's entry into the Trowbridge household Gardiner Trowbridge became very much attached to him and referred to him and treated him in every respect as his son.

On May 31, 1929, Gardiner Trowbridge executed his will. At that time he was of the opinion that it was not well to make Peter a rich man. After making certain specific bequests, the life use of three-quarters of the residue is given to his wife. The remaining fourth is charged with an annuity of $2,000 ‘ for the maintenance and education of Peter Trowbridge, who is now a member of my household * * * until * * * 1952 at which time any accumulated balance of this two thousand dollars a year shall be paid to said Peter Trowbridge and no further payments shall be made to him from my estate.’ The will was prepared by the confidential secretary of the Trowbridge family and when Gardiner Trowbridge read the will he made no comment on the foregoing provision nor did he say anything about the adoption of Peter Trowbridge. The net value of the estate is a little over $200,000.

On these facts the trial court concluded that the adoption did not revoke the will and that declarations of the testator that he intended to adopt Peter, made before the execution of the will, were not admissible. Both parties appealed, the defendants claiming error in the former conclusion and the plaintiff in the latter ruling.

General Statutes, § 4880 reads, in part: ‘ If, after the making of a will, the testator shall marry or a child shall be born to the testator or a minor child shall be legally adopted by him, and no provision shall have been made in such will for such contingency, such marriage, birth or adoption of a minor child shall operate as a revocation of such will.’ In Blake v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 95 Conn. 194, 197, 110 A. 833, 834, we had this to say of this statute: ‘ To provide for a contingency is to prepare for the happening implied by its nature. Provision for assumes and implies prevision of the possible event, foresight enough of the chance of its happening to indicate that any present undertaking upon which its assumed realization might exert a natural and proper influence was entered upon in full contemplation of it as a future possibility.’ This construction was confirmed in Strong v. Strong, 106 Conn. 76, 79, 137 A. 17, 18, where we said: ‘ The established meaning of our statute, then, requires that we find in the will of David K. Strong some provision for...