Fumo, In re
| Decision Date | 20 September 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 43554,43554 |
| Citation | 52 Ill.2d 307,288 N.E.2d 9 |
| Parties | In re Michael R. FUMO, Attorney, Respondent. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
John Cadwalader Menk, Chicago, for amicus curiae.
James P. Chapman, Chicago, for respondent.
The sole issue in this disciplinary proceeding, brought under Supreme Court Rule 751 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 110A, par. 751), is the measure of discipline to be imposed upon the respondent, Michael R. Fumo.
The casue is before us on the respondent's objections to the report and findings of the Committee on Grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, which recommended that he be disbarred. The Board of Managers of the Chicago Bar Association, sitting as Commissioners of this court, overruled the objections and approved the report and findings of the Committee on Grievances.
The recommendation was a consequence of the respondent's plea of guilty in the United States District Court to a multicount criminal indictment charging him with violating section 1341 of Title 18 of the United States Code, in that he devised a scheme, in concert with George J. Pope, a physician, to defraud and obtain money under false pretenses from certain insurance companies and from his own clients.
The respondent entered a plea of guilty to the indictment. He was adjudged guilty as charged, was placed on probation for a period of three years, the first 60 days to be spent in jail, was fined the sum of $5,000, and as further conditions of probation, the judgment order provided that he be immediately referred to the proper authorities of the State of Illinois for disbarment, that the United States Attorney go forward with disbarment proceedings, and that the respondent make restitution. No proof relative to the violation of section 1341, other than the indictment and the respondent's plea of guilty thereto, was entered in evidence before the Grievance Committee.
The respondent admitted to the Committee on Grievances that he had pleaded guilty to the criminal offenses alleged in the complaint for disciplinary action, but denied that he was guilty of: misconduct involving moral turpitude; conduct tending to bring the legal profession into disrepute; and conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession. He here asserts that the recommendation of the disciplinary committee is unduly harsh and severe, and is not consistent with Illinois disciplinary precedents.
The respondent offered proof in mitigation which showed that he had served 60 days in the Du Page County jail; that he had paid his $5,000 fine; and that he had made full restitution to the insurance companies and to his clients, as directed by his probation officer and by order of the court. He called witnesses who testified that his reputation for honesty and integrity was good, and that he was an upstanding member of his community. Testimony was also offered on his behalf that his youngest sonsuffered from a serious affliction, hypsarrythmia, which resulted from anoxic brain damage which occurred shortly after birth, and that his efforts to cure the affliction had created an extraordinary financial burden upon him.
Prior decisions of this court have established that in disciplinary proceedings, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is conclusive evidence of an attorney's guilt and is a ground for disbarment (In re Eaton (1958), 14 Ill.2d 338, 340, 152 N.E.2d 850; In re Teitelbaum (1958), 13 Ill.2d 586, 588, 150 N.E.2d 873); and that violation of section 1341 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C.A., sec. 1341) is a crime involving moral turpitude. In the case of In re Needham (1936), 364 Ill. 65, at page 70, 4 N.E.2d 19 at page 21, the court said: 'Attempting to obtain the money or property of others by fraud or false pretenses, whether through the use of the mails or otherwise, involves moral turpitude.' Also see: In re Eaton (1958), 14 Ill.2d 338, 152 N.E.2d 850. The respondent does not question the validity of these precedents, but contends that the recommendation that he be disbarred is too severe.
Several earlier decisions of this court have been cited by the respondent in support of his argument that disbarment from the practice of law is not justified. (In re Damisch (1967), 38 Ill.2d 195, 230 N.E.2d 254; In re Sullivan (1965), 33 Ill.2d 548, 213 N.E.2d 257; In re Gavin (1961), 21 Ill.2d 237, 171 N.E.2d 588; In re Teitelbaum (1958), 13 Ill.2d 586, 150 N.E.2d 873; In re Borchardt (1934), 357 Ill. 458, 192 N.E. 383.) In particular, the respondent refers to the mitigating circumstances which were considered by the court in determining the penalties in these cases, and he urges that the extenuating circumstances surrounding his conduct were at least as impelling as in the cited cases.
In the case at bar, the United States District Court included in its judgment of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Mandel
...In re Metheany, 104 Ariz. 144, 449 P.2d 609 (1969); In re Higbie, 6 Cal.3d 562, 99 Cal.Rptr. 865, 493 P.2d 97 (1972); In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307, 288 N.E.2d 9 (1972); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lester, 437 S.W.2d 958 (Ky.1968); In re Lurkins, 374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo.1964). The constitutionality o......
-
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Reamer
...of an attorney from the practice of law. See In re Leonard, 64 Ill.2d 398, 1 Ill.Dec. 62, 356 N.E.2d 62 (1976); In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307, 288 N.E.2d 9 (1972); Niebling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S.W.2d 502 (1944); Ohio State Bar Association v. Mackay, 46 Ohio St.2d 81, 346 N.E.2d 302 (1976......
-
State Bar of Tex. v. Heard
...crime of mail fraud has been held to be a crime involving moral turpitude for which an attorney can be disbarred. In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307, 288 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1972); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Hennigan, 340 So.2d 264, 269 (La.1976); Neibling v. Terry, 177 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Mo.1944) (en ban......
-
Grant, In re
...that the disbarment of respondent is clearly warranted, there are numerous other cases to the same effect. (See, e.g., In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill.2d 307, 288 N.E.2d 9; In re Snitoff (1972), 53 Ill.2d 50, 289 N.E.2d 428; In re Lingle (1963), 27 Ill.2d 459, 189 N.E.2d 342; In re Patlak (1938),......