Funes v. The Gardner Consol. Sch. Dist. 72C
| Docket Number | 21 C 5298 |
| Decision Date | 17 May 2022 |
| Parties | KIMBERLY FUNES, as parent and next friend of C.F., a minor, Plaintiff, v. THE GARDNER CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 72C; THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE GARDNER CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 72C; DR. MICHAEL J. MERRIT, in his Official and Individual Capacity; and AUSTIN MCDOWELL, in his Official and Individual Capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' Motion.
The following facts come from the Complaint and are assumed true for the purpose of this Motion. Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013). All reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff's favor. League of Women Voters of Chi. v. City of Chi., 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2014).
C.F. is a student at a school within the Gardner Consolidated School District 72C (the “District”). Prior to entering the seventh grade in the Fall of 2020, C.F. was diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and placed on a 504 Plan. Beginning in January 2021, C.F. fell victim to a campaign of bullying and harassment by another student in her class, M.K. The harassment primarily took place in gym class, where M.K would pull C.F.'s hair, strike her, and call her derogatory names such as “bi**h” “wh**e”, and “*as****e”, on an almosts daily basis. M.K. openly bullied C.F. in full view of the athletic director, Defendant McDowell, and a teacher's aide, yet neither McDowell nor the aide made any attempt to stop the harassment. The school principal and District Superintendent, Defendant Merritt, was also made aware of the bullying in March 2021 and promised “to look into the matter.” But the bullying continued ultimately culminating in an attack where C.F. was seriously injured.
On May 13, 2021, C.F. and the other students in gym class were tasked with running laps. Part of the path was out of the teacher's sight. While running along this portion of the path, M.K. ran up behind C.F., placed her foot in between C.F.'s legs, kicked out C.F.'s left leg, and slammed her chest into C.F.'s back, causing C.F. to fall flat on her face into hard concrete. C.F. had multiple bruises, cuts, scratches, and scrapes on her face, blood running down her cheek, forehead, and nose, swelling of her face, and a chipped front tooth. A teacher's aide helped C.F. back into the school, where C.F.'s math teacher then helped C.F. wash the blood off her face and brought her to the principal's office.
Plaintiff was contacted and told C.F. had “collided” with another student and had “some scratches on her face.” Plaintiff was able to see the extent of C.F.'s injuries through video chat and went to the school to pick her up. At the school, Plaintiff found C.F. sitting alone in the hallway, still bleeding. Defendant Merritt told Plaintiff he was not going to involve the police or call an ambulance, but that she was welcome to do so herself. Plaintiff then took C.F. to the hospital to receive treatment for her injuries.
C.F. suffered significant emotional trauma in addition to her physical injuries. Following the months of bullying, C.F. was diagnosed with acute stress syndrome and anxiety. She suffers from nightmares, severe anxiety, and feelings of panic and mistrust. She continues to receive treatment from a mental health professional, and, in September 2021, she was again injured in gym class when another student pulled a mat out from under her.
Plaintiff alleges M.K. had a history of bullying C.F. since the fourth grade, when M.K. began bullying “virtually all of the students in her class, including C.F.” M.K. moved out of the District for fifth and sixth grade, but returned in seventh grade. Plaintiff alleges that, upon M.K.'s return to the school, M.K. began to limit her attacks to students with known or perceived mental and/or physical disabilities. As an example, Plaintiff alleges that in the Fall of 2020, M.K. bullied another student, A.W., who has spina bifida and requires a teacher's aide, and was C.F.'s close friend.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff raises the following claims: (1) violation C.F.'s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); (2) a Monell claim (Count II); (3) violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; (4) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”); and (5) a state law claim for willful and wanton conduct (Count V).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety for a number of reasons. First, Plaintiff's substantive due process claim fails because Defendants did not instigate, create, or increase the bullying. Second, the Monell claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff fail to allege a viable constitutional claim. Third, Plaintiff does not plead the requisite elements to succeed under the ADA or Section 504 claims because she does not allege facts demonstrating the bullying was based on C.F.'s disability or that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive that it altered the condition of her education. Finally, Plaintiff's willful and wanton conduct claim is barred by certain sections of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the case.” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court accepts as true well pled facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). The allegations in the complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
A plaintiff need not provide detailed factual allegations, but it must provide enough factual support to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The claim must be described “in sufficient detail to give the defendant ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are insufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible if the complaint contains sufficient alleged facts that allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
As detailed above, Defendants move to dismiss each of Plaintiff's claims. We address each argument in turn.
At the outset, the Court notes Plaintiff sued the District and the school officials in their official capacities (in addition to their individual capacities). Official capacity suits, however, are simply “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978).
Accordingly, because the District has also been sued, any official capacity claims are duplicative and are thus dismissed. See, e.g., Selmani v. Vill. of Bartlett, 515 F.Supp.3d 882, 888 (N.D. Ill. 2021).
Section 1983 “provides a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under the color of state law.” First Midwest Bank v. City of Chi., 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021). Thus, a Section 1983 claim requires that a constitutional injury exists. Here, Plaintiff claims Defendants violated C.F.'s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also pursues theories of liability against the District under Monell.
“In contrast with procedural due process, substantive due process bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the procedures used to implement them.” Doe v. Sch. Dist. U-46, 2021 WL 3849635, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2021). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is a restraint upon governmental action . . . [and] does not impose a duty on the state to protect against injuries inflicted by private actors.” First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 987 (emphasis in original). Its purpose is “to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). “The state does not have a due-process duty to protect against acts of private violence.” First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 987.
Pertinent here, a narrow exception[1] to the rule in DeShaney applies when the state created the danger. See Doe v Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2015) (). Under the state-created danger exception, “a plaintiff must show that the state affirmatively placed him in a position of danger and that the state's failure to protect him from that danger was the proximate cause of his injury.” First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 988 (citing Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). “Only the most egregious official conduct will satisfy this stringent inquiry.” Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2011). The rule of DeShaney cannot be circumvented by broadly interpreting what is meant by “increase” so as to erase the...
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