Fuqua v. Hess
| Decision Date | 05 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-01510-HNJ |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER FUQUA, Plaintiff v. R. MARSHALL HESS, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This action proceeds on Defendant R. Marshall Hess's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Christopher Fuqua's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful seizure, false arrest, and excessive force claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. Hess prevails on Fuqua's Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and false arrest claims, yet genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Furthermore, state-agent immunity bars Fuqua's false arrest and false imprisonment claims, yet genuine issues of material fact regarding the assault and battery claim preclude summary judgment.
Therefore, for the reasons set out herein the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant Hess's motion.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
If the movant sustains its burden, a non-moving party demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact by producing evidence by which a reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The non-movant sustains this burden by demonstrating "that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993). In the alternative, the non-movant may "come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1116-17; see also Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 603-04 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1168 (2016).
The "court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citations omitted). "'Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). "Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (citation omitted). "That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that 'evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23. In addition, a movant may prevail on summary judgment by submitting evidence "negating [an] opponent's claim," that is, by producing materials disproving an essential element of a non-movant's claim or defense. Id. at 323 (emphasis in original).
There exists no issue for trial unless the nonmoving party submits evidence sufficient to merit a jury verdict in its favor; if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, the court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. That is, the movant merits summary judgment if the governing law on the claims or defenses commands one reasonable conclusion, but the court should deny summary judgment if reasonable jurors could "differ as to the import of the evidence." Id. at 250.
On the afternoon of September 13, 2014, Plaintiff Christopher Fuqua and his pregnant girlfriend, Luphelia McDade, hosted a football-watching party at their residence in Sheffield, Alabama. (Doc. 43-1, Fuqua Dep. ("Fuqua Dep."), at 42; Doc. 45-2, McDade Dep. ("McDade Dep."), at 32-33).2 Fuqua's sister, Tiffany Fuqua, attended the party with three children: two teenaged daughters, approximately 15 and 16 years old at the time, and a five-year-old offspring. (Doc. 45-3, T. Fuqua Dep. ( ), at 10-13). At some point, McDade left and returned home with groceries, and Fuqua and the guests assisted in taking the groceries inside the home. (McDade Dep. at 34-35, 36, 38, 40, 172; Fuqua Dep. at 55, 61; T. Fuqua Dep. at 17-18, 20-21).
Contemporaneously with the foregoing events, Fuqua's neighbor approximately 404 feet away, Dustin Tyler Roberts, observed and heard from his front porch what he interpreted as an altercation at Fuqua's home.3 (Doc. 43-5, Roberts Decl.). He described a vehicle with approximately three African-American women arrive at the home, and then the women proceeded inside. (Id., ¶ 3). Subsequently, he perceived the women exit the home and apparently engage in an argument with Fuqua and McDade. Roberts heard shouting, and the close proximity of the people to each other contributed to his belief a fight occurred. (Id., ¶ 4). Roberts called 911 and reported a domestic dispute involving a pregnant woman at a house with a black Chevrolet truck and a Chrysler Pacifica parked outside. (Id., ¶ 5). Roberts's description matched Fuqua's home. (Doc. 43-4, Hess Decl. (Hess Decl."), ¶ 3; Doc. 43-3, Cantrell Dep. ("Cantrell Dep."), at 14-15).
During or shortly after Roberts's 911 call, Fuqua went to his truck to retrieve some cigarettes. (Fuqua Dep. at 55, 61-62, 91, 101). City of Sheffield Officers R. Marshall Hess and Regina Cantrell received the 911 dispatch call and proceeded to Fuqua's residence. (Doc. 43-2, Hess Dep. ("Hess Dep.), at 12, 14; Hess Decl., ¶ 2; Cantrell Dep. at 7-8). They encountered Fuqua next to his truck with a door open. (Hess Dep. at 22; Hess Decl., ¶ 3; Cantrell Dep. at 10-11; Fuqua Dep. at 100-01, 114).
The officers informed Fuqua about the 911 call regarding the supposed altercation.4 (Hess Dep. at 25; Cantrell Dep. at 15; Fuqua Dep. at 91-92, 170). Fuqua denied any knowledge of a confrontation.5 (Hess Dep. at 25, 78, 127; Cantrell Dep. at 21; Fuqua Dep. at 92, 120, 199, 207). Hess then asked Fuqua for his name and identification. (Cantrell Dep. at 22). Fuqua gave his name6 and informed the officers his identification was in his home. (Fuqua Dep. at 90, 92, 93, 99, 193; Cantrell Dep. at 27, 101). As he turned and walked towards his home, Fuqua again denied any knowledge about an altercation.7 (Cantrell Dep. at 21; Fuqua Dep. at 168). Fuqua admits that during these events, he was angry, he raised his voice, and he used profanity, yet he denies cursing specifically at Hess or that he was aggressive or threatening. (Fuqua Dep. at 94, 95, 106, 120-21, 155, 156, 171-72, 179-80).
At some point, at either Fuqua's request or the children's behest, McDade and Tiffany came onto the home's porch to observe the encounter. (Fuqua Dep. at 6, 91, 94, 103, 104, 107, 180-81; McDade Dep. at 49, 60; T. Fuqua Dep. at 21-22). Tiffany observed Fuqua walking toward the home with Hess close behind or at his side. (T. Fuqua Dep. at 23, 25, 27, 58). She recounted Fuqua stating repeatedly he had not done anything. (T. Fuqua Dep. at 23-24, 25). Tiffany does not recall Hess responding. (T. Fuqua Dep. at 25). McDade described a confused look on Fuqua's face rather than anger. (McDade Dep. at 64-65, 82, 155-56). McDade recalls Fuqua possibly expressing his belief he was going to jail, although Hess had not informed him he was under arrest. (McDade Dep. at 76; Hess Dep. at 61, 100). Fuqua testified he believed he was going to jail and told McDade so, though, again, Hess had made no specific statement to that effect. (Fuqua Dep. at 94, 104, 105, 106, 116, 117, 119, 170).
At some point, Hess grasped Fuqua on the shoulder and instructed him to stop walking. (Hess Dep. at 40; Fuqua Dep. at 94, 95-96, 100, 103). Fuqua stopped when Hess placed his hand on his shoulder, and he then turned and talked to Hess, without aggression or clenched fists.8 (Fuqua Dep. at 100, 114, 115, 116, 121-22, 123, 179). Fuqua instructed Tiffany to record the encounter, prompting Tiffany to return inside the home and retrieve her mobile telephone to record the events. (Fuqua Dep. at 100, 107, 117, 125; T. Fuqua Dep. at 26; McDade Dep. at 83, 167). Upon the door closing behind her, Hess deployed his taser against Fuqua, without warning and without first asking Fuqua to place his hands behind his back. (Fuqua Dep. at 100, 118, 119-20, 125, 171; McDade Dep. at 77). Neither Tiffany nor McDade recall Hess saying anything, such as a directive, warning, etc., before he tased Fuqua the first time.9 (T. Fuqua Dep. at 25; McDade Dep. at 93-94). The taser struck Fuqua on the side of his chest, and he dropped to his knees. (Fuqua Dep. at 125, 127, 135; ...
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