Fuqua v. Unisys Corp., Civ. No. 4-88-83.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court of Minnesota
Citation716 F. Supp. 1201
Docket NumberCiv. No. 4-88-83.
PartiesJoel FUQUA v. UNISYS CORPORATION.
Decision Date30 June 1989

Charles L. Friedman, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

Thomas M. Sipkins, Bruce H. Little, Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.

ORDER

ROSENBAUM, District Judge.

Plaintiff in this diversity action alleges a breach of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minnesota Statutes, §§ 363.01, et seq. In reply, defendant moves for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to that Act. For the reasons given herein, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff is an employee of defendant, working as a general laborer performing tasks such as moving furniture, washing windows, cleaning furniture and floors, emptying waste baskets, sanitizing restrooms, and other general housekeeping duties. From early May, 1987, to May, 1988, defendant refused to allow plaintiff to perform these duties, claiming its decision was based upon a back injury plaintiff sustained in April, 1987. While there is no question that plaintiff's back was injured, the exact cause of the injury is unknown.1 Plaintiff's complaint states that he sustained the immediate injury on the job. Complaint, par. II. He also told his personal chiropractor, Dr. Gregg M. Poquette, that he injured his back lifting tool boxes and helping his brother move. Poquette Dep., Ex. 2.

Notwithstanding this diffuse history, Unisys contends its decision to disallow plaintiff from returning to work was based on a series of medical reports submitted by plaintiff's chiropractor and physicians. The first such report was a note dated May 4, 1987, from Dr. Poquette stating that plaintiff should refrain from mopping. Dr. Poquette also referred plaintiff to defendant's medical department for magnetic resonance imaging. Pursuant to an examination, defendant's company physician, Dr. C. Robert Baker, issued restrictions on May 5, 1987, against mopping and lifting over 25 pounds. The magnetic resonance imaging report, allegedly received by defendant on May 6, 1987, indicated plaintiff may have had a slipped disc. On that same day, Dr. Baker added significant restrictions to his report. In particular, Dr. Baker stated that plaintiff should neither bend or twist his back nor bend to lift from the floor. On May 7, 1987, Dr. Poquette reported that he agreed with Dr. Baker's new restrictions.

Based on these reports, defendant refused to allow plaintiff to return to his position as a general laborer, stating that these medical restrictions rendered plaintiff unable to perform his duties.

Roughly three weeks after agreeing to Dr. Baker's restrictions, Dr. Poquette submitted a new diagnosis calling for no restrictions.2 Dr. Baker thereafter conducted a new examination of his own and obviously disagreed with Dr. Poquette. Dr. Baker sustained many of the restrictions included in his initial report. As a result of this disagreement between Drs. Poquette and Baker, Unisys referred plaintiff to Dr. Robert Hart, an independent physician. Upon an examination of plaintiff on June 22, 1987, Dr. Hart ordered numerous limitations including abstention from bending, twisting, lifting, and overhead work. Once again defendant refused to allow plaintiff to return to general laborer duties based on its decision that he was unqualified to perform the tasks inherent in the job.

Dr. Baker reiterated Dr. Hart's restrictions in mid-July, 1987. In August of that same year, Dr. Poquette sent a letter to an attorney representing plaintiff in an unrelated legal matter, stating that plaintiff should avoid bending or twisting his back. Plaintiff's attorney forwarded that letter to Unisys.

In April, 1988, plaintiff was cleared to return to work by his chiropractor. However, on April 21, 1988, Dr. Baker issued a report repeating the restrictions in his July 21, 1987, report, but it is unclear whether Dr. Baker actually examined defendant. A May 5, 1988, examination by Dr. Baker, however, cleared many of the previous limitations. With this new report in hand, defendant allowed plaintiff to return to his general laborer duties on May 18, 1988.

During the 13 month period when plaintiff was not working as a general laborer for defendant, he collected unemployment compensation and 26 weeks of "short term disability payments." He also worked as a security guard. Plaintiff admits that during this absence from defendant's employ he was able to lift weights and participate in other recreational activities, notwithstanding the restrictions. There is no evidence regarding limitations on plaintiff's mobility other than those contained in the doctors' reports.

As a basis for liability, plaintiff claims defendant discriminated against him in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minnesota Statutes, § 363.01, et seq. He contends his back injuries are a disability as defined in that Act, and that defendant's refusal to allow him to work constitutes a violation of the Act's prohibition against disability-based discrimination.

Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to the salary he would have earned from May, 1987, to May, 1988. He argues he was able to perform the duties of a general laborer throughout the lay off period. As evidence, he notes that his back condition is unimproved but he can still function as a general laborer.

The Minnesota Human Rights Act is intended to prohibit virtually all forms of discrimination in the work place. For the purposes of this case, it provides, in relevant part, that:

Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair employment practice:
....
(2) For an employer, because of ... disability ...
(b) to discharge an employee; or
(c) to discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.

Minnesota Statutes, § 363.03, subdivision 1(2)(b), (c). The Act defines disability as: any condition or characteristic that renders a person a disabled person. A disabled person is any person who (1) has a physical ... impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.

Minnesota Statutes, § 363.01, subdivision 25. A "qualified disabled person" means:

(1) with respect to employment, a disabled person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions required of all applicants for the job in question; and
(2) with respect to services and programs, a disabled person who, with physical and program access, meets the essential eligibility criteria required of all applicants for the program or service in question.

Minnesota Statutes, § 363.01, subdivision 25a.

Plaintiff also claims a violation of § 363.03, subdivision 1(6). That section provides that it is an unfair practice:

for an employer with 50 or more permanent, full-time employees ... not to make reasonable accommodation to the known disability of a qualified disabled person or job applicant unless the employer, agency, or organization can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the business, agency, or organization.

Minnesota Statutes, § 363.03, subdivision 1(6).

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

II. Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment must produce concrete facts demonstrating the issue for trial. Buford v. Tremayne, 747 F.2d 445, 447 (8th Cir.1984). The opposing party "must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment ... even where the evidence is likely to be within the possession of the movant, as long as the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514.

A lawsuit premised on the Minnesota Human Rights Act must be considered in light of burden of proof standards promulgated by the United States Supreme Court. Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Minn.1986). A plaintiff in such a suit is required to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). If the plaintiff is able to present a prima facie case, the defendant is compelled to answer and plaintiff, in turn, is entitled to a rebuttal. Id. at 803-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1824-25; Sigurdson, 386 N.W.2d at 719-20. If a plaintiff is unable to formulate a prima facie case, a court need go no further and summary judgment is appropriate.

A prima facie case under the Minnesota Human Rights Act has four requirements. Plaintiff must establish that 1) he is a member of a protected class, 2) he is qualified for the job, 3) he was discharged, and 4) he was replaced. Kovalevsky v. West Publishing Co., 674 F.Supp. 1379, 1385 (D.Minn.1987); Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn.1978). In this case, plaintiff claims he is part of a protected class of disabled persons.3

As the Act makes clear, a disabled person is a person with a "physical, sensory or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities" or "has a record of...

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