Fuqua v. United States , Case No. 5:09–CV–212–R.
| Citation | 869 F.Supp.2d 814 |
| Decision Date | 19 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:09–CV–212–R. |
| Parties | Patricia FUQUA, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel N. Thomas, Homas & Arvin, Hopkinsville, KY, for Plaintiff.
Benjamin Seth Schecter, U.S. Attorney Office, Louisville, KY, Jason Ervin Holland, Hopkinsville, KY, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court upon the parties' cross motions for summary judgment (DN 58 and DN 67). These matters have been fully briefed. Defendant has additionally filed a partial motion to dismiss (DN 84). This matter has also been fully briefed. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss (DN 84) is GRANTED, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (DN 67) is MOOT in part and DENIED in part, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment (DN 58) is MOOT in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Patricia Fuqua is the owner of a 53.01 acre tract of land (the “Property”) located below a new flight path into the Fort Campbell airport in Christian County, Kentucky. On December 14, 2007, the government filed an action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A, seeking to condemn certain portions of that land. See United States v. 20.67 Acres, et al., No. 5:07–cv–00207. On December 21, 2007, the Court issued an order condemning the property and ordering possession of said property to be immediately surrendered, to the extent of the estate condemned as described in the Declaration of Taking filed by the government. The amount of compensation owed to Plaintiff has yet to be determined by a jury. That action is currently pending before this Court.
Plaintiff's Property is bordered to the north by Interstate 24 and is bordered to the west by a railroad track, now owned by the United States. The only access to the Property is by way of Naomi Lane off of U.S. 41 A. Naomi Lane crosses over the railroad track and continues eastward into the Property. On December 14, 2007, Fuqua filed this action for a Declaration of Rights.1 In Count IV, Fuqua seeks a declaration that the United States owns an easement for its railroad and does not own the land in fee simple. In Count V, Fuqua seeks a declaration that Naomi Lane is a public road and that there is a public crossing at the road's intersection with the government's railroad. A history of the Property, the railroad track, and Naomi Road is necessary to a determination of this action.
The railroad constructed on the property dates back to 1903. At that time, what is known as Stump Farm was composed of three separate tracts of land: the 423–acre R.H. Rives tract, the 100–acre E.H. Garrott tract, and the W.A. McKenzie tract (acreage unknown). Plaintiff's Property is traceable back to the Garrott tract and the Rives tract. With respect to the Rives and McKenzie tracts, the Tennessee Central Railroad Company (“Tennessee Central”) filed a petition in the Christian County Court in March of 1903 “to condemn right-of-way across the land for railroad purposes....” Condemnation Order, DN 71–2. The condemnation Order and Judgment, dated May 4, 1903, assessed the value of the condemned Rives land to be $1,600 and the damages to be $1,500. The Condemnation Order further ordered the defendants to execute and deliver a deed conveying the land to Tennessee Central. By deed dated April 23, 1903, R.H. Rives, his wife, and the Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Company granted rights to Tennessee Central for a 15.21 acre strip of land along the railroad. 2 The deed states, in relevant part:
That for and in consideration of the sum of Thirty One Hundred ($3100.00) Dollars cash in hand, the said parties of the first part have this day bargained, sold and conveyed and by these presents doth bargain, sell and convey unto the said Tennessee Central Railroad Company, its successors and assigns forever the following strip of land located in Christian County, Ky., being a strip of land one hundred feet wide fifty feet on the left of the center line of the survey of said railroad ... containing 15.21 acres more or less.... To have and to hold the aforesaid tract of land herein conveyed unto the said Tennessee Central Railroad Company, its successors and assigns forever with covenants of general warranty of title.
DN 58–3. On April 21, 1903, in consideration of $700.00, E.H. Garrott and his wife granted rights to the Tennessee Central for a 2.74 acre strip of land, being 50 feet to each side of the centerline of the survey of the railroad. DN 58–2. This deed utilizes identical language as the Rives deed.
W.A. McKenzie later acquired the Garrott tract and a portion of the Rives tract. The October 3, 1914 deed from Mattie Hopson, the daughter of Garrott, to McKenzie described the Garrott tract as comprised of land on both sides of the railroad. The conveyance excepted from the conveyance the land “heretofore conveyed to the Tennessee Central Railroad Company for a right-of-way....” DN 70–3. By deed dated May 1, 1937, W.A. McKenzie conveyed the 123.33 acre Stump Farm to the United States. On July 14, 1947, the United States returned the property to private ownership.
Billy Stump and Margaret Stump acquired the property from Emma Trubenbach by deed dated January 12, 1968.3 This deed also refers to the “right-of-way line of Tennessee Central Railroad.” DN 58–11 at p. 5. Martha Stump acquired the Property from Billy Stump and Margaret Stump on December 15, 1981. This deed's description of the land conveyed likewise refers to the “right-of-way line of Tennessee Central Railroad.” DN 58–11 at p. 2. On August 3, 1976, Martha Stump and her husband deeded part of Stump Farm to the Commonwealth of Kentucky for the construction of I–24, which physically divided Stump Farm and blocked alternative access to the Property except for Naomi Lane.
Robert Ladd, Plaintiff's former husband, purchased the 53.01 acre property from Martha Stump on August 23, 1983. This deed refers to the railroad right-of-way. DN 58–7. This conveyance was a part of a division of the approximately 123.33 acre Stump Farm. Following her marriage to Ladd on August 23, 1998, Plaintiff resided on the property until their divorce 1998. As a result of the divorce litigation, Plaintiff was deeded the Property by the Christian County Master Commissioner. This deed's description of the property refers to the “right of way of railroad.” DN 58–6. The deed also excepts 1.6 acres of the property for a “County Road.” Id.
Tennessee Central conveyed its interest in the land along the railroad to Illinois Central Railroad by deed dated March 18, 1969. On June 30, 1980, the Illinois Gulf Central Railroad, the successor to the Illinois Central Railroad, applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) to abandon the use of the entire railroad line between Hopkinsville, Kentucky and Nashville, Tennessee. Over the objections of the Department of Defense, the ICC granted the petition to close the railroad on March 10, 1981.
The 101st Airborne Division of the United States Army requested a real estate planning report on May 4, 1981 regarding the proposed acquisition of the nineteen-mile stretch of railroad between Fort Campbell and Hopkinsville, Kentucky. The report, prepared by the Office of the Commander, United States Army Engineer District, stated that “discontinuation of rail services to Fort Campbell would have minimal impact on routine peacetime operations;” however, during national emergencies, continued rail service was considered essential for deploying active duty combat units to seaports and simultaneously mobilizing numerous reserve component units. Williamson Declaration, DN 52–5. In addition, continued rail service was essential for the deployment of equipment. Id.
The Department of Defense acquired its interest in the railroad by Special Warranty deed dated June 5, 1986. George F. Williamson III, an attorney for the United States Army Corps of Engineers, prepared the deed. Williamson, in his declaration, stated that “[i]t was always the intention of the United States to acquire a fee interest in this property.” DN 52–5. Williamson further stated that, “Consistent with acquiring the property in fee, as part of this purchase the United States received a title insurance commitment from the Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company that the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, a Delaware corporation, held title to the land in fee simple.” Id.
The United States moves this Court to dismiss Count IV of Fuqua's Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(h)(3). In Count IV, Fuqua asks this Court to declare that the United States' interest in the property along the railroad is an easement for railroad purposes, and not a fee interest, and therefore, the United States has no right to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the underlying property on which the easement is located. The United States, in its motion to dismiss, contends that Fuqua failed to bring this action within the appropriate period of time allowed by the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a party may file a motion asserting “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “Subject matter jurisdiction is always a threshold determination,” Am. Telecom Co. v. Leb., 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)), and “may be raised at any stage in the proceedings,” Schultz v. Gen. R.V. Ctr., 512 F.3d 754, 756 (6th Cir.2008). “A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which case all allegations of the plaintiff...
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