Furber v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act

Citation324 A.2d 254,164 Conn. 446
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Decision Date07 March 1973
PartiesMargaret E. FURBER et al. v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT, et al.

Bruce W. Manternach, Hartford, with whom was Edmund J. Dilworth, Jr., Detroit, Mich., of the Michigan bar, for appellant (defendant New Departure-Hyatt Bearings Division of the General Motors Corporation).

Thomas J. Daley, Asst. Atty. Gen., appeared for the named defendant.

William S. Zeman, Hartford, for appellees (named plaintiff et al.).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

MacDONALD, Associate Justice.

This appeal is taken by the defendant New Departure-Hyatt Bearings Division of the General Motors Corporation, located in Bristol, Connecticut (hereinafter called the Bristol Division), from a judgment of the Superior Court in Hartford County which, in effect, sustained a decision of the commissioner of unemployment compensation benefits for the first district. The commissioner, in ruling that the plaintiffs were eligible to receive unemployment benefits, and the trial court, in dismissing the Bristol Division's appeal therefrom, concluded that the unemployment of the plaintiffs for which they received compensation was not due to the existence of a labor dispute at the Bristol Division, and the sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the court erred, on the facts involved, in reaching that conclusion.

The findings of fact of the commissioner as corrected first by the commissioner and later by the trial court have not been attacked and indicate that the plaintiffs are members of the United Automobile Workers, Local 626 (hereinafter called the Local Union), headquartered in Bristol, which is an affiliate of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (hereinafter called the International Union). The national agreement between the International Union and the General Motors Corporation (hereinafter called G.M.) included the employees of the Local Union in its coverage. They were employed by the Bristol Division, which is a single and separate factory unit of G.M. and is the only factory in Connecticut owned and operated by G.M. The Bristol Division produces bearings, ball bearings, roller bearings and roller clutches, the bulk of which products were sold to G.M. but a portion of which were sold to the Chrysler Corporation (hereinafter called Chrysler) and the Ford Motor Company (hereinafter called Ford) with no price preference being given to G.M.

The national agreement, which, as we have noted, included in its coverage the employees of the Local Union, expired at midnight September 14, 1970, and the International Union and G.M., on July 15, 1970, commenced negotiations for a new contract, each seeking changes from the existing contract. The Local Union, as well as other local affiliates, made certain requests for changes in the contract and the Local Union to which the plaintiffs belonged was represented on a national committee of the International Union which conducted the negotiations with G.M. Any agreement reached between the International Union and G.M. would be subject to ratification by the International Union and any local agreement between the Local Union and the factory (in this case the Bristol Division), where the Local Union acted as bargaining agent, would be subject to approval by the International Union and G.M.

In August, 1970, the International Union informed G.M. that if no agreement were reached a 'selective strike' would be directed against G.M., which meant, it was explained, that certain of the local plants, including the Bristol Division, would continue to operate. The International Union at the same time informed G.M. that no strike would be called against Chrysler or Ford. A strike against G.M. was called effective at midnight, September 14, 1970. The employees at the Bristol Division continued to work after that date as part of the International Union's 'selective strike' strategy which required that employees at G.M. plants continue to work in order to keep Ford and Chrysler, the major competitors of G.M., in production and thereby to increase the union bargaining pressure on G.M. There was no picketing of the Bristol Division during the strike called by the International Union, and the plant continued to function, although at less than full capacity. As a result of the curtailment of orders by G.M. only, a number of employees of the Bristol Division including the plaintiffs were laid off for lack of work on varying dates commencing September 23, 1970. Commencing two weeks after the strike started on September 14, 1970, some of the plaintiffs who were thus laid off obtained loans from the Local Union to ease their economic stress during the pendency of the strike. The moneys of the so-called Strike Fund of the International Union were available as loans to the membership of the Local Union for the payment of personal bills, mortgages, and other items, the loans being repayable out of any funds received as unemployment compensation.

The controlling provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act are found in § 31-236(3) of the General Statutes, which provides in relevant part: 'An individual shall be ineligible for benefits . . . (3) during any week in which it is found by the administrator that his total or partial unemployment is due to the existence of a labor dispute other than a lockout at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or has been employed . . ..' Since the issue raised is whether the unemployment of the plaintiffs was 'due to the existence of a labor dispute' at the Bristol Division, the definition of 'labor dispute' is of basic importance.

' The Unemployment Compensation Act . . . does not define the words 'labor dispute.' For the meaning of the term, as it is used . . . (here), we must look to the definition contained in the statutes relating to injunctions in labor disputes. Alvarez v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 327, 333, 93 A.2d 298; Conte v. Egan, 135 Conn. 367, 371, 64 A.2d 534. The term 'labor dispute' includes 'any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment or concerning employment relations, or any controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Bartlett v. Administrator, 142 Conn. 497, 502-503, 115 A.2d 671, 674. This is the identical definition given to the term in our present statutes relating to injunctions in labor disputes. See § 31-112(c). In determining whether, under the foregoing definition, there was in fact, a 'labor dispute . . . at the factory' (emphasis added), i.e., at the Bristol Division, it is necessary to examine carefully and realistically the underlying facts of this case.

Since under Practice Book § 721 '(t)he testimony printed in the appendices will be deemed to embrace all testimony produced at the trial material to the issues on the appeal,' we disregard certain unsupported statements in the defendant's brief concerning the vote of the Bristol Division employees to strike. Evidence printed in the appendices to both briefs, however, adds materially to a fair understanding of the true facts involved in the labor dispute between the two unions and G.M. Clearly, the Local Union was a party to the labor dispute with G.M. as it affected all G.M. employees, including those at the Bristol Division, and was negotiated nationally by the committee of the International Union on which the Local Union was represented and locally by the negotiating committee of the Local Union. In August, 1970, during negotiations of the dispute, the president of the Local Union published a letter to all of its members stating: 'We are entering negotiations with great issues to be bargained for: '30 and Out' (retirement on pension after thirty years' service regardless of age), substantial wage increase, better working conditions, etc. It is a time to stand indivisible-and go forward together, for those who are not with us are against us.' The president, the strike vote committee and the negotiating committee of the Local Union clearly identified the disputes and negotiations between the International Union and G.M. on the national level with those between the Local Union and local management in a notice urging a strong strike vote on August 20, 1970. 1 This identification is further strenghened by the fact that at least 100 employees who were laid off at the Bristol Division were given loans from the Strike Assistance Fund of the International Union. And the fact that members of the Local Union were faithfully playing their part in the overall plan of the International Union to pressure G.M., including the Bristol Division, to meet the demands of both unions, including the Local Union, is made crystal clear by the instructions and exhortations by the president of the International Union to members of the Local Union through the principal union paper 2 and in a letter dated September 30, 1970, to all members of local unions who had been ordered to continue to work as part of the selective strike strategy. 3

The court is well aware of the peculiar situation existing in the automobile industry in this country in that there are but four major producers, namely, G.M., Ford, Chrysler and American Motors. It is equally aware of th tremendouseconomic pressure that would have been brought to bear on G.M. if the unions involved here had been successful in carrying out their declared purpose of keeping the three principal competitors of G.M. in production by continuing to supply them with the necessary parts produced at Bristol. These basic facts, we well as that of...

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