Furey v. City of Sacramento
Decision Date | 17 August 1979 |
Docket Number | S.F. 23967 |
Citation | 157 Cal.Rptr. 684,598 P.2d 844,24 Cal. 3d 862 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 598 P.2d 844 Lawrence E. FUREY, as Trustee, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Defendants and Respondents. Ernest E. WEBBER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, Douglas B. Hughmanick, Richard M. Sims III, San Francisco, Desmond, Miller, Desmond & Bartholomew, Stephen James Wagner and Richard F. Desmond, Sacramento, for plaintiffs and appellants.
James P. Jackson, City Atty., Leliand J. Savage, Deputy City Atty., Barrett, Newlan & Matheny and Ronald R. Haven, Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., E. Clement Shute, Jr., R. H. Connett, Asst. Attys. Gen. and Mark I. Weinberger, Deputy Atty. Gen., as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.
In these two cases, which have been consolidated for purposes of appeal, we face the question, among others, whether a city, having participated with other public entities in the creation of a special sewer assessment district in a county area intended for transition to urban development, and later having annexed the area, may thereafter amend its general plan and enact an open space ordinance in a manner precluding certain of the owners of property subject to assessment from realizing all or substantially all benefits from the underlying public improvement for an indefinite period of time. We conclude that in the circumstances here alleged it may not, and that in the absence of appropriate reassessment or other relief being afforded, the amendment and ordinance may not be applied to such owners and their properties.
Plaintiffs appeal from judgments of dismissal entered following the sustaining of demurrers, without leave to amend, to their complaints seeking damages for inverse condemnation, declaratory and injunctive relief, and mandate. In the following statement of the facts we accept all properly pleaded allegations of the complaints as true for purposes of this appeal. (See, e. g., Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241.)
The so-called Natomas area of Sacramento County (County) is an area of approximately 15 square miles, devoted primarily to agricultural uses, which is located to the north of the metropolitan area of the City of Sacramento (City). Since 1960, Lawrence E. Furey and his predecessor Joseph A. Maun, trustees, (Furey) have held title to approximately 1,157 acres of land in the portion of this area presently lying to the north of Interstate 880. Ernest E. Webber, Nellys F. Webber, and Robert E. Waller (Webber) have owned approximately 363 acres in the same portion of the Natomas area for a similar length of time. Beginning in 1961, and in light of government determinations on various levels contemplating the imminent and continuing transition of the entire Natomas area to urban development and uses, County, upon a finding of public interest and convenience, undertook the establishment of a special sewer assessment district therein under the provisions of the Improvement Act of 1911 (Sts. & Hy.Code, § 5000 et seq.), which district was to undertake all measures necessary to install various trunk sewer lines and a sewer treatment facility in the area. Said improvements were designed to provide adequate sewer disposal facilities for the anticipated residential and commercial use of over 4,000 acres of planned residential development, including homes, shopping centers and schools. City, within whose then boundaries some of the contemplated improvements and benefits were to be installed, gave its formal consent, and on October 7, 1961, the Natomas area was annexed to City. In January 1962, by action of the board of supervisors of County, defendant Natomas Sanitation District of Sacramento County (District) 1 was formed as a "county sanitation district" pursuant to the provisions of section 4700 et seq. of the Health and Safety Code and since that time has exercised the powers granted to such a district by the provisions of section 4738 et seq. of the same code; on the same date said district assumed ownership, control, management and supervision of the sewer facilities to be built. 2
Work on the contemplated improvements was commenced in 1961 and completed in 1965. During this same general period of time City and County adopted other plans and entered into other agreements reflecting and specifying the intended urban and commercial development of the Natomas area, including the Natomas General Development Plan (1962), the Sacramento Metropolitan Airport Plan (1962), various freeway agreements with planned interchanges for the servicing of urban uses, a Northgate Gardenland community plan (1965), and an Old City community plan (1966).
In April 1965, the assessment on the project was confirmed. The total assessment was $3,137,462; of this $840,644.72 was allocated to the Furey property and $378,609 to the Webber property. Pursuant to the provisions of the Improvement Act of 1911 bonds were issued by County and plaintiffs thereupon became obligated to make and presently continue to make annual payments of principal and semi-annual payments of interest against the amounts allocated to their respective properties. 3
In 1970 the Legislature enacted comprehensive legislation directed to the preservation of open-space lands within the state. (Gov.Code, § 65560 et seq.) As amended Government Code section 65563 required that every city and county (apparently including charter cities such as Sacramento see Gov.Code, §§ 65700, 65302, subd. (e)) by December 31, 1973, adopt a local open-space plan "for the comprehensive and long-range preservation and conservation of open-space land within its jurisdiction," and that an interim plan be adopted by August 31, 1972. Thereupon defendants City, County, and District met on numerous occasions for the purpose of complying with these requirements. These meetings were carried on with full knowledge of (1) the various existing plans affecting the Natomas area and contemplating its transition to urban use, and (2) the construction and assessment which had previously been carried on by District. Nevertheless it was determined that the Natomas area be included in the open-space plan. In 1972 City imposed a moratorium on building and development in the area, and on or about July 7, 1973, it adopted an "Open Space Element" to its general plan indicating that the portion of the Natomas area lying to the north of Interstate 880 was to be reserved for agricultural and open-space uses. This element provided:
The Open Space Element also contained recommendations to "(r)eview City agriculture-urban reserve areas at the time of General Plan updating every 5 to 7 years and adjust these areas if contiguous urban growth warrants the change" and to "(r)eview permanent agriculture areas every 20 years and adjust these areas if warranted."
All of the lands here in question are within the agricultural reserve thus created. Approximately four-fifths of the Furey property lies within the "permanent agriculture" area; the remainder of the Furey property and all of the Webber property lies within the "agricultural-urban reserve" area.
On the date of its adoption of the Open Space Element of its general plan City also amended its comprehensive zoning ordinance, setting up certain open-space zones including one designated "Agricultural Zone A" and one designated "Agricultural Open Space A-OS." Only the following special uses were to be allowed in these open-space zones, subject to the granting of a special permit by the planning commission: The ordinance also provided: "No special permit shall be issued hereunder unless the Planning Commission first determines that such issuance would be in conformity with the Zoning Ordinance and the General Plan as they relate to open space." It also stated:
Shortly after the amendment of the general plan and the zoning ordinance Webber attempted to file with City's planning commission a tentative subdivision map, an application to rezone, and an application to amend the general plan. When the planning commission refused to accept all of these but the latter, and when subsequent attempts to obtain a hearing before the planning commission and...
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