Furlong v. Gardner

Decision Date23 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. 96SC772,96SC772
Parties98 CJ C.A.R. 1302 Bob FURLONG and Richard Marr, Petitioners, v. Susan GARDNER, as personal representative of the Estate of Robert E. Gardner, Jr., and as successor personal representative of the Estate of Robert Edwin Gardner, III, Respondent.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Wood, Ris & Hames, P.C., F. Michael Ludwig, Dennis A. Hanson, Denver, for Petitioners.

Knapp & Sachs, P.C., Benjamin Sachs, Denver, Alexander & Ricci, Joseph M. Ricci, Colorado Springs, for Respondent.

Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review a court of appeals' order dismissing for the second time an appeal taken by the petitioners. The respondent brought suit in the El Paso County District Court (the trial court) against the petitioners, two officials at the Limon Correctional Facility (LCF), alleging that the petitioners violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and were liable for negligently causing the wrongful death of the respondent's grandson. In turn, the petitioners moved for summary judgment, asserting a qualified immunity defense on the § 1983 claim and a lack of evidence on the negligence/wrongful death claim. The trial court, in an unsigned minute order, reserved ruling on the petitioners' motion and ordered, without qualification, discovery to continue. The court of appeals ruled that the minute order was not a final appealable order and, consequently, dismissed the appeal. We now reverse the court of appeals.

We hold that the trial court's reserved ruling order was effectively a final judgment. We also hold that, under the facts of this case, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, even though the trial court did not sign the minute order. Additionally, we reaffirm our opinion in City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo.1996), and hold that the trial court was required to apply the analysis set forth in that case when it ruled on the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we remand the case to the court of appeals with instructions to direct the trial court to determine the appropriateness of summary judgment consistent with this opinion.

I.

This case arises from the protracted civil litigation involving the death of Robert Gardner, III. On April 5, 1993, Robert Gardner, III, then an inmate at LCF, was murdered by strangulation. Subsequently, Robert Gardner, III's father, Robert Gardner, Jr., individually and as the personal representative of Robert Gardner, III's estate, brought an action in the trial court predicated on § 1983 and a negligence/wrongful death claim against petitioners Bob Furlong (Furlong) and Richard Marr (Marr). 1 At the time of Robert Gardner, III's death, Furlong was the Warden of LCF and Marr was the Deputy Warden of LCF. Shortly after filing the original complaint, Robert Gardner, Jr. died and Robert Gardner, III's grandmother, Susan Gardner (Gardner), became the substitute plaintiff, representing the estates of Robert Gardner, III and Robert Gardner, Jr.

On June 1, 1995, Furlong and Marr moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things that they were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim. In their motion for summary judgment, Furlong and Marr argued that Gardner had neither identified a clearly established right which Furlong and Marr violated, nor had Gardner established that Furlong and Marr's conduct violated any clearly established right.

On August 4, 1995, the trial court entered a minute order regarding Furlong and Marr's summary judgment motion. The minute order stated that the trial court "reserves ruling" on the summary judgment motion. At the same time, the minute order ordered "discovery to continue." The minute order was recorded on a computer printout which indicated the date of the order. However, the trial court judge did not sign the minute order.

Furlong and Marr appealed the trial court's minute order to the court of appeals. On November 15, 1995, the court of appeals ordered Furlong and Marr to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed without prejudice either because the minute order was not a final, written, dated, and signed order in accordance with C.R.C.P. 58(a) or because the substance of the minute order was not appealable. Rejecting Furlong and Marr's response to the order to show cause, the court of appeals issued an order on December 15, 1995 dismissing the appeal without prejudice on the ground that there was not a final appealable order.

Furlong and Marr then petitioned this court for certiorari review of the court of appeals' order dismissing their appeal. On August 5, 1996, we granted Furlong and Marr's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of our recent decision in Brace.

On remand, the court of appeals again issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed without prejudice for lack of a final appealable order. In its show cause order dated September 5, 1996, the court of appeals stated [I]n as much as the trial court order here (1) has not been signed by the trial court as required by C.R.C.P. 58(a); and (2) does not decide the motions for summary judgment, and thus leaves issues to be resolved, see Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 (Colo.1982), it appears that the August 5, 1995 trial court order is not an appealable order.

Approximately one month later, after Furlong and Marr filed a response to the court of appeals' order to show cause, the court of appeals dismissed their appeal a second time, ruling that "the unsigned minute order reserving ruling on the motion for summary judgment is not a final appealable order." We granted Furlong and Marr's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' second order dismissing their appeal. 2

II.
A.

Before discussing the two issues before us, it is necessary to review both our decision in Brace and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 117 S.Ct. 1800, 138 L.Ed.2d 108 (1997). In Brace, a former city employee brought an action against the city and certain city officials, alleging state claims based on contract and tort and federal claims under § 1983. See Brace, 919 P.2d at 234. The defendants in Brace moved for summary judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56, arguing among other things that they were entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 236. In denying the defendants' summary judgment motion, the trial court ruled that "[the trial court] cannot determine whether the qualified immunity of the individual Defendants prevents Plaintiff's action against them and summary judgment is not appropriate on the grounds of Defendants' qualified immunity." Id. at 237. On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court's denial on the issue of qualified immunity was not immediately appealable. See id.

In reversing the court of appeals, we reviewed the doctrine of qualified immunity in § 1983 cases. See id. at 237-41. Preliminarily, we noted that the plaintiff must plead a constitutional violation in order to overcome a qualified immunity defense. See id. at 238. Citing Supreme Court case law, we explained that the constitutional right must have been "clearly established" at the time of the action in question, which ensures that a reasonable official in the defendant's situation would have understood his or her conduct violated that right. See id.

We went on to explain the relationship between the qualified immunity defense and an interlocutory appeal taken from the trial court's denial of a government official's motion for summary judgment. See id. at 238-39. We stated:

Interlocutory appeals are the exception to the general rule that an appeal cannot be taken from anything other than a final decision. Under federal law, this policy is reflected in 28 U.S.C. section 1291 (1994) which provides that [a federal court of appeals] can only hear appeals from final decisions. An analogous provision is found in Colorado law at section 13-4-102(1), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which states that "the court of appeals shall have initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of the district courts."

Id. (citation omitted). After reviewing the Supreme Court's then recent decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), and other federal case law, we concluded that the appealability of a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment premised on qualified immunity turns on the trial court's underlying rationale. See Brace, 919 P.2d at 240-41. If the denial is based on a question of law (i.e., the trial court finds that the plaintiff pled sufficient facts to support a violation of a clearly established law), the defendant can immediately appeal an adverse trial court ruling. See id. at 241. However, if the trial court denies the summary judgment motion because a material, triable question of fact exists, that determination is not immediately appealable. See id. Accordingly, we set forth the framework a trial court should apply in determining whether or not to grant summary judgment based on qualified immunity:

The proper framework for the analysis requires the trial court to first determine whether the facts--as pled by [the plaintiff]--sufficiently state a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. If not, the inquiry stops there. Alternatively, if the trial court finds that [the plaintiff] has met this burden, it must also determine, under a summary judgment standard, if there are genuine issues of material fact such that the issue of qualified immunity must await determination by a trier of fact. The first part of the analysis is immediately reviewable, but the second part is not. Naturally, the trial court's order may encompass both types of findings. In that event, the court of appeals reviews only the legal...

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