Furman v. State

• Citation: 225 Ga. 253,167 S.E.2d 628
• Decision Date: 24 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 25163,25163
• Parties: William Henry FURMAN v. The STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 628

167 S.E.2d 628

225 Ga. 253

William Henry FURMAN v. The STATE.

No. 25163.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 24, 1969.

B. Clarence Mayfield, Savannah, for appellant.

Andrew J. Ryan, Jr., Dist. Atty., Robert E. Barker, Savannah, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Larry H. Evans, Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.

This case involves the crime of murder by shooting, occurring during a burglary after the intruder had been discovered by the deceased who was then shot through a closed door. The accused was indicted, tried and convicted without a recommendation for mercy. A motion for new trial, as amended, was filed, heard and overruled, and the appeal is from the judgment, after conviction, and sentence with error enumerated on the denial of the motion for new trial, as amended. Held:

1. A juror having been excluded for cause because he stated that his opposition to the death penalty would affect his decision as to a defendant's guilt, his exclusion did not fall within the rule as laid down in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, and the court did not err in excluding him for cause. There is no merit in the amended motion complaining that the exclusion violated the rule in the Witherspoon case, supra.

2. The record showing a definitive determination from a consideration of the evidence by the trial judge, out of the jury's presence, that upon his arrest the accused had his constitutional rights explained to him, including the right to remain silent, the right of counsel, and that anything he said might be used against him in court, and that he thereafter freely and voluntarily and knowingly made certain statements in regard to the crime, the same was admissible both legally and factually, and all the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, have been complied with fully and completely. We find no merit in the contention of counsel that his constitutional rights had been violated.

3. We find no violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, supra, as contended by counsel, hence the extrinsic evidence of fingerprints, admissions, and pistol were properly allowed in evidence against him and should not have been supppressed. Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594(3), 157 S.E.2d 431; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.

4. The statutes of this State authorizing capital punishment have repeatedly been held not to be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. See Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7(2), 136 S.E.2d 766; Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594(18), 157 S.E.2d 431, supra. Hence, there is no merit in this complaint.

5. The record discloses that the accused was arrested on August 11, 1967, and a commitment hearing held on August 15, 1967. While Code Ann. § 27-212 (Ga.L.1956, pp. 796, 797) requires a hearing within 48 hours, nevertheless, a detention or imprisonment beyond a reasonable time does not render the verdict of a jury after indictment illegal or void. It has already been held above that the...