Furr v. State
| Decision Date | 21 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. PD-0212-15,PD-0212-15 |
| Citation | 499 S.W.3d 872 |
| Parties | Chris Furr, Appellant v. The State of Texas |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Travis W. Berry, for Appellant.
Douglas K. Norman, for the State.
HERVEY
, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., JOHNSON, KEASLER, RICHARDSON, YEARY, and NEWELL, JJ., joined.
Chris Furr was charged with possession of a controlled substance after police found heroin on him while patting him down for weapons. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was illegally stopped and frisked. The trial court denied the motion. Furr pled guilty, and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, probated for three years. He appealed the denial of the motion to suppress, once again arguing that he was illegally stopped and frisked. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Furr v. State , No. 13-14–00287–CR, 2015 WL 307757, at *1 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 22, 2015)
(mem.op.) (not designated for publication). We granted Furr's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred when it held that the stop and frisk of Furr did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.1 Because we agree with the court of appeals, we will affirm its judgment.
FACTS
One Tuesday afternoon, Officer George Alvarez of the Corpus Christi Police Department responded to an anonymous tip that two white males, one in all black and one in a black shirt and carrying a brown backpack, were using drugs on a street corner. An officer who later arrived at the scene testified that the corner was located in a “high drug, high crime” area. In response to the call, Alvarez drove by the street intersection and saw two males who fit the description given by the informant. As he drove past the men in his police car, he noticed in his rearview mirror that they were watching him as he drove past. He then approached the two,2 but Furr avoided Alvarez and quickly walked into the nearby Mother Theresa Shelter. As he walked away, he repeatedly looked over his shoulder at Alvarez. Alvarez spoke to the other man, Collier, about the call police received. When another officer arrived, Officer Ayala, Alvarez told him that Furr walked away from him “furtive[ly], like he was trying to get away.”
Both officers entered the shelter to make contact with Furr. They found him in the facility's yard, where according to Ayala, he was still acting nervous, seemed anxious, was profusely sweating, appeared to be evasive, and was trying to avoid them. Ayala asked Furr if he had any weapons on him, but Furr did not initially respond. It appeared to Ayala that Furr was “kind of out of it” and “looked like he was under the influence of a drug.” To protect himself and others, Ayala frisked Furr for weapons. While doing so, he felt something in Furr's right front pocket that he knew from experience was a glass crack pipe. As he removed the pipe, he also found two syringes. After seizing the contraband, Furr was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia, and according to Ayala, he was no longer free to leave. Ayala asked if he had any identification, and Furr said that it was in his pocket. After removing the wallet and opening it, Ayala found two small balloons of what he believed to be heroin.
Furr was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. The record contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law. Furr pled guilty after losing his motion to suppress, but he reserved his right to appeal the ruling of the trial court.
COURT OF APPEALS
Furr argued on appeal that the anonymous tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk him, but the court of appeals disagreed. Furr , 2015 WL 307757, at *6
. It noted that brief investigative detentions are permitted when police have reasonable suspicion to believe that a person is involved in criminal activity and that, police are justified in patting down a suspect for weapons, if they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect may be presently armed and dangerous. Id. at *3.
(internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, based on Ayala's testimony that Furr “was just kind of out of it,” “looked like he was under the influence of a drug,” and Furr's failure to respond when Ayala asked if he was armed, the court held that the tip was sufficiently corroborated to warrant a brief detention and a limited pat down of Furr for weapons.3
Id. Although it concluded that the pat down was justified, it rejected the State's argument that the “guns follow drugs” presumption should be extended to people who are merely accused of possessing drugs.4
ARGUMENTS
Furr argues that United States Supreme Court precedent requires us to conclude that the anonymous tip in this case, without more, was insufficient to justify the stop and frisk. Among other cases, he relies on Florida v. J.L. , 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000)
. According to Furr, in that case, the Supreme Court held that an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was insufficient standing alone to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. Id. at 273–74, 120 S.Ct. 1375
.
The State responds that Furr's detention did not begin until the frisk itself; therefore, anything that happened prior to the frisk can be considered in determining reasonable suspicion. The State also argues that there are a number of other factors that, when considered together, are sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion here: (1) the relative contemporaneity; (2) the high-crime location of the incident; (3) Furr's altering course and retreating into the shelter upon seeing law enforcement; and (4) Furr's nervousness, (5) unresponsiveness, and (6) possible intoxication.
With respect to the weapons frisk, the State contends that an officer's objective belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous can be predicated on the nature of the alleged criminal activity alone, and it argues that we should apply the “guns follow drugs” presumption to people accused only of possessing drugs. Griffin v. State , 215 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex.Crim.App.2006)
. According to it, because it is inherently difficult to separate drug dealers from drug users, officers should not be prevented from conducting a pat down of someone who is observed with drugs in a high crime area. The State also asserts that there was a heightened threat to officer safety in this case because the incident took place in a homeless shelter and Furr appeared to be under the influence of drugs and did not initially respond when asked whether he had a weapon.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion and apply a bifurcated standard of review, affording almost complete deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, especially when those determinations are based on assessments of credibility and demeanor. Crain v. State , 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex.Crim.App.2010)
. We review de novo, however, whether the facts are sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion in a given case. Crain , 315 S.W.3d at 48–49. When the trial court does not make express findings of fact, as in this case, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will assume it made findings that are consistent with its ruling and that are supported by the record. Turrubiate v. State , 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). If the ruling of the trial court is correct under any applicable theory of law, we will sustain its ruling. Arguellez v. State , 409 S.W.3d 657, 662–63 (Tex.Crim.App.2013).
DETENTIONS & FRISKS
“There are three distinct types of police-citizen interactions: (1) consensual encounters that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions that are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures, that are reasonable only if supported by probable cause.” Wade v. State , 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex.Crim.App.2013)
. This case implicates the first and second categories: consensual encounters and investigative detentions.
We review de novo the question of whether a consensual encounter has advanced into a detention. Id. at 668
. There is no bright-line rule dictating when a consensual encounter becomes a detention. Id. at 667. Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the officer's request or to terminate the consensual encounter. Id. Formulated a different way, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when there is application of physical force or, where such is absent, a submission to an assertion of authority. Id. at 667–68
. The test to determine whether a person has been detained is objective and does not rely on the subjective belief of the detainee or the police. Id. at 668.
Reasonable suspicion to detain a person exists when a police officer has “specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in...
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