Fusilier v. Landry
| Citation | 963 F.3d 447 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-30665,19-30665 |
| Parties | Vincent FUSILIER, Sr., Reverend; Lionel Myers; Wendell Desmond Shelby, Jr.; Daniel Turner, Jr.; Terrebonne Parish Branch NAACP, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Jeffrey Martin LANDRY, Esq., Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, in his official capacity, Defendant - Appellant |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Leah Camille Aden, Esq., Janai S. Nelson, Esq., Samuel Spital, NAACP, Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Incorporated, New York, NY, William Aaron Lesser, Cozen O'Connor, P.C., New York, NY, Michaele Turnage Young, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Incorporated, Washington, DC, Ronald Lawrence Wilson, New Orleans, LA, Michael B. de Leeuw, Cozen O'Connor, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellees
Angelique Duhon Freel, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Wale, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Louisiana Department of Justice, Baton Rouge, LA, Phillip Michael Gordon, Jason Brett Torchinsky, Holtzman Vogel Josefiak Torchinsky, P.L.L.C., Warrenton, VA, Elizabeth Baker Murrill, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellant
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
African-American voters and the Terrebonne Parish NAACP filed suit in 2014 to challenge the electoral method for Louisiana's 32nd Judicial District Court ("32nd JDC"). They asserted that at-large elections for the judges produce discriminatory results, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and have been maintained for a discriminatory purpose in violation of that statute and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. After trial, the district court upheld both claims. Eventually, it ordered a remedial plan breaking the 32nd JDC into five single-member electoral subdistricts. Louisiana's Attorney General appealed.
Careful review persuades us that the district court erred legally and factually. Specifically, the court erred in holding that weak evidence of vote dilution could overcome the state's substantial interest in linking judicial positions to the judges’ parish-wide jurisdiction, and it erroneously equated failed legislative attempts to create subdistricts for the 32nd JDC with a racially discriminatory intent. We REVERSE.1
The 32nd JDC encompasses Terrebonne Parish. Terrebonne Parish begins south of New Orleans and covers territory extending well into the bayous and ultimately to the Gulf of Mexico. Formerly the site of sugar plantations, the parish became a hub for the offshore oil and gas industry seventy years ago. The Parish seat is located in Houma, population over 30,000, with a few smaller towns and Cajun residents still living among the bayous. Of the parish's population, about ten percent of the residents still spoke French at home according to the 2010 Census; slightly less than 19% of the residents were black.
Since its creation in 1968, elections for the five judicial seats in the 32nd JDC have been conducted on an at-large basis. The plaintiffs’ lawsuit took issue with this electoral method, asserting claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") and unconstitutional racial discrimination. They initially named as defendants then-Louisiana Governor Piyush "Bobby" Jindal, Attorney General James "Buddy" Caldwell, and Secretary of State Tom Schedler. During discovery, the plaintiffs, without explanation, moved to dismiss the Secretary of State with prejudice. The district court granted that motion.
After an eight-day bench trial, the district court held in 2017 that Louisiana's use of an at-large voting system for the 32nd JDC "deprives black voters of the equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in violation of Section 2" of the VRA, and that the voting system "ha[d] been maintained for that [discriminatory] purpose, in violation of Section 2 and the United States Constitution." The court reached these conclusions after rejecting the defendants’ standing argument and their claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The district court invited the parties to submit proposals "regarding the appropriate remedy for the court and legislature to take." Neither the defendants nor the Louisiana legislature, for two legislative sessions, offered a plan conforming to the judgment. A new judge was substituted after the trial judge passed away, and in early 2019 the court determined that it "would be aided by the technical expertise of a Special Master" in reviewing the plaintiffs’ proposed districting plans. The Special Master endorsed, and the district court adopted, a plan to divide the 32nd JDC into five single-member subdistricts, one of which was created as a likely majority-black district. The district court then enjoined the Governor and Attorney General "from administering, implementing, or conducting any future elections for the 32nd JDC in which [judges] are elected on an at-large basis;" commanded them to "ensure that all elections for the 32nd JDC ... be conducted using the remedial redistricting [p]lan;" and ordered them to "take all steps necessary to implement the five single-member district plan ... in order to allow district-based elections to proceed." Only the Attorney General has appealed from this adverse judgment.
This court reviews questions of subject matter jurisdiction, including standing, de novo . Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche , 449 F.3d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 2006). We likewise review de novo "the legal standards the district court applied to determine whether Section 2 has been violated," but "we review the district court's findings on the Gingles threshold requirements and its ultimate findings on vote dilution for clear error." Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2004). A factfinding of intentional discrimination in a voting rights case is also reviewed for clear error. United States v. Brown , 561 F.3d 420, 432 (5th Cir. 2009). "The clear error standard precludes reversal of a district court's findings unless we are ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ " Rodriguez v. Bexar County , 385 F.3d 853, 860 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) ).
The Attorney General challenges the plaintiffs’ standing to assert their claims and raises an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense. He contends that the plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim fails the preconditions established in Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S. 30, 106 S. Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). In particular, he asserts that the court discounted this court's en banc decision in League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 868 (5th Cir. 1993) (" LULAC "), which holds, as a matter of law, that a state's "substantial" "linkage interest" in at-large judicial elections Finally, he argues that the district court erred in finding intentional discrimination. We are persuaded by the last two of these contentions and reverse on that basis.
Taking a novel position in voting rights litigation, the Attorney General argues that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue after they dismissed the Secretary of State and, alternatively, the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit. Neither argument works. In order to have constitutional standing, a plaintiff must establish (1) an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) redressable by a favorable ruling. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Although the Governor has not appealed, the district court must have had jurisdiction to find liability and fashion a remedial order against the Governor. Further, standing must exist at all stages of the litigation. Fontenot v. McCraw , 777 F.3d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 2015). The plaintiffs plainly had standing to maintain suit against Louisiana's Governor. Without raising any complaint in the past about his standing, the Governor has been a party defendant in nearly all of Louisiana's voting rights cases challenging judicial districts2 , and as chief executive, he plays a pivotal role in the enactment of legislation that could address any adverse federal judgment. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott , 495 F.3d 151, 159 (5th Cir. 2007) ( ).3 In contrast, the Secretary of State, although an elected official4 , is responsible for conducting elections only after the districts have been changed, whether by law or by court order. The Attorney General's implicit argument that only the Secretary of State should have been sued is wrong.5
The Attorney General's other jurisdictional argument is that the Eleventh Amendment shields him and the Governor from suit. The parties spar over the prerequisites of Ex parte Young ’s exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) ; Okpalobi v. Foster , 244 F.3d 405, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Both parties miss the mark. "The VRA, which Congress passed pursuant to its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, validly abrogated state sovereign immunity." OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas , 867 F.3d 604, 614 (5th Cir. 2017). Thus, the immunity from suit these officials might otherwise enjoy offers no protection from VRA suits, whether premised on dilution or intentional...
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