Futrell v. J.I. Case

• Decision Date: 20 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-4049,93-4049
• Parties: 66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 238, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,333 Roger FUTRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.I. CASE, a Tenneco Company, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 342

38 F.3d 342

66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 238,

65 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,333

Roger FUTRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.I. CASE, a Tenneco Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-4049.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 9, 1994.

Decided Oct. 20, 1994.

Thomas Nelson (argued), Schneidman, Myers, Dowling & Blumenfield, Milwaukee, WI, for plaintiff-appellant.

John T. Murray, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, Alvin R. Ugent, Podell, Ugent & Cross, Milwaukee, WI, and William R. Sullivan, Jr. (argued) and Pamela B. Hall, Franczek, Sullivan, Mann, Crement, Hein & Relias, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee.

Gwendolyn Young Reams, James R. Neely, Jr., Robert J. Gregory, and Lorraine C. Davis, E.E.O.C., Office of Gen. Counsel, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae.

Before BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and FOREMAN, District Judge. ^*

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Roger Futrell brought suit under Section 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626, against his former employer, Defendant J.I. Case, for discriminatory discharge from employment. At trial, a jury found for Futrell and awarded him $265,576 in damages. The district court then granted Case's motion for judgment as a matter of law (formerly judgment notwithstanding the verdict) under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) and Futrell appealed. We now reverse.

I.

Beginning in 1974, Roger Futrell worked in upper-level management for J.I. Case Company as Manager of Manufacturing Engineering at the Case plant in Wausau, Wisconsin. Futrell reported directly to the General Plant Manager and was considered part of the General Plant Manager's staff. Futrell received generally favorable performance reviews during the time he worked for Case.

In February 1984, Dennis George was appointed General Plant Manager of the Wausau plant. Prior to this appointment, George had been the Manager of Manufacturing Engineering at Case's Wichita, Kansas plant. Upon his arrival in Wausau, George had a conversation with Futrell about the appointment, although the two dispute what was said. According to George, Futrell expressed disappointment that George and not he had received the promotion to General Plant Manager. According to Futrell, George raised the issue and said that he would understand if Futrell were upset. Futrell claims he then told George that he was not upset and would support George completely.

Relations between Futrell and George were apparently good at first. At the end of 1984, George gave Futrell a strong evaluation indicating that Futrell's results achieved were above average and that his performance exceeded expectations in many areas. Moreover, in late 1984 or early 1985, George appointed Futrell to head an important venture between the Wausau plant and Newport News Shipping, a sister company of Case. Both sides agree that this undertaking was viewed as critical to the health and continued existence of the Wausau plant. The project went well but was abruptly canceled in early 1986 for reasons unrelated to Futrell's efforts. The relationship between George and Futrell remained stable during the Newport News project, although the two apparently had a number of confrontations. For his work on the project, Futrell received a mostly positive report from George, although George did note in Futrell's "Key Manager Review" that Futrell "has a tendency when the pressure is on to blame other departments. Must learn to function as a team player. Attitude is strained under pressure." Pursuant to Case policy, this review was not made known to Futrell but was sent only to Case's headquarters in Racine, Wisconsin.

The cancellation of the Newport News project again placed the viability of the Wausau plant in question. In Spring of 1986, however, Case decided to close two plants, one in Terre Haute, Indiana and one in Bettendorf Iowa, and move their product lines to Wausau. This consolidation, called Project 57, necessitated a complete overhaul of the Wausau plant, including new layouts, new equipment, and the implementation of new manufacturing techniques. Like the Newport News project, Project 57 revitalized the Wausau plant. And as with the Newport News project, George asked Futrell to lead this crucial undertaking.

The relationship between George and Futrell became more strained as Project 57 progressed. The two often disagreed about the direction of the Project 57, including two major arguments during project staff meetings. The parties disagree as to how heated these arguments were. George and other witnesses contended that Futrell was insubordinate at the meeting and "went too far," while Futrell maintained that although voices were raised, the disputes were neither inappropriate nor extraordinary. In any event, the last of these arguments occurred at a meeting on September 23, 1986, when George and Futrell disagreed over the hiring of certain engineering personnel. A few days later, on September 26, 1986, George fired Futrell.

Futrell filed a complaint on September 28, 1988, alleging that Case had violated the ADEA in discharging him. Futrell asserted claims against Case for both willful and non-willful employment discrimination. On Case's motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed the non-willful discrimination claim because the two-year statute of limitations on such claims had already run but denied the motion with regard to the willful discrimination claim. The case proceeded to trial on July 12, 1993. At the close of Futrell's case and again at the close of all the evidence, Case moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). The trial court denied both motions. On July 16, 1993, the jury found for Futrell and awarded him $132,788 in lost wages and benefits and $132,788 in liquidated damages. Case then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).

The district court granted Case's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court found that Futrell had not met his burden of persuasion and had failed to prove that the reasons Case proffered for his discharge were pretextual. See Futrell v. J.I. Case, 838 F.Supp. 401, 406-10 (E.D.Wis.1993). This appeal followed.

II.

Lacking direct evidence of a discriminatory discharge, Futrell attempted to prove age discrimination indirectly pursuant to the Supreme Court test fashioned for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and refined in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). See also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir.1994) (hereafter "Baxter Healthcare") (applying test to cases brought under the ADEA); Anderson v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 965 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir.1992) (hereafter "Anderson") (same); Ayala v. Mayfair Molded Products Corp., 831 F.2d 1314, 1318 (7th Cir.1987) (same); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 17-18 (7th Cir.1987) (same); La Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir.1984) (same). The test involves three basic steps. First, an employee must present a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. To show age discrimination in his discharge, the employee must demonstrate: (1) that he was over forty; (2) that he was doing his job well enough to meet his employer's expectations; (3) that he was discharged; and (4) that his employer sought replacement for him. Baxter Healthcare, 13 F.3d at 1122; Anderson, 965 F.2d at 400; La Montagne, 750 F.2d at 1409. Once the employee makes this prima facie case, the employer bears the burden of producing evidence to counter the employee's showing. To do so, the employer must "articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's discharge." Anderson, 965 F.2d at 400 (quoting Weihaupt v. American Medical Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 427 (7th Cir.1988)). Finally, if the employer succeeds in articulating this reason, the burden then falls on the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's proffered reason was only a pretext for discrimination. Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2748; Baxter Healthcare, 13 F.3d at 1122. When making this proof, "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.

The district court found and the parties more or less agree that Futrell made a prima facie showing of age discrimination: Futrell was fifty-three at the time he was fired, had generally received favorable evaluations, and was replaced by a younger person. ¹ It is also uncontroverted that Case articulated a non-discriminatory reason to rebut that showing: Futrell was fired for his outbursts and disagreements with George. Hence, the dispute between the parties, and the ground on which the district court granted judgment as a matter of law, centers on the third part of the proof.

We review de novo a district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law. Mathewson v. National Automatic Tool Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 87, 90 (7th Cir.1986). The standard on review is whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, sufficiently supports the jury verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party winning the verdict. Id.; Yarbrough v. Tower Oldsmobile, Inc., 789 F.2d 508, 512-13 (7th Cir.1985). The reviewing court "does not judge the credibility of witnesses." Mathewson, 807 F.2d at 90. "Our role is not to weigh the evidence in search of a preponderance as would a jury, but it is...