G. C. Breidert Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 01 March 1956
• Citation: 294 P.2d 93,139 Cal.App.2d 633
• Parties: , 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2760, 30 Lab.Cas. P 69,843 G. C. BREIDERT COMPANY, a California corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 21337.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 93

294 P.2d 93

139 Cal.App.2d 633, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2760,

30 Lab.Cas. P 69,843

G. C. BREIDERT COMPANY, a California corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 21337.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

March 1, 1956.

Rehearing Denied March 26, 1956.

Hearing Denied April 30, 1956.

Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Ray L. Johnson, Jr., Los Angeles, for appellant.

Gilbert, Nissen & Irvin, John C. Stevenson, Robert W. Gilbert, Los Angeles, for respondents.

WHITE, Presiding Justice.

This is an action for injunction and damages brought by G. C. Breidert Company, a California corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the employer'), against Sheet Metal Workers Union and Teamsters Unions (hereinafter referred to as 'the unions'), under the California Jurisdictional Strike Act, Labor Code, sections 1115-1120.

The complaint alleges that for some time prior to the filing of the complaint, the unions requested the exclusive right to bargain collectively with the employer on behalf of the latter's employees with respect to wages, hours and working conditions and have requested that the unions have the exclusive right to have their members perform work for the employer; that Air-X-Hauster Workers Association is a labor organization which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work; that Air-X-Hauster Workers Association represents the majority of the employees and has made demand upon employer to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of the latter's employees and has made a request of the employer to negotiate a written contract relating to wages, hours and working conditions and has demanded the exclusive right to have its members perform work for the employer; that the Air-X-Hauster Workers Association has not been financed, in whole or in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by employer, or any representative of the latter; that the unions are engaged in concerted interference with the operation of employer's business for the purpose of compelling the latter to refuse to recognize Air-X-Hauster Workers Association as exclusive bargaining representative of employer's employees and for the purpose of forcing and compelling employer to bargain collectively with the unions on behalf of employer's employees and to compel the former to employ only members of the unions in connection with employer's business; that the unions' concerted interference with employer's business arises out of a controversy between said unions and Air-X-Hauster Workers Association as to which of said unions has, or should have, the exclusive right to bargain collectively with employer on behalf of its employees, or any of them, and as to which of said unions has, or should have, the exclusive right to have its members perform work for employer; that the concerted interference with the business of employer by the unions consists of a primary picket line which causes customers and suppliers of employer to refuse to do business with it, and a consumer secondary boycott wherein the unions threatened officials and supervisors of companies with whom employer does business, with picketing and boycotting if said companies do not cease doing business with the latter; that, as a consequence of said threats, companies with whom employer has in the past done business have ceased doing business with it; that the unions carry picket signs which proclaim to the public that employer is 'unfair to organized labor'; that the unions characterize employer as 'unfair to organized labor', only because employer has failed and refused to recognize the unions as the exclusive representative for the employees of employer. Based upon its verified complaint and supporting affidavits, employer sought a preliminary injunction restraining the unions from:

(a) 'Picketing * * * at or near, around or in front of the entrances to plaintiff's place of business * * *'

(b) 'Persuading, inducing, or causing by any means or manner whatsoever any person, customer or supplier, to refrain from doing business with plaintiff.'

(c) 'Representing to any person that plaintiff is unfair to organized labor or to the American Federation of Labor, or to any one associated therewith.'

(d) 'Persuading, inducing or causing plaintiff to cease recognizing the Air-X-Hauster Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agency for plaintiff's employees by concerted interference with plaintiff's business in any manner whatsoever.'

(e) 'Causing plaintiff to interfere with or coerce its employees in their designation of a collective bargaining representative.'

The unions, by their verified answers, denied the allegations relating to such asserted jurisdictional controversy and of fered two affirmative defenses; the first such defense being that the State court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct complained of because such jurisdiction had been preempted by the authority vested in the National Labor Relations Board under federal law.

Upon the hearing of the application for a preliminary injunction, it was stipulated in open court that the employer was a corporation engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.

In its order, 'denying preliminary injunction', the trial court concluded that, 'it does not have jurisdiction in this matter to issue a preliminary injunction', because 'While the Supreme Court of California held in Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, 40 Cal.2d 392, 254 P.2d 559, that the state court had jurisdiction under the facts in that case to issue an injunction, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States indicate that in labor matters where the employer is engaged in interstate commerce state courts do not have jurisdiction to issue injunctions except in the exercise of the police power of the state. The question is a federal question and this court deems itself bound by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.' From such order, plaintiff employer prosecutes this appeal.

It is first contended by appellant that the trial court had no power to act in the instant case except in accordance with the latest decision of the Supreme Court of California in Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, 40 Cal.2d 392, at page 401, 254 P.2d 559, at page 565, wherein the court held under the facts therein presented, 'there is involved a possible area of activity which is neither protected nor condemned under the federal act, and pursuant to the foregoing decisions', International Union, U. A. W. A. F. of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, decided February, 1949, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651; Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, decided March, 1949, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691; Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, decided February, 1950, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491, 94 L.Ed. 588; International Union, etc. v. O'Brien, decided May, 1950, 339 U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978, and Amalgamated Association, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, decided February, 1951, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364, 'is subject to state action under the anti-jurisdictional strike provisions of the Labor Code'. While conceding that state authority and action must fall where it is in conflict with federal legislation, Hill v. State of Florida, 1944, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York L. R. B., 1949, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1243; Amalgamated Ass'n, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment R. B., 1951, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359, 95 L.Ed. 364; International Union, etc. v. O'Brien, 1950, 339 U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978; Garner v. Teamsters, etc., 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228; Capital Service v. N. L. R. B., 347 U.S. 501, 74 S.Ct. 699, 98 L.Ed. 887; and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546, appellant earnestly insists that the instant case is identical factually in all respects with the Sommer case, supra, and that it is therefore, the bounden duty of any court in this state subordinate to the Supreme Court, not to announce changes in what has hitherto been treated within this state as the settled law with respect to the constitutionality or legality of a state statute, unless there be so exact a parallel between a particular case presented and a controlling decision of a federal court, that no reasonable distinction between them can be made. Birkhofer v. Krumm, 27 Cal.App.2d 513, 536-537, 81 P.2d 609. Appellant does not, however, contend that a state court has jurisdiction to grant relief against concerted labor activities which are either forbidden or protected by the amended Federal Labor Relations Act, International Union, etc. v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781, 94 L.Ed. 978, or that the application of the federal statutes to determine whether the area of regulation of concerted labor activities is open or closed to state regulation presents a federal question, upon which the Supreme Court of the United States is the ultimate authority, 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 206, pp. 365, 366, 377 and cases therein cited; 7 Cal.Jur., Courts, paragraph 48, at...