G. I. Veterans' Taxicab Ass'n, Inc. v. Yellow Cab Co.

Decision Date11 March 1949
Docket Number114.
PartiesG. I. VETERANS' TAXICAB ASS'N, Inc. v. YELLOW CAB CO. et al.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Circuit Court, Baltimore City; John T. Tucker, Judge.

Suit by The Yellow Cab Company and others to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City wherein the G. I. Veterans' Taxicab Association, Inc. intervened. From an order overruling its demurrer to the complaint, the intervenor appeals.

Order reversed.

H Clifton Owens, of Baltimore, for appellant.

Randolph Barton, Jr. and Isidor Roman, both of Baltimore (Nicholas G. Penniman III, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

HENDERSON Judge.

The Yellow Cab Company, holding permits to stand its taxicabs at certain locations in Baltimore City, joined with certain hotels, other property owners, and individual taxicab drivers in filing a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, praying an injunction to restrain the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City from enforcing ordinance 201, of the Mayor and City Council, approved January 26, 1948, on the ground that it is unconstitutional and invalid. The Police Commissioner answered, submitting to whatever action the court might deem proper. The Mayor and City Council demurred to the bill. The present appellant, intervening by leave of court, likewise demurred and has appealed from an order overruling the demurrer. Its right to appeal is not questioned.

Ordinance 201 reads as follows:

'An ordinance prohibiting the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City from granting an exclusive franchise to any person, firm or corporation to stand vehicles for hire in front of any hotel or other place and providing that any taxicab may stand in any place designated as a taxicab stand.
'Whereas, the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City has designated certain places in front of hotels and other places as taxicab stands, with the exclusive right to the person receiving permission therefor; and
'Whereas, this procedure is contrary to the principles of democracy and encourages monopoly; and
'Whereas, numerous veterans have secured permits from the Public Service Commission for the operation of taxicabs but cannot enter the so-called taxicab stands in front of hotels and other places, thereby being deprived of the opportunity to secure or solicit patronage from hotels and other places; therefore

Section 1. Be it ordained by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, That any spaces heretofore or hereafter designated by the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City as taxicab stands in front of hotels and other places shall not be for the exclusive use of the person, firm or corporation given such permit but shall be open to any person operating a taxicab, who shall have equal rights to enter such spaces and secure or solicit patrons. Any person interfering with any taxicab operator in entering or standing in such places shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to a penalty of not more than One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) for each such violation.'

By section 286, ch. 109 of the Acts of 1910, the Board of Police Commissioners of Baltimore City was 'authorized and empowered to set aside and designate certain places in the City of Baltimore to be occupied and used as public or private stands for hackney carriages, and to stipulate the number of such carriage which may occupy or use each of such stands, and to make regulations for the occupation and use of such stands.' Section 281 defined 'hackney carriage' to include 'every vehicle * * * propelled by mechanical motor, except a street car, used or to be used for the conveyance of persons for hire from place to place within the city.' The Board was also authorized to fix rates of fare. The validity of these sections was sustained in Swann v. Baltimore City, 132 Md. 256, 261, 103 A. 441, 442, where it was said: 'There can be no question that the designation of hack stands and the regulation of the use and occupation of the streets of the city therefor is a proper exercise of the police power, and the Legislature is the sole judge of the reasonableness of the method adopted.'

These sections were, of course, enacted as a public local law, prior to the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment in 1915, Art. XIA, Maryland Constitution. Baltimore City adopted a charter and miscellaneous local laws in 1918, including the sections quoted, which were thereby continued in full force and effect. Charter, 1927 ed., Art. II, section II, p. 229. Among the powers granted to the City was the power to regulate the use of the streets. Under sections 3 and 4 of Art. XIA it was provided that after the adoption of a charter, the Mayor and City Council should have power to repeal or amend local laws, subject to the Constitution and Public General Laws of the State, and that no local law should be enacted by the General Assembly, on any subject covered by the express powers granted. Notwithstanding these provisions, various changes were made by the General Assembly in the sections enacted in 1910, which were neither repealed nor amended by the Mayor and City Council, prior to 1947.

The powers granted to the Board of Police Commissioners were transferred to the Police Commissioner by ch. 559, Acts of 1920. By ch. 677, Acts of 1920, the Public Service Commission law was amended to include taxicabs, and by ch. 485, Acts of 1931, new sections were added to section 361 et seq., Art. 23 of the Code, conferring regulatory power over taxicabs, including rates, on the Public Service Commission. Section 361F (Section 367, Code of 1939) provided, however, that the provisions relating to taxicabs should not be construed 'to limit the power and authority of incorporated cities and towns to adopt reasonable traffic regulations, including the designation of taxicab stands'. By ch. 708, Acts of 1939, sections 281 et seq., ch. 109, Acts of 1910 were amended to harmonize with the change placing taxicabs under the supervision of the Public Service Commission. Section 286 was re-enacted without change, except to substitute the word 'taxicabs' for the words 'hackney carriages', and the word 'vehicles' for 'carriages'. This, of course, was not a change in substance. The section appeared in this altered form in the Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1938 ed.), as section 379. In the new charter, approved June 5, 1946, no local laws were included, but by section 6 (23) the Mayor and City Council were empowered to 'exercise within the limits of Baltimore City all the power commonly known as the police power to the same extent as the State has or could exercise said power within said limits; provided, however, that no ordinance of the City * * * shall conflict, impede, obstruct, hinder or interfere with the powers of the Police Commissioner.'

The first question presented is whether the power to regulate taxicab stands in Baltimore City now resides in the General Assembly or in the Mayor and City Council. We think it clearly resides in the latter. The effect of the adoption of Section 286 of ch. 109, Acts of 1910, in the charter of 1918, was to delegate the exercise of that portion of the police power to the Board of Police Commissioners, appointed by the governor, and to its successor, the Police Commissioner. In the legislation relating to the Public Service Commission in 1920, the legislature clearly recognized the power of the Mayor and City Council to designate taxicab stands, and the amendments to section 286, by the Act of 1939, made no changes in substance and may be disregarded for the purposes of this case. The Mayor and City Council undoubtedly had the power, in 1947, to repeal or amend section 286 (now section 379) of the Charter and Public Local Laws.

The chancellor took the view that the Mayor and City Council, in enacting Ordinance 201, did not purport to repeal or amend section 286(379). Certainly it did not undertake to abrogate the power of the Police Commissioner to designate taxicabs stands, or to confer that power on a new agency. It did however, limit the exercise of his power, and we think that was in effect, an amendment, in substance if not in form, of the public local law. The proviso in Section 6(29) of the present charter, that 'no ordinance * * * shall * * * interfere with the powers of the...

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