G.P. v. State
| Decision Date | 28 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-JV-611 |
| Citation | 175 N.E.3d 364 (Table) |
| Parties | G.P., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: R. Patrick Magrath, Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP, Madison, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General, Catherine E. Brizzi, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] G.P. appeals the trial court's order adjudicating him a delinquent child, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
[2] On the night of November 2, 2020, Jonathan Struckman answered the door of his apartment in Greensburg to find two people in dark clothes and masks. One person displayed a pistol and demanded drugs and money. Struckman slammed the door shut, and the two people pushed on it to try to get in. Struckman called police, prompting the two people to leave. According to Struckman, the assailant with the gun was "definitely" fourteen-year-old G.P. Tr. p. 60. Struckman knew of G.P. "through friends and other connections" and recognized his eyes, and at one point G.P. pulled his mask down, allowing Struckman to see his whole face. Id. at 56, 60, 64.
[3] About one month later, in early December, Alvin Herbert, who was dating and lived with G.P.’s maternal grandmother, discovered that at least five guns had been stolen from his garage. Herbert "figured" that G.P., who had previously lived with the couple, had taken the guns because "he stole stuff before," so Herbert had G.P.’s grandmother call G.P.’s mother. Id. at 34, 38. When G.P.’s mother confronted him about it, G.P. said "there's only two guns[.]" Id. at 42. G.P. then directed his mother to an abandoned garage where two guns were located, and they retrieved them and returned them to Herbert. All this happened over the course of a day or two. See id. at 32-40.
[4] Based on the attempted robbery of Struckman, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging G.P. had committed what would be the following offenses if committed by an adult: Level 3 felony attempted robbery, Level 4 felony attempted burglary, Level 5 felony intimidation, and Level 6 felony pointing a firearm. Cause No. 16C01-2012-JD-247 ("JD-247"). Based on the theft of Herbert's guns, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging G.P. had committed what would be the following offenses if committed by an adult: Level 5 felony burglary, Level 6 felony theft, and Level 6 felony residential entry. Cause No. 16C01-2101-JD-3 ("JD-3").
[5] The trial court held a joint fact-finding hearing for the two cases. In JD-247, the trial court entered true findings for Level 4 felony attempted burglary, Level 5 felony attempted robbery, and Level 6 felony intimidation. In JD-3, the court entered a true finding for Level 6 felony theft.
[6] G.P. now appeals.
[7] G.P. contends the State presented insufficient evidence to support the true findings. When reviewing such a claim, we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the true finding. D.P. v. State , 80 N.E.3d 913, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We neither reweigh the evidence nor re-evaluate witness credibility. Id. We will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could have found the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[8] Regarding the November 2 incident, G.P. acknowledges Struckman's testimony that G.P. was one of the two assailants, but he argues that testimony should be disregarded under the incredible-dubiosity doctrine. Under that doctrine, we can impinge upon a fact-finder's responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses when "the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it." Hampton v. State , 921 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The doctrine "requires that there be: 1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence." Moore v. State , 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). As G.P. concedes, application of this rule is rare. Leyva v. State , 971 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[9] In arguing that Struckman's identification testimony should not be believed, G.P. points to three facts: (1) it was dark outside; (2) Struckman told police that he recognized G.P.’s eyes, but he testified at the fact-finding hearing that he recognized G.P.’s eyes and that G.P. had pulled his mask down; and (3) there is evidence Struckman snorted Xanax earlier in the day. While these may be reasons to question Struckman's testimony, they do not render his testimony so "inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it." Hampton , 921 N.E.2d at 29. Though it was dark at the time of the incident, Struckman was very close to the assailants when he answered the door. And while Struckman stated for the first time at the fact-finding hearing that G.P. pulled his mask down, that testimony does not "contradict" Struckman's statement to police that he recognized G.P.’s eyes. That is, there is no evidence Struckman told police that G.P. did not pull his mask down. Finally, the evidence that Struckman had taken Xanax earlier in the day was not accompanied by evidence of how much earlier that occurred, how much he consumed, or...
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