E.G. v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 2:16-cv-02412-TLN-KJN
| Decision Date | 31 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:16-cv-02412-TLN-KJN,2:16-cv-02412-TLN-KJN |
| Parties | E.G., a minor, by his Parent, IDA GARRETT, Plaintiff, v. ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Elk Grove Unified School District's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26), and Plaintiff E.G.'s ("Plaintiff") Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27). The parties both oppose each other's motions (ECF Nos. 28 & 29) and filed replies (ECF Nos. 30 & 31). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) is DENIED.
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Plaintiff is a nine-year-old boy residing within the jurisdictional boundaries of Defendant. (Admin. R. (hereafter, "AR") at 510, 564.) Plaintiff has difficulty with impulse control, sustained attention, emotional regulation, and compliance with activities he does not prefer. (AR at 564.) In May 2014, Plaintiff was initially assessed and determined eligible for special education services in the Fullerton School District. (AR at 533, 564.) In the summer of 2014, Plaintiff and his parent ("Parent") moved to Elk Grove. (AR at 2-3, 564.) After Parent registered Plaintiff for school in September 2014, Defendant offered Plaintiff a new Individualized Education Program ("IEP").1 (AR at 564.) Parent disputed aspects of the new IEP. (AR at 564.) On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff and Defendant resolved the dispute and entered into a settlement agreement ("2015 Settlement Agreement") wherein Parent agreed to several assessments. (AR at 93-100, 564.) On March 17, 2015, Defendant created an assessment plan ("2015 Assessment Plan") to assess Plaintiff. (AR at 101.) Parent agreed to the 2015 Assessment Plan. (AR at 196.) Thereafter, Plaintiff began attending Butler Elementary School. (AR at 550, 564.) On May 7, 2015, Parent withdrew Plaintiff from Butler Elementary School. (AR at 564.)
Most of the assessments Parent agreed to in the 2015 Settlement Agreement were incomplete when Parent withdrew Plaintiff from Butler Elementary School. (AR at 532, 564.) After Parent withdrew Plaintiff, Parent refused to make Plaintiff available for testing or return rating scales or questionnaires. (AR at 564.) Thereafter, Plaintiff began attending a private school in Elk Grove. (AR at 58, 564.) Parent requested speech and language support at Plaintiff's private school, but the "incomplete speech and language assessment from spring 2015 tentatively concluded [Plaintiff] no longer need[ed] such support and [wa]s no longer eligible for services in that category." (AR at 571.)
On October 8, 2015, Gabriela Macias, a school psychologist for Defendant, noted in areport that "[Plaintiff] is of African-American ethnic background" and thus "the assessment procedures used are in accordance with a judgment by Federal District Court Judge Robert Peckham (in response to C-71-2270 RFP, Larry P. v. Riles) which bars the administration of certain tests to this student." (AR at 554.)
On January 12, 2016, an IEP team meeting was held and Plaintiff's needs for placement and services were discussed. (AR at 528, 564.) Parent, Dr. David Paltin, and James D. Peters, III, Plaintiff's representative ("Representative"), attended the meeting by telephone. (AR at 528, 564-65.) Dr. Paltin, a private assessor retained by Plaintiff's family, stated Plaintiff had a diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and Asperger's Syndrome. (AR at 6, 565.) Defendant's IEP team concluded that further assessments of Plaintiff were necessary. (AR at 528, 565.) On January 12, 2016, Defendant prepared an assessment plan ("2016 Assessment Plan") and sought permission to conduct additional assessments of Plaintiff. (AR at 529, 565.)
After Parent did not consent to the 2016 Assessment Plan, on February 19, 2016, Defendant filed a complaint requesting a due process hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"). (AR at 2.) The question posed in Defendant's complaint was whether Defendant was entitled to conduct assessments pursuant to the 2016 Assessment Plan without Parent's consent. (AR at 8.) On March 7, 2016, Plaintiff requested a continuance in order to retain counsel (AR at 23-24), which Presiding Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Margaret Broussard granted (AR at 33-34).
On April 20, 2016, Plaintiff moved to dismiss Defendant's complaint that was then pending before OAH. (AR at 41.) Plaintiff argued OAH did not have jurisdiction because Defendant was essentially requesting an order from OAH enforcing the 2015 Settlement Agreement. (AR at 42.) In support, Plaintiff relied on another ALJ's dismissal of Defendant's complaint in another "virtually identical" matter. (AR at 42.)
On May 3, 2016, ALJ Dena Coggins denied Plaintiff's motion to dismiss. (AR at 119-20.) Distinguishing the instant matter from the matter that Plaintiff characterized as "virtually identical" (AR at 42), ALJ Coggins noted that Defendant's complaint did not raise an issue relating to a breach of the 2015 Settlement Agreement. (AR at 120.) Instead, ALJ Cogginsreasoned that Defendant's complaint related to Parent's purported refusal to consent to an assessment of Plaintiff outside the terms of the 2015 Settlement Agreement. (AR at 120.) Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration (AR at 122), which ALJ Coggins granted (AR at 175). On reconsideration, ALJ Coggins again denied Plaintiff's motion to dismiss Defendant's complaint. (AR at 175.)
Accordingly, a due process hearing was scheduled for June 7-9, 2016. (AR at 255.) The day before the due process hearing was scheduled to occur, Representative filed a motion for continuance on Plaintiff's behalf. (AR at 275.) Representative stated he was injured and per his doctor's order, was unable to represent Plaintiff at the hearing. (AR at 276.) Presiding ALJ Broussard denied Representative's requested continuance and notified the parties by telephone. (AR at 446.) On June 7, Presiding ALJ Broussard issued her written order denying the continuance. (AR at 282.) Presiding ALJ Broussard cited numerous issues with Representative's motion and determined Plaintiff had not established good cause for a continuance. (AR at 284-85.) Thus, the hearing took place on June 7 before ALJ Charles Marson. (AR at 563.) There was no appearance for Plaintiff. (AR at 563.) ALJ Marson waited an hour for Parent or Representative to appear. (AR at 563.) After both Parent and Representative failed to appear, ALJ Marson telephoned Representative's office twice but was unable to contact Representative because Representative's voicemail was full. (AR at 563.) ALJ Marson proceeded with the hearing, took evidence, and heard testimony. (AR at 563.)
On June 10, Representative emailed Division Presiding ALJ Bob Varma, asking him to review Representative's motion for continuance that ALJ Broussard denied on June 7. (AR at 348-49.) On June 13, Representative sent a fax to Division Presiding ALJ Varma containing a similar message as the June 10 email. (AR at 397-98.) On June 14, Presiding ALJ Broussard issued a notice of ex parte communication and found that Representative's email and fax were intended to affect the outcome of a motion. (AR at 449-50.) As a result, Presiding ALJ Broussard issued an order to show cause relating to the ex parte communication. (AR at 458-61.) After a show cause hearing, Presiding ALJ Broussard ordered Representative to pay Defendant's costs relating to the ex parte communication. (AR at 503.)
On July 5, 2016, ALJ Marson issued his decision from the June 7 hearing. (AR at 563-73.) In the decision, ALJ Marson made numerous factual findings and conclusions of law, ultimately holding that Defendant was entitled to reassess Plaintiff according to the 2016 Assessment Plan, without Parent's consent. (AR at 572.)
On October 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) On October 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). (ECF No. 6.) In the FAC, Plaintiff requests the reversal of ALJ Marson's decision and the reversal of Presiding ALJ Broussard's cost-shifting order. (ECF No. 6 at 20-21.) On August 10, 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 26, 27.) Defendant's motion for summary judgment argues that ALJ Marson's decision and ALJ Broussard's cost-shifting order should both be upheld. (ECF No. 26 at 9.) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment argues that Presiding ALJ Broussard's denial of Representative's requested continuance deprived Plaintiff of his right to due process. (ECF No. 27 at 7.)
A. Review of Administrative Hearing Decisions Pursuant to the IDEA
In California, due process hearings are conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings, a state agency independent of the Department of Education. See M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2012). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Under the IDEA, "[a] party dissatisfied with the outcome of a due process hearing may obtain further review by filing a civil action in state or federal court. " Fairfield-Suisun Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 780 F.3d 968, 969 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)). "[T]he party seeking relief . . . bears the burden of demonstrating that the ALJ's decision should be reversed." J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1994)).
The IDEA provides that a district court reviewing the outcome of a due process hearing "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing...
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