A.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 19 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-7577 (LJL) |
| Parties | A.G., individually and on behalf of R.P., a child with a disability, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff A.G., individually and on behalf of R.P., a child with a disability, brings this action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3), seeking attorneys' fees and costs, and pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, seeking equitable relief. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, seeking attorneys' fees and costs for work performed by the Cuddy Law Firm.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment except as otherwise stated.
R.P. is a child with a disability under IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A), and is classified as a student with a learning disability. Dkt. No. 16 () ¶¶ 2 6; Dkt. No. 24 (“Counter Statement” or “CS”) ¶¶ 2, 6. A.G. is R.P.'s parent as defined by IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23). SMF ¶ 3; CS ¶ 3. R.P. and A.G. reside in Bronx County New York. SMF ¶ 1; CS ¶ 1.
Defendant New York City Department of Education (“Defendant” or “DOE”) is a local educational agency as defined by IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19). SMF ¶ 4; CS ¶ 4.
Plaintiff first approached counsel for advice in late 2017 and early 2018. Dkt. No. 14-3. The matter was assigned to Jason Sterne Esq., who worked with the parent regarding her concerns about the 2017-2018 school year, including make-up and compensatory education and support necessary for R.P. to receive a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). Dkt. No. 14 (“Cuddy Decl.”) ¶ 42.
On May 11, 2018, Sterne initiated the administrative hearing component of the matter by filing a due process complaint on behalf of the parent. SMF ¶ 7; CS ¶ 7. The complaint asserted that (1) a DOE committee on special education had convened to develop a required individualized education services program (“IESP”) for R.P. on June 29, 2016; (2) the IESP had recommended group special education teacher support services six periods per week with no related services; (3) the committee did not reconvene until January 11, 2018 in violation of regulations requiring annual review; (4) the January 11, 2018 committee recommended group special education teacher support services eight periods per week, group occupational therapy twice weekly in forty-minute sessions, and group counseling once weekly for forty minutes; and (5) the DOE had failed to provide the required services. Dkt. No. 14-1. The parent complained that the DOE had failed to timely convene a committee or develop an IESP until January 2018 and that as a result R.P. had not received the services to which he was entitled and had been denied a FAPE, that there was no triennial review in June 2017, and that as of May 2018 and that the DOE had not implemented the counseling and occupational therapy required in the January 2018 IESP. Id. The complaint demanded a finding that Defendant did not provide R.P. with a FAPE during the 2017-2018 school year pursuant to the IDEA and sought an order directing DOE to immediately implement all services recommended by the January 11, 2018 IESP and to provide makeup occupational therapy and counseling services at an enhanced rate to compensate for Defendant's delay in commencing and implementing services. Id.
An impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) was appointed on May 23, 2018 and held a hearing on July 17, 2018. SMF ¶¶ 9; CS ¶¶ 9; Cuddy Decl. ¶¶ 46-48. The July 2018 hearing was later adjourned so that the parties could explore settlement, but the parties failed to reach a settlement agreement after the Department offered only a fraction of the relief sought. Cuddy Decl. ¶¶ 48-49.
A further impartial due process hearing was held on March 29, 2019. SMF ¶ 10; CS ¶ 10. Plaintiff presented testimony from one witness and submitted 20 pieces of documentary evidence. Cuddy Decl. ¶ 50. Defendant presented no witnesses and no documentary evidence, SMF ¶ 12; CS ¶ 12, and conceded to a denial of a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school year due to a combination of an untimely delay in the issuance of the IESP for the 2017-2018 school year and a failure to provide mandated services to R.P. for two full school years, Cuddy Decl. ¶ 50. Defendant, however, requested that the IHO deny awarding an enhanced rate for any award of compensatory makeup services. Id. ¶ 52.
On June 25, 2019, the IHO issued findings of fact and decision in favor of Plaintiff, finding that Defendant denied R.P. a FAPE during the 2017-2018 school year. SMF ¶ 12; CS ¶ 12; Cuddy Decl. ¶ 53; Dkt. No. 14-2. The IHO ordered 50 periods of special education teacher support services, 160 periods of occupational therapy, 36 periods of counseling, and, if necessary, transportation for R.P. so that he may receive the awarded compensatory services. Cuddy Decl. ¶ 53; Dkt. No. 14-2. In addition, the IHO mandated that Defendant locate compensatory service providers before April 19, 2019 for all ordered compensatory services.
Cuddy Decl. ¶ 53; Dkt. No. 14-2. If Defendant failed to do so, the parent was authorized to locate qualified providers of her choosing at an enhanced rate. Dkt. No. 14-2.
Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel engaged in implementation efforts for a period of over seven months, until about November 4, 2020, to locate providers and subsequently authorize payment of the awarded makeup services. Cuddy Decl. ¶ 56. In September 2020, the parties stipulated to an open issue regarding the duration of compensatory services to be provided to R.P. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. R.P. began receiving compensatory makeup services in November 2020. Id. ¶ 69.
In June 2020, Plaintiff submitted a fee demand to Defendant. SMF ¶ 13; CS ¶ 13. The parties have not reached a resolution on fees in this matter. SMF ¶ 14; CS ¶ 14.
Plaintiff initiated this action by complaint filed on September 16, 2020. Dkt. No. 1. The complaint asserts two causes of action: (1) equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendant's deprivation of Plaintiff's rights under the IDEA by failing to implement the findings of fact and decision;[1] and (2) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3).
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment for attorneys' fees and costs on April 2, 2021. Dkt. No. 12. In the accompanying memorandum in support and declaration, Plaintiff sought $15, 838.52 for the administrative component of the matter and $28, 002.50 for the federal component, for a total of $43, 841.02 in fees and costs. Dkt. No. 13 at 28-29; Cuddy Decl. ¶ 87. DOE filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on May 24, 2021. Dkt. No. 25. Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum of law in further support of the motion for summary judgment for attorneys' fees and costs on June 17, 2021. Dkt. No. 28. Along with the reply, Plaintiff submitted an updated billing statement seeking $38, 812.50 for the federal component. Dkt. No. 30-1. Thus, together with the amount sought for the administrative component, Plaintiff requests a total award of $54, 651 in fees and costs.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The movant bears the burden of ‘demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Id. at 114 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Gilman v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., 826 F.3d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 2016).
If the movant meets its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). It may not rely on “mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts, ” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010), or “on the allegations in [its] pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible, ” Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Rather, to survive a summary judgment motion, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), and demonstrating more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). See also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). If “the party opposing summary judgment propounds a reasonable conflicting interpretation of a material disputed fact, ” summary judgment must be denied. Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1983).
The IDEA provides that “the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party...
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