G.W. v. Ringwood Bd. of Educ.
Decision Date | 20 March 2020 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-13734 |
Parties | G.W. and Mk. W., Plaintiffs, v. Ringwood Board of Education, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Not for Publication
Plaintiffs G.W. and Mk. W. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") bring this suit against Defendant Ringwood Board of Education seeking the reversal of an Administrative Law Judge's order approving the parties' settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"), as well as a declaratory judgment that the Settlement Agreement is void. In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Settlement Agreement's waiver of attorneys' fees is void. Currently pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. D.E. 5. The Court reviewed the parties' submissions1 and decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice. As further discussed, the Court has concerns as to whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and orders additional briefing on this point.
Plaintiffs are appealing an administrative decision under the individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C § 1400 et seq. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs had originally filed a due process petition, seeking relief on behalf of their child, M.W., against Defendant in the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law ("NJOAL"). Id. ¶ 2. A three-day hearing on Plaintiffs' petition was scheduled to begin on May 7, 2019. Id. ¶ 3. G.W. was present for the first day of the hearing, but Mk. W. was not. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Plaintiffs assert that prior to the hearing, they had no notice of any potential settlement conference. Id. ¶ 30.
Before the hearing began, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") tasked with overseeing the hearing conferenced the matter with both parties' counsel. Id. ¶ 31. Following this conference, G.W. agreed to meet with the ALJ and Defendant to discuss the possibility of settlement. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs contend that the ALJ "became an active advocate for settlement, driving the discussion of what it would take to settle the case, opining on the legality and practicability of [Plaintiffs'] requests, and pressuring [Plaintiffs] to settle their matter to avoid a trial." Id. ¶ 35. Meanwhile, Defendant indicated that reimbursement of attorneys' fees were "off the table." Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs allege that this statement was "readily endorsed" by the ALJ, who they claim stated that it was unlikely Plaintiffs would recover their costs if she were to preside over their trial. Id. ¶ 37. As such, G.W. agreed to continue to discuss settlement without reimbursement of attorneys' fees. Id. ¶ 38.
Sometime thereafter, G.W. "respectfully requested that the parties simply go to trial." Id. ¶ 42. The ALJ "again stepped in to advocate for a settlement, suggesting that G.W. not get angry and return to the bargaining table." Id. ¶ 43. Mk. W. was not present for these discussions. Id. ¶ 45. The ALJ indicated that if Mk. W. was a "decisionmaker," then Mk. W. must appear at the hearing the next day. Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiffs contend that this should have ended the proceedings for the day; however, the ALJ asked G.W. to call Mk. W. to get Mk. W.'s input on the settlement talks. Id. ¶¶ 47-48. G.W. then called Mk. W., and Mk. W. advised G.W. that her position to settlement was a "firm no." Id. ¶ 49. As such, G.W. again attempted to end settlement discussions, to which the ALJ attempted to get discussions "back on track" despite Mk. W.'s position. Id. ¶ 50. The settlement discussions thereafter continued for several more hours. Id. ¶ 51.
The ALJ requested that G.W. again call Mk. W., with whom the ALJ then spoke directly. Id. ¶ 52. Mk. W. discussed her objections to the proposed settlement "to the extent that it had been explained to her and/or to the extent that she understood it." Id. ¶ 53. Mk. W. "was left with the distinct impression from [the ALJ] that the settlement of this matter was a 'done deal.'" Id. ¶ 55. Plaintiffs nonetheless allege that the ALJ ; however, G.W. was not present for these discussions. Id. ¶ 56. The ALJ thereafter asked G.W. to call Mk. W. again, to which Defendant questioned whether the parties were actually going to settle. Id. ¶ 58. "Without input from either [Plaintiffs] or their counsel," the ALJ replied that the parties were going to settle. Id. ¶ 59. Thereafter, Plaintiffs contend that the parties "hurriedly created a draft settlement agreement." Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to send the proposed written agreement to Mk. W. for review, but Plaintiffs contend that Mk. W. never received the agreement due to "poor service on her cell phone." Id. ¶ 61. G.W. also attempted tocall Mk. W. to confirm her receipt of the settlement document, but was unable to reach her. Id. ¶ 62.
During this process, a dispute arose as to the scope of the release in the Settlement Agreement. Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiffs allege that G.W. agreed to waive only those claims regarding the instant matter, while Defendant instead sought a "global" release of all claims involving G.W., Mk. W, and their child, M.W. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. Plaintiffs allege that "the ALJ advised G.W. that a global release was standard, that [Plaintiffs] must waive all of their claims in order to reach a settlement, and demanded that G.W. and his counsel 'let it go.'" Id. ¶ 65. Thereafter, the ALJ asked G.W. if Mk. W. had consented to the Settlement Agreement, and G.W. replied that she had not seen it. Id. ¶ 66. G.W. then asked if he could take a photo of the agreement and send it to Mk. W. via text message, to which Defendant's counsel objected. Id. ¶ 67. Plaintiffs allege that sometime thereafter, the ALJ requested that the parties read a description of the Settlement Agreement into the record. Id. ¶ 68.
Prior to taking testimony from G.W., the ALJ had the following colloquy on the record:
Id. ¶ 69. Plaintiffs contend, however, that G.W.'s affirmative responses were based on G.W.'s mistaken belief that Mk. W. had expressed her agreement to the settlement. Id. ¶ 70. Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that Mk. W. had previously informed the ALJ that Mk. W. did not, in fact, agree to the settlement. Id. ¶ 72. Plaintiffs add that while the terms of the settlement were being read into the record, G.W. received numerous texts from Mk. W. regarding the settlement, and that Id. ¶¶ 75-76. Plaintiffs provide no indication as to whether G.W. informed his counsel, the ALJ, or Defendant of these text messages. Plaintiffs claim, however, that G.W. "felt powerless to stop the settlement process." Id. ¶ 77.
Immediately following the hearing on May 7, 2019, the ALJ entered her decision approving the Settlement Agreement, see D.E. 8, Ex. B, which Plaintiffs argue "prematurely discontinue[ed] the matter."3 Id. ¶ 79. Plaintiffs allege that "as soon as G.W. had an opportunity to reflect on the[Settlement Agreement]," and Id. ¶ 80. Accordingly, three days after the settlement conference, on May 10, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion with the ALJ to set aside the settlement.4 Id. ¶ 82. That same day, Plaintiffs also sent letters to the Superintendent of Ringwood Public Schools, as well as the President and board members of the Board of Education of Ringwood Public Schools, in which G.W. indicated that he revoked his consent to the Settlement Agreement and Mk. W. indicated that she never agreed to the Settlement Agreement. Id. ¶¶ 83-84; see also D.E. 1, Exs. B, C, D, E. Defendant held its board meeting on May 13, 2019, which G.W. attended. Compl. ¶ 85. At the board meeting, G.W. again repudiated the Settlement Agreement; however, Defendant approved the Settlement Agreement that same day. Id. ¶ 86.
Plaintiffs then filed a three-count Complaint in this Court on June 14, 2019. D.E. 1. Count One is brought under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and seeks to "reverse the Decision Approving [] Settlement" because the Settlement Agreement was not executed knowingly and voluntarily. Compl. ¶¶ 87-91; Pls.' Opp. at 7. Count Two seeks a declaratory judgment under the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-52, that the Settlement Agreement is void. Compl. ¶¶ 92-115; Pls.' Opp. at 7. Count Three seeks, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment under the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Act that the Settlement Agreement's waiver of attorneys' fees is void under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and New Jersey public policy. Compl. ¶¶ 116-134; Pls.' Opp. at 7. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). D.E. 5. Plaintiffs filed opposition, D.E. 11, to which Defendant replied, D.E. 12.
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