Ga. State Conference of the Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Registration & Elections

• Decision Date: 02 September 2020
• Docket Number: 1:20-CV-00879-ELR
• Citation: 484 F.Supp.3d 1308
• Parties: GEORGIA STATE CONFERENCE OF the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DEKALB COUNTY BOARD OF REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

484 F.Supp.3d 1308

GEORGIA STATE CONFERENCE OF the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DEKALB COUNTY BOARD OF REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

1:20-CV-00879-ELR

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed September 2, 2020

David Barret Broussard, Clyde & Co. LLP, Gail Podolsky, Carlton Fields, Sean Young, ACLU of Georgia Foundation, Atlanta, GA, Ihaab Syed, Pro Hac Vice, Dale E. Ho, Sophia Lin Lakin, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, John Michael Powers, Julie Marie Houk, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Aaron Joshua Ross, DOJ-USAO, Atlanta, GA, Irene B. Vander Els, Shelley Driskell Momo, DeKalb County Law Department, Decatur, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

Eleanor L. Ross, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 27]. For the reasons below, the Court denies Defendants' motion.

I. Background¹

On February 26, 2020, Plaintiffs The Georgia State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("Georgia NAACP") and the Georgia Coalition for the People's Agenda ("GCPA") filed this action against the DeKalb County Board of Registration and Elections ("DeKalb BRE"); Anthony Lewis, Susan Motter, Dele Lowman Smith, Samuel Tillman, and Baoky N. Vu, in their official capacities as members of the DeKalb BRE; and Erica Hamilton, in her official capacity as Director of Voter Registration and Elections (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"). Compl. [Doc. 1]. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are unlawfully purging voters from the DeKalb County registration rolls in violation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ("NVRA"), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501 - 20511, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See id. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. [Doc. 27]. The Court first provides the relevant context for this case before addressing the merits of Defendants' motion.

A. The Parties

As set forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff Georgia NAACP is a nonprofit membership organization which works to protect voting rights. Id. ¶ 10. Similarly, Plaintiff GCPA is a nonprofit coalition, consisting of more than thirty (30) organizations, whose support of voting rights is central to its mission. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant DeKalb BRE is the governing body that oversees elections and voter registration in DeKalb County, Georgia. Id. ¶ 12. Defendants Lewis, Motter, Smith, Tillman, and Vu are the individual members of the DeKalb BRE. Id. ¶¶ 13–17. Defendant Hamilton is the Director of the DeKalb County Department of Voter Registration and Elections. Id. ¶ 18.

B. Defendants' Removal Procedures

At various times, the DeKalb BRE holds hearings on challenges to voter registrations in its county. Id. ¶¶ 2, 31. After these hearings, the DeKalb BRE has, in some cases, voted to cancel a voter registration based on what it contends to be evidence that the registration is invalid. Id. ¶¶ 2, 31–34. Plaintiffs allege that the cancellation of certain registrations violates the requirements of federal law because the DeKalb BRE failed to either (1) provide a written notice that conformed to the requirements of the NVRA or (2) wait through two general election cycles before cancelling the registrations in question, as the NVRA requires. Id. ¶ 29.

Plaintiffs further allege that the DeKalb BRE violates the NVRA by its solicitation of information from certain local municipalities, and not others, regarding the validity of some voter registrations. Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiffs contend this practice constitutes prohibited non-uniform list maintenance, in violation of the NVRA. Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that this conduct violates the United States Constitution because it improperly discriminates against voters "residing in transitional housing or non-traditional residences[.]" Id. ¶ 57. Plaintiffs assert that due to Defendants' procedures, they must divert portions of their respective resources from their primary goals to educating voters about Defendants' practices as well as assisting eligible (or potentially eligible) voters who have been "purged from the rolls." Id. ¶¶ 10–11.

C. Plaintiffs' Complaint and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

To address Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint, wherein they bring five (5) counts:

• Count I — Violation of Section 8 of the NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d) ;

• Count II — Violation of Section 8 of the NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(2) ;

• Count III — Violation of Section 8 of the NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b) ;

• Count IV — Violation of the Fundamental Right to Vote, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and

• Count V — Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

See id. As relief, Plaintiffs request (1) a declaratory judgment that Defendants' conduct violates the NVRA and First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and (2) that the Court issue an injunction:

1. Prohibiting the purging of voters from the rolls without complying with the NVRA;²

2. Prohibiting the solicitation of challenges to voter eligibility from the City of Decatur and other municipalities;

3. Prohibiting the targeting and purging of voters on the basis that they are domiciled at the Peer Support, Wellness, and Respite Center or other transitional or non-traditional residences;

4. Ordering Defendants to promulgate uniform and NVRA compliant procedures for removing voters from the rolls premised on an alleged change of address;

5. Ordering Defendants to maintain, preserve, and not destroy until after December 31, 2022, any and all records relating to Defendants' list maintenance programs that have resulted in challenges to voter eligibility based upon a change of address;

6. Ordering Defendants to restore to the DeKalb County registration list all voters removed from the list in violation of the NVRA and the U.S. Constitution;

7. Ordering Defendants to count all provisional ballots cast by voters removed from the DeKalb County voter registration list in violation of the NVRA and the U.S. Constitution and, where appropriate, to inform voters if any provisional ballots they cast in previous elections were improperly rejected; and

8. Ordering Defendants to adopt revised procedures for processing and adjudicating challenges to voters' eligibility on the basis that they allegedly moved or do not reside in DeKalb County that comply with the NVRA and the U.S. Constitution.

Id. at 28–31. Plaintiffs further request that the Court retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance with such injunctive relief, and that Plaintiffs be awarded attorneys' fees and costs. Id.

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. [Doc. 27]. After full briefing, and with the benefit of oral argument,³ this motion is now ripe for the Court's review.

II. Discussion

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on three (3) grounds: (1) standing, (2) sovereign immunity, and (3) legislative immunity.⁴ [See id. ] The Court discusses each in turn.

A. Standing

The Court begins by addressing the threshold issue of standing. [See id. at 12–16]. Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to adjudicate only "actual cases and controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). To establish Article III standing:

the party invoking the power of the court must show (1) injury in fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.

Cochran v. City of Atlanta, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ) (internal marks omitted).

Here, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' standing on two (2) grounds: (1) lack of injury in fact and (2) failure to establish causation. [Doc. 27 at 13–16]. The Court addresses each in turn.

1. Injury in Fact

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not demonstrate injury in fact. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' injuries are hypothetical, speculative, and conclusory. [Id. at 13–14]. Upon review, the Court disagrees.

To establish injury in fact, Plaintiffs must show "an invasion of a legally protected interest that is sufficiently concrete and particularized rather than abstract and indefinite." Kawa Orthodontics, LLP v. Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 773 F.3d 243, 246 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). As organizations, Plaintiffs "may demonstrate a concrete, imminent injury either through a ‘diversion-of-resources’ theory or through an ‘associational standing’ theory." Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Crittenden, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (citing Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2014) ). Plaintiffs contend that they each have standing under both theories. [Doc. 33 at 5].

Under the diversion-of-resources theory, an organization has standing to sue when a defendant's illegal acts impair the organization's ability to engage in its own projects by forcing the organization to divert resources in response. See Arcia, 772 F. 3d at 1341 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) ("[C]oncrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities—with the consequent drain on the organization's resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests.")). According to...