Gable v. Village of Gates Mills, 2004 Ohio 5719 (OH 11/10/2004)

• Decision Date: 10 November 2004
• Docket Number: Case No. 2003-0476.
• Citation: 2004 Ohio 5719,103 Ohio St.3d 449
• Parties: Gable et al., Appellees, v. Village of Gates Mills; Daimlerchrysler Corporation, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 1

103-Ohio St.3d-449

2004 Ohio 5719

Gable et al., Appellees, v. Village of Gates Mills; Daimlerchrysler Corporation, Appellant.

Case No. 2003-0476.

In the Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 30, 2004.

Decided November 10, 2004.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 80469, 2003-Ohio-399.

John F. Norton and Richard C. Alkire, for appellees.

Sutter, O'Connell, Mannion & Farchion Co., L.P.A., Lawrence A. Sutter and Christina J. Marshall, for appellant DaimlerChrysler Corporation.

MOYER, C.J.

¶1} Appellee David Gable ("Gable") was injured while in the front passenger seat of a Dodge Intrepid automobile driven by his wife. He suffered permanent neck and spinal injures, resulting in quadriplegia, when the vehicle slid off the road and into a guardrail, causing the air bag to deploy. At the time of the accident the vehicle was traveling at a speed of 12 to 21 miles per hour.

{¶2} Gable, his wife, and his daughter filed a complaint naming appellant, DaimlerChrysler, and others as defendants. He asserted that DaimlerChrysler had manufactured the Dodge Intrepid "in an unreasonably defective and unsafe condition in that the airbag system is capable of producing serious harm and death to vehicle occupants in proximity to the airbag during a collision." He further alleged that the "Intrepid and airbag component was defectively designed in that it was more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner," citing R.C. 2307.75(A)(1)(2).¹ Gable further claimed that the Intrepid was defective due to inadequate warnings, citing R.C. 2307.76. He claimed that the air bag struck him in the upper torso, head, and neck after the Intrepid left the roadway and that the spinal cord injury that left him paralyzed was the direct and proximate result of the design defects and inadequate warnings.

{¶3} Prior to trial Gable filed a motion in limine asking the court to instruct all defense counsel and witnesses not to mention or otherwise convey to the jury "any argument concerning Plaintiff David Gable's seatbelt nonuse during the accident of September 17, 1995 implying that such nonuse somehow constitutes a defense." Counsel for Gable acknowledged at a pretrial oral hearing held on the motion in limine that David Gable was not wearing his seat belt when the accident occurred, stating: "Obviously, the fact that David Gable is unbelted will come into this case. It's a function of what happened. It's the way the event will be explained. But its use and characterization as a defense is what's at issue in this motion."

{¶4} At the hearing, the court observed that DaimlerChrysler had pled assumption of the risk as a defense, stating:

{¶5} "[W]hile the seat belt usage in and of itself is not a defense to the * * * claim of injury * * *, assumption of the risk means that this defendant [sic] David Gable understood quite clearly that if he didn't wear his seatbelt and this air bag deployed at whatever rate the plaintiffs are claiming it deployed at that this gentleman was going to be injured.

{¶6} "* * * [W]hile this Court realizes that this is a difficult burden for the defendants to shoulder, that burden is certainly theirs to assume and the Court is going to deny the motion in limine as to these seat belt nonusage [sic]. It can be used for a limited purpose and a limited purpose only and I think defense counsel understands what that purpose is."

{¶7} In its entry denying the motion, the court ruled that evidence as to David Gable's failure to use a seat belt would be "permitted as to limited circumstances and for a limited purpose." The court did not specify in its entry what those limited circumstances and limited purpose would be.

{¶8} The cause was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict finding that DaimlerChrysler was not liable.

{¶9} On appeal Gable argued that "[i]n a products liability case based on R.C. § 2307.75, it is prejudicial error to allow the manufacturer to introduce irrelevant evidence of an ideal standard of consumer conduct," i.e., evidence that David Gable was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident. The court of appeals agreed, vacated the jury's verdict and remanded the cause for a new trial. It observed that the jury had heard testimony regarding Gable's failure to wear his seat belt, "which testimony understandably implied that he was in some manner comparatively negligent for his injuries." The court concluded that "the introduction of seat belt evidence was highly prejudicial and without merit under the facts and evidence presented at trial."

{¶10} The cause is before us on discretionary review. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the jury verdict in favor of the defendant because Gable did not properly preserve for appellate review his contention that the trial court erred in the introduction of evidence and in allowing defense counsel to make improper statements throughout the trial.

{¶11} R.C. 4513.263 is Ohio's mandatory seat belt law. It provides, with certain exceptions, that front-seat passengers in an automobile must wear "all of the available elements of a properly adjusted occupant restraining device," including seat belts. R.C. 4513.263(B)(3) and 4513.263(A)(2).

{¶12} In addition, the statute provides a legislative resolution to previously disputed issues concerning the admissibility of evidence of an autoaccident victim's nonuse of an available seat belt. R.C. 4513.263 states:

{¶13} "(F)(1) Subject to division (F)(2) of this section, the failure of a person to wear all of the available elements of a properly adjusted occupant restraining device, * * * , in violation of division (B) of this section, shall not be considered or used as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence, shall not diminish recovery for damages in any civil action involving the person * * *; and shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal action involving the person other than a prosecution for a violation of this section.

{¶14} "(F)(2) If, at the time of an accident involving a passenger car equipped with occupant restraining devices, any occupant of the passenger car who sustained injury or death was not wearing an available occupant restraining device * * * then, consistent with the Rules of Evidence, the fact that the occupant was not wearing the available occupant restraining device * * * is admissible in evidence in relation to any claim for relief in a tort action to the extent that the claim for relief satisfies all of the following:

{¶15} "(a) It seeks to recover damages for injury or death to the occupant.

{¶16} "(b) The defendant in question is the manufacturer, designer, distributor, or seller of the passenger car.

{¶17} "(c) The claim for relief against the defendant in question is that the injury or death sustained by the occupant was enhanced or aggravated by some design defect in the passenger car or that the passenger car was not crashworthy." (Emphasis added.)

{¶18} Thus, R.C. 4513.263 states, as a general rule, that evidence of nonuse of seat belts is inadmissible in a civil action. However, an exception exists: Evidence of nonuse of seat belts may be admitted where an automobile accident victim seeks damages from a passenger car manufacturer, designer, distributor, or seller under the theory that his or her injuries were enhanced or aggravated by a design defect, or that the vehicle he or she was occupying was not crashworthy. The statute provides, however, that even in an enhanced- or aggravated-injury case or a crashworthiness case, evidence of nonuse of seat belts may be admitted only to the extent admission is consistent with the Rules of Evidence.

{¶19} Therefore, under Ohio's mandatory seat belt statute, as a general rule, the failure of a person to have worn a seat belt, in violation of the statute, may not be considered or used as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence, may not diminish recovery for damages in any civil action involving the person, and is not admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal action involving the person other than a prosecution for a violation of R.C. 4513.263. R.C. 4513.263(F)(2), however, provides an exception to the general rule established in R.C. 4513.263(F)(1) against admissibility of seat belt nonuse: Consistent with the Rules of Evidence, the fact that a person was not wearing a seat belt is admissible in evidence in relation to any claim for damages against a manufacturer, designer, distributor, or seller of a passenger car asserting that injury or death was enhanced or aggravated by some design defect in a passenger car or that a passenger car was not crashworthy.

{¶20} The parties do not dispute that DaimlerChrysler was the manufacturer of the Dodge Intrepid involved in Gable's accident or that Gable seeks to recover damages for his injuries suffered in the accident. Thus, the threshold issue before us is whether Gable sought to recover damages under a theory of enhanced or aggravated injury or under a theory that the Dodge Intrepid was not crashworthy. If so, pursuant to R.C. 4513.263(F)(2), evidence that Gable was not wearing his seat belt was admissible, but only to the extent consistent with the Rules of Evidence.

{¶21} The Revised Code does not define "enhanced" or "aggravated" injuries for purposes of R.C. 4513.263, nor does it define "crashworthy." We therefore determine whether the General Assembly intended that an action like Gable's would fall within the scope of Subsection F(2) of the seat belt law.

{¶22} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 4513.263(F)(2) (then [G][2]) in 1987, approximately six years after our decision in Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 456, 21 O.O.3d 285, 424 N.E.2d 568. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1750. Leichtamer is the seminal Ohio case recognizing a cause of action for enhanced or aggravated injury suffered...