Gackler Land Co., Inc. v. Yankee Springs Tp.
| Decision Date | 30 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 75246 |
| Citation | 398 N.W.2d 393,427 Mich. 562 |
| Parties | GACKLER LAND COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YANKEE SPRINGS TOWNSHIP and Payne Lake Association, Defendants-Appellees. 427 Mich. 562, 398 N.W.2d 393 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Siegel, Hudson, Gee, Shaw & Fisher by James H. Fisher, Middleville, for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard L. Lang, Bauckham, Reed, Lang, Schaefer, Sparks & Rolfe, P.C., Kalamazoo, Robert W. Richardson, Law, Weathers & Richardson, Grand Rapids, for defendants-appellees.
Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, Rex E. Schlaybaugh, Jr., William J. Perrone, Daniel M. Moore, Lansing, for amicus curiae.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Walter V. Kron and James L. Stropkai, Asst. Attys. Gen., Appellate Div., Lansing, for amicus curiae Michigan Mobile Home Com'n.
This case involves the validity of a zoning ordinance in Yankee Springs Township, Barry County, Michigan, which excludes from the property of plaintiff, Gackler Land Company, Inc., the placement of "single-wide" mobile homes that do not comply with certain requirements.
Plaintiff presents the following questions for our consideration: (1) Whether the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to plaintiff's plat, (2) whether plaintiff has established a vested nonconforming use as a single-wide mobile home plat, and (3) whether certain portions of the zoning act are preempted by federal and state law?
We hold that the zoning ordinance is neither unconstitutional on its face nor as applied to plaintiff. The requirements of the zoning ordinance are either reasonable standards designed to assure favorable comparison of mobile homes with site-built housing or constitute a reasonable exercise of police power for the protection of the public. Moreover, the zoning ordinance does not preclude other reasonable uses of the land. Plaintiff cannot establish a confiscation by simply showing a disparity in value between uses.
We further hold that by virtue of expenditures in the development of the land as a residential subdivision, plaintiff has not established a tangible change by way of preparation for the actual use of the property as a single-wide mobile home plat. The property, as developed, is suitable for site- built, double-wide, and single-wide mobile homes. Although approximately one-fourth of the back lots in the plat are occupied by single-wide mobile homes, an apparent use of the property as a single-wide mobile home plat has not been established when the remaining back lots could be used for site-built or mobile homes at the plaintiff's option.
Finally, we hold that the federal and state laws do not preempt portions of the zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance regulates the location and conditions of mobile home placement and therefore does not conflict with the construction and industry regulations set forth by the federal and state laws.
Accordingly, the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals upholding the zoning ordinance are affirmed.
The plaintiff platted approximately twenty acres of a 103-acre tract along the northwest shore of Payne Lake. This plat, "Gackler's Payne Lake Plat," was approved by the township and consists of fifty-four lots. The zoning in effect at that time permitted mobile, prefabricated, and site-built homes on the lots. After the plat was approved, restrictions were recorded excluding mobile homes from the twelve lots which bordered the lake. Through 1972, eleven single-wide mobile homes had moved onto the back lots in the plat.
In 1972, the defendant township enacted a zoning ordinance which restricted mobile homes to mobile home parks. Pursuant to this Court's decision in Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981), the township amended its zoning ordinance to permit mobile homes meeting the definition of "dwelling" in any zoning classification where site-built or modular single family residences were allowed. "Dwelling" was defined in the zoning ordinance as follows:
1 138 Mich.App. 1, 7-8, 359 N.W.2d 226 (1984).
The effect of this ordinance was to exclude single-wide mobile homes from placement on plaintiff's lots unless the foregoing requirements were met. The plaintiff challenged this portion of the zoning ordinance as unconstitutional on its face and as applied to plaintiff, and because it was preempted in part by state and federal law. Plaintiff also averred that it had established a prior nonconforming use in the property as a single-wide mobile home plat. Following a bench trial, the trial court upheld the ordinance as to these requirements and rejected plaintiff's claim that it had established a nonconforming use. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. We agree.
Plaintiff contends that the township zoning ordinance is unconstitutional on its face because it operates to exclude all single-wide mobile homes from areas other than mobile-home parks. We disagree.
In Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, supra, 410 Mich. 310, 302 N.W.2d 146, this Court held that "[t]he per se exclusion of mobile homes from all areas not designated as mobile-home parks has no reasonable basis under the police power, and is therefore unconstitutional." We also held:
The requirements for a "dwelling" within the definition of the zoning ordinance are set forth in the facts stated above.
We initially note that these regulations do not treat mobile homes materially different than site-built homes. We further find that the requirements, as stated, are either reasonable standards designed to assure favorable comparison of mobile homes with site-built housing, or constitute a reasonable exercise of police power for the protection of the safety, health, morals, prosperity, comfort, convenience, and welfare of the public or a substantial part of the public. Robinson Twp., supra, 312, 302 N.W.2d 146.
Nor are we persuaded that the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. We believe the trial court properly summarized the plaintiff's argument in this regard:
The following principles of law are applicable to plaintiff's claim:
" '[S]econdly, that an ordinance may be unreasonable because of the purely arbitrary, capricious, and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from the area in question.' " Kirk v. Tyrone Twp., 398 Mich. 429, 434, 247 N.W.2d 848 (1976).
There are four rules for applying these principles:
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Case List
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