Gaddie v. State
| Decision Date | 13 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S00-8808-CR-756,49S00-8808-CR-756 |
| Citation | 566 N.E.2d 535 |
| Parties | Robert GADDIE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Stephen T. Owens, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Pursuant to a plea agreement executed March 18, 1985, appellant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, I.C. 35-42-1-3, a Class B felony. The plea agreement provided that at the time of appellant's sentencing, the State would recommend that both sides argue for an appropriate sentence, with the trial court determining the actual sentence. On April 25, the trial court sentenced appellant to eighteen years, which represented the presumptive ten-year sentence for the offense of voluntary manslaughter, enhanced by eight years for aggravating circumstances.
On November 20, 1987, appellant filed a pro se motion to correct erroneous sentence and memorandum in support thereof pursuant to I.C. 35-38-1-15. On December 7, the trial court denied this motion. On December 21, appellant filed a pro se motion to correct errors, addressed to the December 7 ruling, which was denied on December 22. On December 23, appellant contacted the Public Defender of Indiana and asked for assistance in this cause. On May 11, 1988, appellant, by counsel, filed a petition for permission to file a belated appeal. This petition was granted on May 19.
Appellant now brings this direct appeal asserting error in that the court ruled upon his motion without a formal hearing, ruled upon his motion without appointing counsel, and that the sentencing judge failed to state specific reasons for his decision to enhance appellant's sentence and did not properly balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The statute governing appellant's motion, I.C. 35-38-1-15, allows for the correction of an erroneous sentence and requires a motion to correct sentence to be in writing and to be supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence. Appellant's motion to correct erroneous sentence was summarily denied by the trial court, without providing appellant with an opportunity to present an oral legal argument or to present evidence. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in proceeding in this fashion.
We hold that, in this instance, it was not error for the trial court to determine appellant's motion to correct erroneous sentence following this summary procedure. In explanation of the function of this post-conviction procedure this Court has recently said:
The use of the statutory procedure should be limited to those instances where the sentence is erroneous on its face. The use of Ind.Code Sec. 35-38-1-15 is proper for errors in sentencing similar to those which an appellate court would hold to be fundamental and would correct even if presented for the first time on appeal. Such fundamental error would include illegal sentences in violation of express statutory authority or an erroneous interpretation of a penalty provision. See Killian v. State (1987), Ind., 512 N.E.2d 411, 412. Not included within the type of fundamental error that may be raised under the statute would be constitutional issues or issues concerning how the trial court weighed factors in imposing sentence.
Jones v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 492, 496. The purpose of the statute is to provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence. Here the allegation in the motion for correction of sentence is a general one. The claim is made that the sentencing judge failed to state any specific reasons justifying the enhancement of the standard ten-year sentence by adding an additional eight years to it. The allegation is supported by a written memorandum containing legal arguments in support of the motion as required by the governing statute. The allegation, however, does not raise an issue of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. It is based entirely upon the records of the Court reflecting the sentencing procedures and resulting order. When the judge ruled that the sentence not be altered, he had in hand the written motion, the supporting written legal arguments, and the...
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State v. Francis
...prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.” Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind.1991) ; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Green v. Washington, 917 F.Supp. 1238, 1276 (N.D.Ill.1996) (noting that “a properly prepar......
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State v. Francis
...prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence." Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind. 1991); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Green v. Washington, 917 F. Supp. 1238, 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that "a properly pre......
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Dexter v. State , 79S05–1106–CR–367.
...and supporting evidence to identify the defendant as the same person who was convicted of those crimes.” (citation omitted)); Beavers, 566 N.E.2d at 535 (holding that oral testimony considered in conjunction with documentary evidence was sufficient to establish proper sequence because “[t]h......
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Robinson v. State
...prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence." Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind.1991). In Thompson v. State, we declined to limit a defendant to the remedy provided by the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules and By al......