Gaddis v. Bd. of Com'rs of Gibson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1932
• Docket Number: No. 14233.,14233.
• Citation: 179 N.E. 279,93 Ind.App. 658
• Parties: GADDIS v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF GIBSON COUNTY.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

93 Ind.App. 658

179 N.E. 279

GADDIS

v.BOARD OF COM'RS OF GIBSON COUNTY.

No. 14233.

Appellate Court of Indiana, in Banc.

Jan. 13, 1932.

Appeal from Warrick County Court; U. W. Youngblood, Judge.

Action by John W. Gaddis against the Board of Commissioners of Gibson County. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

S. L. Vandeveer, of Princeton, for appellant.

Thomas Duncan, of Princeton, for appellee.

KIME, J.

Pursuant to chapter 115, Acts of 1919, p. 562, a board of trustees was appointed to establish, maintain, manage, and control a war memorial as contemplated by said act. The board of commissioners, for the purpose of raising money to pay for the establishment of the memorial issued bonds to the extent of $25,000. The board of trustees contemplated by the act did all the things enumerated therein to be done on their part, one of which was the employment of the appellant as architect. The appellant prepared plans and specifications, which, after some changes, were accepted and approved as contemplatedin said act. For some reason not apparent the building was never erected. The said appellant brought this suit to recover for his services.

A second amended complaint in three paragraphs was demurred to by appellee. These demurrers were sustained. Appellant refused to plead further and the court adjudged that appellant take nothing by his complaint.

This is a vacation appeal and the appellant assigns as error the sustaining of the demurrers. All demurrers questioned the absence from each paragraph of the complaint of an allegation that section 25 of the County Reform Act of 1899, c. 154 (section 5886, Burns' Ann. St. 1926) was complied with. The statute is as follows: “No board of county commissioners, officer, agent or employee of any county shall have power to bind the county by any contract or agreement, or in any other way, to any extent beyond the amount of money at the time already appropriated by ordinance for the purpose of the obligation attempted to be incurred, and all contracts and agreements, express or implied, and all obligations of any and every sort beyond such existing appropriation are declared to be absolutely void.” There is no allegation of an appropriation in either paragraph of complaint.

Appellant's contention is that: “The war memorial law of 1919 is a special statute governing the whole subject and its provisions control and are not to be subordinated to any prior statute. It provides its own exclusive procedure which in many instances is in conflict with the provisions of the county reform law. Such conflict cannot be harmonized so as to bring the war memorial law within the provisions of the county reform law. Appellant's counsel calls to the court's attention the mandatory nature of the county memorial law, to the frequent use of the word ‘shall’ in section 7; in the first sentence in section 8; in section 9 and thus all of the way throughout the entire act. It is ridiculous to say that in enacting the county memorial law the legislature intended that the county council should authorize any bond issue and at the same time enact section 10 of the county memorial law with its restrictive provisions upon the board of commissioners. The Legislature in creating the county council did not and could not put the county council beyond the power of subsequent legislation and the Legislature has the ample power and has exercised that power by the enactment of special legislation excepting certain subjects from its control and limiting it as to other subjects,” citing as authority the following cases: Rexford v. Board of Commissioners of Rush County (1926) 85 Ind. App. 281, 151 N. E. 830;State ex rel. Simpson v. Meeker (1914) 182 Ind. 240, 105 N. E. 906;Comer v. State ex rel. Hauter (1916) 184 Ind. 217, 110 N. E. 984.

The appellee contends that: “Section 5862 to and including Section 5912, Burns' Ann. St. 1926, known as the County Reform Act, must be construed with section 13638, to and including section 13658, Burns' 1926, which is the act of 1919, touching World War Memorials, must be construed together. No single statute should be interpreted solely by its own words. Upon enactment it becomes a part of and is to be read in connection with the whole body of the law. Every statute which is properly the subject of judicial construction should receive such a construction as will not conflict with general principles and will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of law. There is a presumption that the Legislature in the enactment of statutes does not intend to overturn long established principles of law, unless such intention is made clearly to appear, either by express declaration or by necessary implication. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that not only should the intention of the lawmakers be deduced from a view of the whole statute and all its material parts, but statutes on the same subject matter, should be construed in pari materia. This means that for the purpose of learning and giving effect to the legislative intention statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, even though some of them have expired or have been repealed, and so far as still in force, be construed in reference to each other that effect may be given to all of the provisions of each, if that can be done by any fair and reasonable construction. The object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the Legislature and it proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes relating to one subject were governed by one spirit and policy and were intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions,” and cites the following cases: 25 R. C. L. § 277 and 285; Elliott v. Brazil Block Coal Co. (1900) 25 Ind. App. 592, 58 N. E. 736;Lincoln School Township v. American School Furniture Co. (1903) 31 Ind. App. 405. 68 N. E. 301;Conn v. Board of Commissioners of Cass County (1898) 151 Ind. 517, 51 N. E. 1062;Ensley, Treasurer, v. State ex rel. Brown (1909) 172 Ind. 198, 88 N. E. 62;Snyder, Adm'r, v. Thieme, etc., Co. (1910) 173 Ind. 659. 90 N. E. 314, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 774;Hyland v. Rochelle (1913) 179 Ind. 671, 100 N. E. 842;Bradley v. Thixton (1889) 117 Ind. 255, 19 N. E. 335;Wilson v. Donaldson (1889) 117 Ind. 356, 20 N. E. 250, 3 L. R. A. 266, 10 Am. St. Rep. 48;Johnson v. City of Indianapolis (1910) 174 Ind. 691, 93 N. E. 17;Hanly v. Sims (1910) 175 Ind. 345, 93 N. E. 228, 94 N. E. 401.

The contention of appellee seems to be the better reasoning. The county reform law is so clear, convincing, and persuasive that it requires a fertile intellect, full of resourcefulness and tact, to emasculate it and find any act free from its influence, except, where the Legislature has expressly provided that it shall not prevail. An example of the exception is the County Memorial Act of 1921, Acts 1921, c. 245, p. 707, which expressly eliminates action by the county council as contemplated in the County Reform Act.

[1] The County Reform Act and the Memorial law must be construed together. Statutes must be construed as forming part of one great and uniform system of jurisprudence. If construction proceeded on any other principle, the laws of the state would consist of disjointed and inharmonious parts and conflict and confusion would be the result. The light needed for the just interpretation of the statutes is not supplied by the statute itself, but comes from the principles declared by the courts. State v. Boswell (1886) 104 Ind. 541, 4 N. E. 675;Minnich v. Packard (1908) 42 Ind. App. 371, 85 N. E. 787;State v. Smith (1877) 59 Ind. 179.

The County Reform Act itself, in section 29 (section 5890, Burns' Ann. St. 1926), explains the intent of the Legislature in no uncertain terms. It says: “The...