Gaddis v. Chater
| Decision Date | 16 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-2488,95-2488 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 15096B Michael Wayne GADDIS, Appellant. v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri; Dean Whipple, U.S.D.C. Judge.
Michael D. Mayes, Springfield, MO, argued, for appellant.
Jerry Lee Short, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, argued (Lucy E. Mason, Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BEAM and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and JONES, * Senior District Judge.
Michael Wayne Gaddis applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. Gaddis alleged disability commencing July 16, 1992, on account of tinnitus with hearing loss and related mental impairments. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Mr. Gaddis' application, a decision which was affirmed by the Appeals Council.
Gaddis sued in federal district court in Missouri for judicial review of that decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On cross motions for summary judgement, the district court 1 found that the decision of the ALJ should be affirmed and granted summary judgment to the government. Mr. Gaddis appeals arguing the ALJ committed various errors and that his decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
At the time of his hearing, Gaddis was a thirty-five-year-old man who has completed high school and has taken some college courses. He was injured on the job with Burlington Northern Railroad on March 15, 1987, when a train whistle was activated by an engineer while Gaddis was standing at the crossing. As a result he suffers from tinnitus which the ALJ described as a "constant high pitched ringing hiss in [Gaddis'] ears." The record indicates that Gaddis cannot tolerate loud or sustained noise but that he can hear and tolerate conversation. Gaddis testified he has difficulty concentrating and that he now suffers "mental pain" on account of the tinnitus. He and his wife testified that in addition to tinnitus, he suffers from nervousness, anxiety and depression which preclude him from working.
The ALJ analyzed the case by following the five-step analysis mandated by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1995). After hearing all of the evidence, and examining the entire record (including medical records), the ALJ determined that Gaddis was not disabled as defined by the Act. Specifically the ALJ found that despite having "severe impairments of tinnitus and depression and anxiety" that Gaddis retained the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work as a liquor store sales clerk. The ability to perform past relevant work precludes a claimant from being termed disabled and recovering social security benefits. Martin v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 650, 652-53 (8th Cir.1990).
Our task on review is to determine whether the denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Rappoport v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1991). To do so, we must evaluate the evidence in the record which supports the ALJ's decision as well as that which detracts from it. See Turley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 528 (8th Cir.1991). "We may not reverse merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision." Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir.1995).
On appeal it is argued that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical evidence by improperly disregarding the opinion of Gaddis' treating psychiatrist, Dr. Christy. Dr. Christy reported that Gaddis had anxiety and depression related to "severe and disabling tinnitus." Gaddis' assignment of error belies the fact that the ALJ specifically assigned the most weight to and relied on Dr. Christy's report regarding Gaddis' depression and anxiety. The only thing discounted was the reference to "disabling tinnitus." The ALJ noted that Dr. Christy's characterization of Gaddis' mental impairments as disabling was disputed by other medical evidence and the record as a whole. It was further noted that many of Dr. Christy's conclusions were based on the subjective complaints of Gaddis, complaints found not wholly credible by the ALJ. Based on our review of the record we find no error in the evaluation of the medical evidence.
Regarding subjective complaints, Gaddis contends the ALJ erred when he found Gaddis' complaints of disabling "mental pain" associated with his tinnitus not credible. The ALJ considered the subjective complaints in accordance with Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984). Polaski provides that an ALJ can discount subjective complaints if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole. Id. at 1322.
At the outset we must note that the ALJ did not completely reject Gaddis' complaints regarding the tinnitus and accompanying mental pain. The record indicates that the ALJ found that Gaddis suffers from tinnitus (as well as depression and...
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