Gaddis v. Wyman

• Decision Date: 05 August 1969
• Docket Number: No. 69 Civ. 2921.,69 Civ. 2921.
• Citation: Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F.Supp. 713 (S.D. N.Y. 1969)
• Parties: Luretha GADDIS, individually, on behalf of her minor children, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. George K. WYMAN, individually, and as Commissioner of the Department of Social Services for the State of New York, and Louis P. Kurtis, individually, and as Commissioner of Westchester County Department of Social Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

304 F. Supp. 713

Luretha GADDIS, individually, on behalf of her minor children, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.George K. WYMAN, individually, and as Commissioner of the Department of Social Services for the State of New York, and Louis P. Kurtis, individually, and as Commissioner of Westchester County Department of Social Services, Defendants.

No. 69 Civ. 2921.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

August 5, 1969.

Legal Aid Society of Westchester County, for plaintiff; Bernard Clyne, and Antone G. Singsen, III, White Plains, N. Y., of counsel.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, New York City, for defendantCommissioner Wyman; Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., and Maria L. Marcus, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel.

MANSFIELD, District Judge.

In this class action which was commenced on July 3, 1969, plaintiff, who is an applicant for public assistance pursuant to the federal-state program for Aid to Dependent Children, attacks the constitutionality of § 139-a of New York Social Services Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 55, and seeks the convening of a three-judge court, injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment.Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281,2284,2201,2202,1331, and1343, and42U.S.C. § 1983.

Prior to the commencement of the action plaintiff was denied public assistance by the Westchester County Department of Social Services on the ground that she had failed to satisfy § 139-a which requires social service officials to deny public assistance to any person who applies for such assistance within one year of his or her arrival in the state unless the applicant can establish "by clear and convincing proof that the purpose of his or her entry was not for the purpose of securing public assistance and care in this state."¹Plaintiff contends that the section denies to her and all members of the class she sought to represent the equal protection of the laws and the right to travel guaranteed by our Federal Constitution.SeeShapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600(1969)

On July 7, 1969plaintiff's attorney was informed that despite § 139-aplaintiff would thereafter receive assistance.As a result of this change in circumstances defendant Wyman, on July 15, 1969, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the case was moot.Conceding that plaintiff Gaddis' interest in the litigation had been substantially affected by the Social Service Department's decision to give her aid despite § 139-a, plaintiff's attorney moved, on July 18, 1969, for intervention on behalf of three additional applicants for assistance who had moved to New York within a year, and continued to press for the relief originally sought by plaintiff and the purported class; a temporary restraining order, convocation of a three-judge court, preliminary injunction and a class action order.

We must first rule upon defendants' contentions that the case has become moot and therefore incapable of supporting any additional plaintiffs who seek to intervene.The contention rests upon the assumption that in order to have a class action at least one named plaintiff must continue to be a representative of the purported class.Since Gaddis, the only named plaintiff, is no longer a representative of that class, defendant argues that the entire action must fall.When the action was commenced, however, Gaddis was properly a representative of the purported class.To say that the whole action is mooted simply because it may be moot as to the named plaintiff would be contrary to the expressed purpose of Rule 23(e), which prohibits dismissal or compromise of a class action if the result would be to injure the other members of a purported class.

Defendants are not aided in their argument by the fact that a court has never determined that a class in fact exists, for "during the interim between filing and the 23(c)(1) determination by the court, it must be assumed to be a class action for purposes of dismissal or compromise under 23(e) unless and until a contrary determination is made under 23(c)(1)."Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326(E.D.Pa.1967);and seeBerger v. Purolator Products, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542(S.D.N.Y.1966)(Bryan, J.)(motion for court approval of settlement of class action brought along with a motion to determine whether the purported class action was a proper class action).A holding that an action commenced as a class action retains that character until a court finds otherwise is supported by the Advisory Committee's note on the 1966amendments to Rule 23.The Committee said:

"An order embodying a determination can be conditional; the court may rule, for example, that a class action may be maintained only if the representation is improved through intervention of additional parties of a stated type.A determination once made can be altered or amended before the decision on the merits if, upon fuller development of the facts, the original determination appears unsound.A negative determination means that the action should be stripped of its character as a class action."Advisory Committee's Notes reprinted at 39 F.R.D. 69, 104(1966)(Emphasis added)

Therefore, no class determination having been made at the time that the motion for intervention was made, a class action must be presumed to have existed at the time of the filing of the motion for intervention.

The motion to intervene was filed pursuant to Rules 23and24, F.R. Civ.P., by Willa Jean Manning, Annie Bell McAllister and Ruth Mickle.Applicant McAllister came to New York in late August 1968 with her husband and family.Shortly thereafter her husband deserted her leaving her with five children to feed and clothe.In February of 1969she was granted public assistance but after § 139-a was amended she was removed from the relief rolls as the presumption became, under the new law, that she had come to New York for the purpose of receiving public assistance.Only after her attorney was successful in getting the Social Services Department to schedule a hearing in regard to her rights was Mrs. McAllister returned to the welfare rolls.As a consequence of this presumption she was left for 10 days without aid to which she could turn to for the purposes of feeding her family.As she will remain subject to the provisions of § 139-a until the end of August, 1969, she is subject to possible further cutoffs and is a proper representative of the class which she seeks to represent upon intervention.

Applicant Manning arrived in New York on July 6, 1969, and applicant Mickle arrived on or about June 14, 1969.Both are living with relatives, allege to have come to New York for purposes other than receiving welfare, and both are in need of public assistance which has been denied to them allegedly because of the operation of § 139-a.Both of these intervenors are therefore properly representative of the class on whose behalf Mrs. Gaddis brought this action.

As Mrs. Gaddis' interest in this action has diminished with the Department's change of position in her case (coupled with the fact that because of the delays in this action she may no longer be subject to § 139-a because she came to New York in August of 1968), intervention in this class action by persons properly members of the class should be permitted to protect the interests of the class and the intervenor applicants who are no longer "adequately represented by existing parties."Rule 24(a), F.R.C.P.Therefore applicants Manning, McAllister and Mickle will be permitted to intervene in this action.

Defendant Wyman's motion to dismiss the complaint as moot is denied, since the intervenors represent the interests of the class of which they are members.Under such conditions this Court should hesitate to declare the action moot."Judicial determination of questions of this importance cannot thus be evaded and, in any event, dismissal is not appropriate when the individuals purport to represent a class."Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 887, 891(S.D.N.Y.1968)(Bryan, J., convening a three-judge court); and see opinion of that three-judge court per Feinberg, C. J., Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 893, 908(S.D.N.Y.1968).Further, an attack on § 139-a has just been made in the Western District of New York where a three-judge court has been convened.²There also the Department has moved to dismiss for mootness after making a similar change in position resulting in the plaintiff there now receiving aid despite §...