Gaddy v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 4:01CV786 SNL.,4:01CV786 SNL.
• Citation: 218 F.Supp.2d 1123
• Parties: Raydeen Lynn GADDY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

218 F.Supp.2d 1123

Raydeen Lynn GADDY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 4:01CV786 SNL.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

September 11, 2002.

Thomas A. Connelly, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Don M. Downing, Shonagh K. Clements, Stephen P. Palley, Stinson and Morrison, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

LIMBAUGH, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Hartford Life Insurance Company's ("Hartford's") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 14) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (# 15). Plaintiffs originally filed this breach of contract action in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis on May 18, 2001. Defendant removed this case to federal court on diversity grounds. Plaintiffs assert that they, as the surviving children of decedent Charles Gaddy, are entitled to death benefits under an accidental death and dismemberment policy issued by Defendant. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs are not entitled to death benefits under said policy because decedent died because he was driving while intoxicated; a non-accidental cause of death under Missouri law. Defendant further contends that death attributable to driving while intoxicated is specifically excluded under the policy. Responsive pleadings have been filed with respect to both summary judgment motions. This case is set for trial on the Court's jury trial docket of September 30, 2002.

Courts have repeatedly recognized that summary judgment is a harsh remedy that should be granted only when the moving party has established his right to judgment with such clarity as not to give rise to controversy. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 554 F.2d 896, 901 (8th Cir.1977). Summary judgment motions, however, "can be a tool of great utility in removing factually insubstantial cases from crowded dockets, freeing courts' trial time for those that really do raise genuine issues of material fact." Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988).

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). The burden is on the moving party. Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 273. After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in its favor to allow a jury to return a verdict for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir.1983). The court is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir.1976). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to an examination of the facts.

The facts in this case are largely undisputed. June 27, 1998 was a clear, dry, sunny day in Pulaski County, Missouri. At 5:35 pm Charles R. Gaddy ("Gaddy") was on his way home from the grocery store, driving his white 1996 Ford Taurus, Southbound, along a curved section of Missouri Highway 28¹. Gaddy took the curve at 50 miles per hour, and lost control of his vehicle; running off the roadway and onto the soft gravel shoulder. Gaddy then overcorrected his steering, returned to the roadway, and crossed the center line. His car collided with a second vehicle in the Northbound lane. The crash severely damaged both vehicles, and both drivers were pronounced dead at the scene less than one hour after impact.

Given the circumstances of the collision, and pursuant to § 43.250 R.S.Mo., the Missouri Highway Patrol conducted a technical accident investigation with the assistance of the Pulaski County Sheriff's Department and the Dixon Fire Department. As part of the investigation, blood drawn from decedent Gaddy was tested by the Missouri State Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory, which determined his blood alcohol content to be 0.21%. Defendant's Exhibit D. A report of the investigation was made by Sgt. G.L. Borlinghaus of the Missouri Highway Patrol. Defendant's Exhibit I at HAR-0113. In his report Sgt. Borlinghaus determined that Gaddy's intoxication² caused the crash. Defendant's Id. at HAR-0119.

At the time of his death, decedent Gaddy maintained a checking account at State Bank of Dixon, which is now known as Mid-America Bank & Trust Company ("Bank"). Plaintiffs' Exhibits 3 and 4. The Bank provided the names and addresses of its depositors to Hartford Life Insurance Company ("Hartford") which in turn solicited customers to purchase accident and dismemberment insurance under its Accidental Death & Dismemberment Policy No. ADD-5461 ("Policy"). Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2. The Policy offered $2,000.00 of free coverage to any enrolled Bank depositor, and offered additional coverage paid for by premiums deducted from the insured's checking account. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3. Gaddy completed an enrollment form, selecting an additional $60,000 in coverage. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3. Premiums for the Policy were deducted from Gaddy's checking account monthly. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4. The Policy was in effect at the time of Gaddy's death. Defendant's Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 5.

After Gaddy's death, Plaintiffs submitted a claim to Defendant for the proceeds of the Policy. Defendant refused to pay the proceeds of the Policy on the grounds that Gaddy's death did not meet the conditions of the Policy in that it was proximately caused by Gaddy's driving while intoxicated. Defendant argues that this is not an "accidental" cause of death under Missouri law, and that even if it was, an exclusion in the Policy bars coverage in this case. In addition to contesting the Defendant's argument that decedent Gaddy was driving while intoxicated, Plaintiffs have argued at length against the validity of an alleged amendment by rider to the Policy which includes an exclusion for "injury sustained while legally intoxicated from the use of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle." Defendant's Exhibit B.

Before addressing the issues, the Court must first consider certain evidentiary matters. Plaintiffs have argued that "[t]he coroner's report and police report are unauthenticated business records which are being offered as proof of the matter asserted therein and, as a result, are impermissible hearsay and not competent evidence for use for any purpose in these proceedings. FRE 802(6) and 903(11)." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. The Court docket does not show the filing of a "coroner's report" by any party to this lawsuit. The Court assumes that Plaintiffs are attacking the admissibility of Defendant's Exhibits D and I; the Missouri State Highway Patrol's toxicology report and accident investigation report, respectively.

The contents of these reports are admissible hearsay under FRE 803(8)(C) which carves out an exception for hearsay contained in public records and reports consisting of "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." FRE 803(8)(C). The reports at issue were prepared pursuant to § 43.250 R.S.Mo., and as police accident investigation reports, are admissible under the public records hearsay exception. Foster v. General Motors Corporation, 20 F.3d 838 (8th Cir.1994).

Plaintiffs' objections offer no grounds as to why the documents might not be authentic, and the Court finds Plaintiffs' objection to Defendant's Exhibit D unusual in light of the fact that Plaintiffs produced Defendant's Exhibit D. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 929 (3d Cir.1985). The reports bear sufficient indicia of authenticity to overcome Plaintiffs' conclusory objections. Accordingly Plaintiffs' objections to Defendant's Exhibits D & I are without merit.

The parties agree that Missouri law governs this case. In Missouri, a putative beneficiary claiming benefits under an accidental death policy must prove that the insured died by accident as a condition precedent to the insurer's duty to pay. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 377 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Mo.1964) (citing Caldwell v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907, 921 (1924)). Where, as here, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the cause of death is driving while intoxicated, the issue is whether an insured who drives while intoxicated, and subsequently dies in an automobile crash caused by his voluntary intoxication, died by "accident".

The parties have not cited any Missouri case law addressing the issue of whether an insured's death proximately attributable to the insured's driving while intoxicated constitutes an "accidental" cause of death. The Court's own independent research likewise has been unsuccessful in locating any case in which this issue has been addressed by a Missouri court or a federal court applying Missouri law. Where there is no state supreme court case on point, a federal court sitting in diversity has the duty to predict how the state's highest court would resolve...