Gade v. Chittenden Solid Waste Dist.

Decision Date13 November 2009
Docket NumberNo. 08-462.,08-462.
Citation989 A.2d 491,2009 VT 107
PartiesChristopher GADE and Tere Gade, et al. v. CHITTENDEN SOLID WASTE DISTRICT and Town of Williston.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Mark L. Sperry and Erin Miller Heins of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jon Anderson and David W. Rugh of Burak Anderson & Melloni, PLC, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee Chittenden Solid Waste District.

Paul S. Gillies and Daniel P. Richardson of Tarrant, Marks & Gillies, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee Town of Williston.

Present: REIBER, C.J., JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ., and TEACHOUT, Supr. J., Specially Assigned.

¶ 1. JOHNSON, J.

A group of homeowners residing in the Town of Williston filed a complaint in Chittenden Superior Court, alleging that the Town's agreement with Chittenden Solid Waste District for the siting, construction, and operation of a solid waste disposal facility in the Town was an ultra vires delegation of municipal authority. Homeowners appeal the superior court's decision upholding the agreement. We affirm.

¶ 2. In 1977, the Legislature created a state-wide waste-management system to assure proper disposal of municipal waste and to provide leadership and guidance to individual municipalities in implementing waste management plans. See 10 V.S.A. §§ 6601-6632 (creating a state-wide waste-management scheme); see also id. § 6601 (stating legislative purpose). The Legislature required each municipality to either join a solid waste management district or work with its regional planning commission in developing a waste management plan. 24 V.S.A. § 2202a(c)(1). The cities, towns, and villages of Chittenden County—including the Town of Williston— formed and then joined the Chittenden Solid Waste District (CSWD) for the collective disposal of their solid waste.

¶ 3. In 1991, the Legislature granted CSWD its charter, outlining its powers and responsibilities, which specifically include the power to make contracts. 24 V.S.A. app. ch. 405 §§ 1-63. Under this charter, each constituent town appoints one commissioner to CSWD's Board of Commissioners. Id. § 7. After the State granted the charter, CSWD began the process of siting the landfill and chose a site in the Town of Williston, adjacent to the Town's existing landfill. The Town agreed to the placement of the landfill, and in 1992, the Town and CSWD negotiated the Host Town Agreement (HTA), outlining each party's rights and responsibilities. Among the HTA's provisions are the Town's promise to use its "best efforts" to support CSWD in obtaining all necessary permits and licenses as well as the Town's warranty that CSWD's proposal complies with the town plan. In March 1992, all towns in CSWD, including Williston, held a special meeting to discuss and vote on the HTA. All approved the HTA.

¶ 4. CSWD then took possession of the Town's existing landfill and began the condemnation and development process on the site. This process has taken almost twenty years and has continued at considerable expense—at least $5,000,000—to CSWD. CSWD's efforts to condemn the site have resulted in litigation before this Court on three previous occasions, each appeal concerning a different aspect of the condemnation proceedings. See In re Chittenden Solid Waste Dist., 163 Vt. 185, 657 A.2d 197 (1995) (appealing denial of petition to condemn the landfill site); Chittenden Solid Waste Dist. v. Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co., 169 Vt. 153, 730 A.2d 614 (1999) (condemnee appealing trial court's judgment for CSWD on remand); In re Chittenden Solid Waste Dist., 2007 VT 28, 182 Vt. 38, 928 A.2d 1183 (condemnee appealing damage award).

¶ 5. Homeowners are twenty-five residents of a Williston development and all live between 0.25 and 0.8 miles from the proposed landfill site. In March 2007, homeowners filed this declaratory judgment action against both the Town and CSWD, asking the court to rule the HTA void as an illegal delegation of municipal authority. The Town and CSWD moved for summary judgment and homeowners cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted CSWD's and the Town's motions for summary judgment and denied homeowners' cross-motion. The court ruled that the Town had not illegally delegated its municipal authority by agreeing to support CSWD in its permitting applications and found that certification of the facility was not a prerequisite for the Town's ability to contract for payment from CSWD. The court also ruled that given the statutory authority for the Town to enter into the HTA, the lack of a termination date did not render the contract between the Town and CSWD void.1 Following the trial court's ruling, homeowners appealed to this Court.

¶ 6. On appeal, homeowners make two arguments. First, homeowners contend that by promising to support CSWD in its permit applications and warranting that CSWD's plans conform with the town plan, the Town illegally delegated its statutory authority regarding construction, permitting, and operation of solid waste disposal facilities. Homeowners argue that this delegation makes the contract ultra vires and therefore void ab initio. Second, homeowners argue that the HTA is void because it does not include a termination date and binds the Town for an unreasonable amount of time.2

¶ 7. We review decisions on motions for summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as the trial court. Mooney v. Town of Stowe, 2008 VT 19, ¶ 5, 183 Vt. 600, 950 A.2d 1198 (mem.). Summary judgment is appropriate when, giving the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; V.R.C.P. 56(c). As the facts in this case are undisputed, our sole task is to determine whether homeowners, rather than the Town and CSWD, are legally entitled to summary judgment. See Mooney, 2008 VT 19, ¶ 5, 183 Vt. 600, 950 A.2d 1198.

I.

¶ 8. Homeowners argue that the Town impermissibly delegated its police powers when it entered into the HTA and that the HTA is void ab initio as an ultra vires act by a municipality. Homeowners rely on two provisions of the HTA to support this claim. First, homeowners point to Article IV, § 4.0 of the HTA, which obligates the Town to support CSWD in obtaining all necessary permits and licenses. That section provides:

[T]he Town shall use its best efforts to assist the District in obtaining all necessary Approvals, licenses and permits for the acquisition, construction, operation, and management of the Landfills. Such best efforts shall include being a co-applicant with the District if requested by the District, attendance at permit hearings, testifying that the Town's concerns regarding the siting, construction, and operation of the Landfill have been adequately and fully addressed, and attendance at other public hearings in connection with the foregoing.

Homeowners argue that by promising to support CSWD in its Act 250 and municipal permit applications, the Town "has impermissibly contracted away to CSWD its statutory power to participate as an independent party in the permitting process for the proposed regional landfill."

¶ 9. Second, homeowners point to Article 4.0(c) of the HTA, which consists of a warranty in which Town represents that:

The Town Board of Selectpersons has reviewed this agreement and the District's proposals for using [the site], and have agreed that the District's proposed uses of [the site] will ... comply fully with

(i) all of the criteria set forth at 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a) [Act 250], and

(ii)the Town's duly adopted plan (if any).

Homeowners contend that this warranty amounts to an agreement with CSWD that the Town "will make its Town Plans conform to CSWD's plans for the proposed regional landfill without any independent evaluation."

¶ 10. In claiming that the Town entered into an illegal contract, homeowners attempt to characterize the HTA as both an abrogation of the Town's municipal authority as well as an illegal "contract zoning" situation in which a town bypasses permitting procedures and effectively pre-approves a project. Homeowners rely principally on our decision in Vermont Department of Public Service v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co., 151 Vt. 73, 558 A.2d 215 (1988) (hereinafter MMWEC). In MMWEC, we found that a contract between several municipalities and an electric power cooperative amounted to an illegal delegation of municipal authority where the contract was not authorized by the Legislature and involved delegation of virtually all present and future spending decisions. Id. at 86, 89-90, 558 A.2d at 223, 224-25. In casting the situation here as akin to the one we found illegal in MMWEC, homeowners have critically mischaracterized the Town's actions. The above HTA provisions represent only the Town's promise of cooperation and warranty of good faith in achieving the goals of a legislatively authorized contract. For reasons discussed below, these types of provisions are entirely permissible and, indeed, legislatively encouraged.

¶ 11. We preface our discussion of the two HTA provisions at issue by noting the explicit legislative sanction for the type of contract entered into by the Town and CSWD. This situation differs significantly from the one presented in MMWEC. See id. at 75, 558 A.2d at 218 (finding no explicit statutory authority for the type of electric power contract at issue). The Legislature has authorized municipalities to enter into contracts with a waste disposal district for the siting and management of landfills. 24 V.S.A. § 2202a(b) (providing that "[m]unicipalities may satisfy the requirements of the state solid waste management plan ... through agreement between any other unit of government or any operator having a permit from the secretary"); 10 V.S.A. § 6603(3) (granting the Secretary of the Agency of Natural Resources the power to "[e]ncourage local units of government to...

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