Gadomski v. Tavares

Decision Date22 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. 2014–72–M.P.,2014–72–M.P.
Citation113 A.3d 387
PartiesNorman T. GADOMSKI, Jr. v. Joseph H. TAVARES, Chief of Police for the City of East Providence.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

David J. Strachman, Esq., Providence, for Petitioner.

Robert E. Craven, Esq., Washington County, for Respondent.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

The petitioner, Norman T. Gadomski, Jr. (Gadomski or petitioner), seeks review by petition for common law writ of certiorari of a decision of the respondent, Joseph H. Tavares (Tavares or respondent), the Chief of Police for the City of East Providence (city or East Providence), denying the petitioner's application for a license to carry a concealed weapon pursuant to G.L.1956 § 11–47–11. On April 2, 2015, this case came before the Supreme Court sitting at Rhode Island College in the City of Providence, for oral argument, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this petition should not be decided without further briefing and argument. After considering the parties' submitted memoranda and oral arguments, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the petition at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, the decision denying the petitioner's application is quashed. Further, the respondent is directed to issue a new decision on the petitioner's application not inconsistent with this opinion.

IFacts and Travel

In early 2012, Gadomski, a resident of East Providence, submitted to the East Providence Police Department an application for a license to carry a concealed weapon. The application indicated that Gadomski wanted a license because he occasionally works alone handling cash and expensive tools and equipment, carries cash when purchasing firearms for his collection, and because he camps, hikes, and bikes alone. The application also stated that Gadomski wanted a license from this state, in which he resides, so that he could obtain a nonresident license from Massachusetts, which would enable him to join a nearby gun club in Massachusetts. In response to a question in the application asking if the applicant had ever been arrested, petitioner replied in the affirmative, and attached his Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) report from Massachusetts. The CORI report indicated that petitioner had been arraigned on misdemeanor charges twice as an adult. The first charge was for possession of alcohol by a minor, which was dismissed with a payment into the Victim–Witness Fund and court costs. The second charge was for destruction of property. Initially, a continuance without a finding was entered, and then later the charge was dismissed, again with a payment into the Victim–Witness Fund and court costs.

On March 20, 2012, Gadomski was interviewed by Tavares regarding petitioner's application. Gadomski appeared at the interview without counsel. No record of the interview was transcribed or otherwise recorded. On April 27, 2012, petitioner, through counsel, sent a letter to Tavares regarding petitioner's application. The letter indicated that petitioner had not heard anything from Tavares since the interview and requested that a permit be issued to him. On July 9, 2012, petitioner's counsel sent a second letter to Tavares indicating that there still had not been any response from the city regarding petitioner's application. This second letter included copies of Gadomski's concealed firearm permit issued by the State of Utah and his federal firearm license to be a collector of curios and relics, which petitioner had acquired since submitting his initial application. The petitioner asserts that there was no response to this letter.

On August 21, 2012, petitioner's counsel sent a third letter to Tavares requesting copies of certain records pursuant to G.L.1956 § 38–2–2. The letter requested copies of all East Providence records for the years 2007 through 2012 showing the number of applications for a license to carry a concealed weapon, the number of applications for such a license that were granted, and the time between receipt of an application and the issuance of a permit or denial of a request. Subsequently, Gadomski's counsel received a letter from Tavares responding to petitioner's requests. The response indicated that, to Tavares's knowledge, no license to carry a concealed weapon had been issued within the last decade and that, in order to receive a license, all requirements of the application must be met. On September 11, 2012, petitioner's counsel sent another letter to Tavares indicating receipt of Tavares's response and expressing frustration with the handling of petitioner's application. The letter requested the issuance of the license to Gadomski or in the alternative, specification of the legal basis for refusal to do so. Tavares did not respond to this letter.

On October 5, 2012, Gadomski filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Providence County Superior Court seeking an order requiring Tavares to rule on Gadomski's application. In the interim, while Gadomski's mandamus petition was still pending, Gadomski sent Tavares a copy of several other firearm-related certifications that he had acquired, including a pistol/revolver license from the State of New Hampshire. On January 16, 2013, an East Providence police officer hand-delivered a letter to Gadomski, which served as official notice that Gadomski's application for a license to carry a concealed weapon had been denied. In light of this development, on January 18, 2013, the Superior Court denied Gadomski's mandamus petition on the grounds that the denial had rendered the issue moot.

On February 15, 2013, Gadomski filed another action in the Superior Court, this time seeking review of the denial of his application pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.1956 § 42–35–15, and later, added a request for mandamus relief. Finding that Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031 (R.I.2004), was controlling, the Superior Court determined that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's appeal and, therefore, dismissed the action.

The following year, on February 20, 2014, Gadomski filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted on June 12, 2014.

IIStandard of Review

In Mosby, 851 A.2d at 1048, we stated that “if a license is refused on the ground that a person is not suitable, th[at] determination is subject to review by this Court on certiorari.” Thus, petitioner has invoked the proper vehicle for judicial review of the denial of his application.

It is well settled that [o]ur review of a case on certiorari is limited to an examination of the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.” Cruz v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 108 A.3d 992, 995 (R.I.2015) (quoting State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 423 (R.I.2013) ).

IIIDiscussion

While the legal landscape surrounding the procurement of a license under the Firearms Act, chapter 47 of title 11, is far from saturated, we do not write on an entirely clean slate. In State v. Storms, 112 R.I. 121, 126–27, 308 A.2d 463, 466 (1973), this Court analyzed the propriety of the delegation of legislative power to licensing authorities under the Firearms Act. We noted that “our brief summary of some of the Act's essential provisions clearly evidences that the goal of the Legislature was to prevent criminals and certain other persons from acquiring firearms generally and handguns in particular without at the same time making unduly difficult such acquisition for other members of society.” Id. at 127, 308 A.2d at 466. We recognized that, in order to effectuate that intent, among other provisions, the Firearms Act “established licensing procedures and delineated the broad parameters within which those selected by it might determine the facts upon which the right to be licensed to carry a handgun hinged.” Id. Further, we acknowledged that certain determinations required under the Firearms Act “call[ ] for an exercise of the fact-finding function.” Id. at 128, 308 A.2d at 466.

Over a quarter-century later, in Mosby, we commented further on the licensing scheme established by the Firearms Act. There, we recognized that [t]wo separate and distinct licensing procedures are set forth in the Firearms Act.” Mosby, 851 A.2d at 1047. We observed that the licensing procedure in § 11–47–18, which was at issue in Mosby, “provides for the discretionary grant of a firearms license by the [D]epartment [of the Attorney General] ‘upon a proper showing of need’ * * *.” Mosby, 851 A.2d at 1047 (quoting § 11–47–18). In contrast, we noted that § 11–47–11, which grants local officials the power to issue licenses, “is mandatory—an applicant who meets the criteria set forth in § 11–47–11 is entitled to a gun permit.” Mosby, 851 A.2d at 1047.

There are three components to the statutory scheme set forth in § 11–47–11 : (1) an age and residency requirement; (2) a reason requirement; and (3) a suitability requirement. Each of these components must be satisfied in order for a license or permit to be issued under § 11–47–11. To satisfy the age and residency requirement, an applicant must be twenty-one years of age or older and have either (i) a bona fide residence or place of business within the city or town where applying, or (ii) a bona fide residence within the United States and a license or permit to carry a pistol or revolver concealed upon his or her person issued by the authorities of any other state or subdivision of the United States. The reason requirement demands that an applicant has either (i) a good reason to fear an injury to his or her person or property, or (ii) any other proper reason for carrying a pistol or revolver. Lastly, the suitability requirement necessitates that all applicants must be a “suitable person” to be licensed.

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature...

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