Gadsden & A.U. Ry. Co. v. Causler

• Citation: 12 So. 439,97 Ala. 235
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decision Date: 02 February 1893
• Parties: GADSDEN & A. U. RY. CO. v. CAUSLER.

12 So. 439

97 Ala. 235

GADSDEN & A. U. RY. CO. v. CAUSLER.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 2, 1893

Appeal from city court of Gadsden; John H. Disque, Judge.

Action by Thomas H. Causler against the Gadsden & Attalla Union Railway Company to recover damages for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

The court, at the request of plaintiff, among others, gave the following written charges: (1) "The court charges the jury that if they are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant passed Lane's crossing, the point where plaintiff was to get off the dummy, and the train went to the next crossing, where passengers got off and on said dummy, and the engine stopped on said crossing for half a minute or a minute, and the passenger coach was but 50 or 60 feet from said crossing, and the land where plaintiff got off was smooth, and equally as convenient and safe for passengers to get off as at the crossing, and that Causler [plaintiff] had got off at that point before, and all the surrounding circumstances were such as to reasonably cause plaintiff to reasonably believe that the defendant intended he should get and that he could get, off with safety, then in such case the law is that it was not negligence for plaintiff to get off." (3) "The court charges the jury that if they are reasonably satisfied that the injury occurred to plaintiff because of such failure of defendant's agents to observe due or legal care towards plaintiff, and such failure resulted from an indifference on the part of defendant's agents as to the consequence of their conduct, and the results to plaintiff, then in such case plaintiff can recover for said injury, although plaintiff may have contributed to such injury." (4) "The court charges the jury that it is not necessary that defendant's agents should have given Causler an express invitation to get off, but if, under all the circumstances in the case, the jury believe they were such as implied an invitation, from the acts and conduct of agents of defendant to Causler, to alight, then such implied invitation from the circumstances is as good as an express invitation." The second charge given by the court at the request of the plaintiff is copied in the opinion. The defendant separately excepted to the giving of each of these charges, and also separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the charges requested by it.

Dortch & Martin, for appellant.

W. H Denson, for respondent.

STONE C.J.

We do not think the fact that Causler, the plaintiff, had been riding on the platform of the car, should exert any influence in the consideration of this case, for several reasons First. He had left the platform and was standing on the ground, when the train was backed which caused the injury. The injury was not at all dependent on the place from which he had come. Second. Although his being on the platform was one of the attending conditions, without which he probably would not have been able to leave the train during its very short stop, yet there was no causal connection, as the law defines that term, between his violation of the company's rule, in so riding, and the injury inflicted upon him. We have recently considered this question so fully that we need not repeat the argument or reproduce the authorities. Railway Co. v. Mutch, (Ala.) 11 South. Rep. 894; Beach, Contrib. Neg. §§ 33, 34. This renders it unnecessary for us to consider charges given or refused, involving the doctrine of contributory negligence, and relieves us of the discussion of charges 5 and 7 given at the instance of plaintiff, and charges 1, 2, 3, and 6 asked by defendant. They were abstract, and there was nothing in those given that could prejudice defendant.

We discover little or no conflict or controversy in the testimony in this case. The plaintiff was in the habit of riding out on the dummy train, and of alighting from it at a certain crossing. Those in charge of the train had notice of his intention to leave the train at that crossing. The train was driven past the crossing without stopping; but when approaching the next crossing, only 175 or 200 yards distant, it was brought to a full stop. Nothing was said of any intention to back the train to plaintiff's customary crossing. Plaintiff had previously gotten off the train at the point at which it was now stopped, and the ground at that place was level and smooth. The plaintiff stepped off the train, and, while in the act of reaching back to the platform for his crutches, (he was a cripple,) the train, without signal or warning, was moved backwards, knocking him down, and inflicting the injury for which he sues. The question for our consideration is, where there circumstances sufficient to be submitted to the jury, on the inquiry of negligence in those having control of the train? When a train is brought to a full stop at one's stopping place, or near to it,-having passed it,-it is not customary, or expected, that the passenger will be notified that his is his place of getting off. The circumstances, if nothing is said or done to the contrary, are sometimes an invitation to alight; and if, from the circumstances, in the absence of notice or warning to the contrary, he reasonably concludes that the train has been stopped that he may alight, he is certainly not guilty of negligence in acting on this apparent invitation. Cockle v. Railway Co., L. R. 7 C. P. 321, 39 Law. J. C. P. (N. S.) 226; Railroad Co. v. Abele, 59 Ill. 131; Milliman v. Railroad, Co., 66 N.Y. 642; Cartwright v. Railway Co., 52 Mich. 606, 18 N.W. 380; Curtis v. Railroad Co., 27 Wis. 158; Railroad Co. v. Burt, 9 South. Rep. 410, 92 Ala. 291; Railway Co. v. Smith, 90 Ala. 60, 8 South. Rep. 86; Duame v. Railway Co., 72 Wis. 523, 40 N.W. 394. We hold that the circumstances were sufficient to authorize their submission to the jury, and that charges 1 and 4 given at the instance of plaintiff were authorized by the testimony, and correctly stated the rules of law to be observed in its consideration.

Charge 2 given at the instance of plaintiff raises the question of the proper measure of diligence due to passengers from a common carrier for hire. Its language is "that the defendant is liable in damages to the plaintiff for any injury resulting to plaintiff that occurred because defendant's agents failed to...