Gadsden v. Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc.

• Citation: 210 F.Supp.2d 430
• Decision Date: 11 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00 CIV. 7854(CBM).,00 CIV. 7854(CBM).
• Parties: Leon GADSDEN, Plaintiff, v. JONES LANG LASALLE AMERICAS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

210 F.Supp.2d 430

Leon GADSDEN, Plaintiff, v. JONES LANG LASALLE AMERICAS, INC., Defendant.

No. 00 CIV. 7854(CBM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 11, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Anthony C. Ofodile, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff.

David Bennet Ross, Peter Walker, Esq., Lori Meyers, Seyfarth Shaw, New York City, for Defendant.

OPINION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MOTLEY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Leon Gadsden brings this action against his former employer defendant Jones Lang Lasalle, Inc. Plaintiff claims that defendant discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Now before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment and for attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements. Also pending is defendant's written request for sanctions. For the reasons stated in this opinion, defendant's request for sanctions will be GRANTED IN PART, the motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED, and the motion for attorneys' fees will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action in October 2000. The matter was originally assigned to the Honorable Deborah Batts, and on February 23, 2001, Judge Batts entered a scheduling order which provided that, except for good cause shown, "all discovery, including expert discovery, shall be commenced in time to be completed by 5/18/01."

Judge Batts heard nothing from the parties until three months later. In a letter motion dated May 15, 2001, defendant's counsel sought an order from Judge Batts compelling plaintiff to respond to its discovery requests and setting a date for plaintiff's deposition. Defendant also asked the court to sanction plaintiff and award defendant its attorneys' fees and costs associated with the preparation and filing of the motion. According to the letter, plaintiff's counsel had been derelict in his duties over the preceding three months regarding the production of documents, responding to interrogatories, and producing his client for deposition. Defendant alleged that plaintiff had ignored return dates on notices and subpoenas, and that plaintiff had also failed to respond to subsequent written reminders. After plaintiff had failed to respond to written reminders, defendant's counsel telephoned the offices of plaintiff's counsel on April 20. The attorney who had appeared at the original February 23 scheduling conference assured defendant's counsel that he would comply with the various discovery requests and make his client available for deposition. Agreed upon deadlines subsequently passed again with plaintiff's counsel failing to live up to his representations. Defendant's counsel, apparently having grown weary of opposing counsel's intractability, sought judicial intervention.

On May 21, 2001, Judge Batts referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Douglas Eaton for resolution. Plaintiff's counsel responded to defendant's allegations in a letter to Judge Eaton dated May 29, 2001. Plaintiff's counsel offered little in the way of excuse other than that he was "overextended," that he had been on vacation, and that his "most Senior Associate" (the attorney to whom defendant's counsel had spoken on April 20, 2001) had recently left his employ.

Judge Eaton did not look favorably upon plaintiff's counsel's proffered excuses, and in a Memorandum and Order dated May 29, 2001,¹ he ordered plaintiff's counsel to produce responses to defendant's discovery requests within the week. See Gadsden v. Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 7854, 2001 WL 585531, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2001). He also ordered plaintiff to appear for deposition within two weeks and limited plaintiff to two depositions of defendant's employees. Id. Judge Eaton also held that, as a result of plaintiff's counsel's unexcusable delays, plaintiff had effectively waived any objections to defendant's discovery requests except for materials covered by attorney-client and/or work-product privileges. Id. Finally, with respect to defendant's request for fees and costs, Judge Eaton indicated that he would "defer ruling on defendant's request for sanctions," but that "defendant may renew the request, with updated information," at a later date. Id. at *1-*2.

Four weeks later, on June 27, 2001, plaintiff's counsel delivered a letter to Judge Eaton in which plaintiff sought an extension of the discovery deadlines that Judge Eaton had set in his Memorandum and Order. Plaintiff also requested permission to conduct more depositions. In a memorandum endorsement dated that same day, Judge Eaton denied the applications, chastising plaintiff's counsel for making what was "essentially an untimely motion for reconsideration."

After the completion of discovery, Judge Batts entered an order on December 12, 2001, which set forth a briefing schedule for defendant's summary judgment motion. Defendant's moving papers were to be served no later than February 8, 2002, plaintiff's opposition papers were due March 8, 2002, and defendant's reply was due March 18, 2002. Defendant timely served its moving papers in compliance with Judge Batts's order.

In a letter to Judge Batts dated March 4, 2002, plaintiff's counsel requested an extension of time in which to respond to defendant's motion. Plaintiff's counsel requested the extension because he was "involved in a trial last month that lasted for two weeks which made it impossible for [him] to work on little else." Judge Batts granted the request and gave plaintiff an additional three weeks — until March 29, 2002 — in which to respond.

On March 6, 2002, this matter was transferred to the undersigned. On March 27, 2002, plaintiff's counsel wrote the court to request an additional three weeks in which to respond to defendant's motion. Plaintiff's counsel stated that the additional time was necessary because he "had not been feeling well for some time now and was not able to work on this motion as a result." In an order dated April 1, 2002, the court granted plaintiff's request, resetting the due date for plaintiff's opposition to April 19, 2002. The order also indicated that "[t]he parties are hereby advised that no further extensions of time will [be] granted."

Late in the day on April 23, 2002, defendant's counsel faxed a letter to the court stating that plaintiff's counsel had yet to file and serve opposition papers by the April 19 deadline. According to the letter, defendant's counsel had telephoned plaintiff's counsel on April 22 to inquire where the papers were. Defendant's counsel indicated that he had been working furiously on the papers for several days and that they would be filed and served by the morning of April 23. When they had not arrived by mid-day on April 23, defendant's counsel telephoned plaintiff's counsel, leaving a message. Plaintiff's counsel failed to return the call. Defendant's counsel then faxed its letter to the court, that evening, asking the court to reject plaintiff's opposition papers as untimely and asking the court to grant its motion for summary judgment on default.

Plaintiff's counsel wrote the court the next day "to apologize" and "beg the Court's forgiveness." He stated that he had been "seriously handicapped by the departure of two attorneys who worked for me within the past one year." He also indicated that he was overextended with numerous pending matters, and that was why he had initially asked for an extension. He made no reference to his earlier claim of illness.

Defendant's counsel replied the following day in a fax to the court, stating that the fact that plaintiff's counsel was over-worked and understaffed should not excuse plaintiff's failure to comply with this court's order. Defendant renewed its request for a default judgment, or, in the alternative, asked the court to deem admitted the facts in defendant's Local Civil Rule 56 Statement. Defendant also requested an extension of time in which to file reply papers.

Later that day, April 25, 2002, the court entered an order granting defendant's request for an extension of time in which to reply. While the order indicated that the court would defer ruling for the time being on defendant's request for sanctions, it also indicated that defendant could renew its request for sanctions at oral argument and that "plaintiff must be prepared to respond."

The court heard oral argument on defendant's summary judgment motion on May 22, 2002. At that time, defendant renewed its request for sanctions and plaintiff's counsel was heard on the issue.

III. DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS

Defendant argues that it is entitled to have its summary judgment motion granted by default because the reasons given by plaintiff's counsel in support of his after-the-fact request for an extension of time do not rise to the level of "excusable neglect" as required by Rule 6(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant cites Daniels v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 96-CV-1518, 1997 WL 538904 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1997), for the proposition that failure to comply with a court's scheduling order is not excused by an attorney's large caseload or meager staff. In Daniels, plaintiff had served and filed her opposition papers to defendant's motion for summary judgment over one month late. On defendant's application, the court ordered plaintiff to show cause why she should not be deemed to have consented to defendant's motion pursuant to that court's Local Civil Rules. In response, plaintiff's attorney admitted that he had "no good answer" and merely provided the court with "a detailed description of his calendar and generally argued that his status as a solo practitioner caused his untimely filing." Id. at *5. While then-District Judge Pooler explicitly indicated that she was "unpersuaded by this argument," she held that she did not have to reach the default issue because she was...