Gadson v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 25,25
• Citation: 341 Md. 1,668 A.2d 22
• Parties: Tyrone Jerome GADSON v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 1

341 Md. 1

668 A.2d 22

Tyrone Jerome GADSON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 25, Sept. Term, 1995.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 7, 1995.

Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Assistant Public Defender, (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.

Thomas K. Clancy, Assistant Attorney General, (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.

CHASANOW, Judge.

The question presented in this case is whether the State may constitutionally detain a prospective visitor to a prison long enough to conduct a "canine sniff" of the visitor's motor vehicle after the visitor, upon being told of the procedure, objects and expresses a desire to leave without entering the prison. While it is absolutely proper to require the visitor to submit to such a detention as a condition of entry, we hold that absent reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, it is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to detain those visitors who, prior to entering the prison, indicate a preference to leave rather than submit to the detention.

I.

Tyrone Jerome Gadson, Petitioner, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The convictions were based on evidence seized during a search of Gadson's truck, including three bags of "crack" cocaine, two bags of marijuana, an electronic scale and other drug paraphernalia. The sole issue on appeal is whether the physical evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure.

On September 13, 1992, Gadson and a friend planned to drive to the House of Correction in Jessup to drop off money for an inmate of the facility. Gadson turned off Maryland Route 175 and onto an access road leading to the prison building. The road also gives access to some houses owned by the Division of Correction and some construction trailers. After travelling up the access road approximately 300 yards, Gadson came to a stop at a "guard booth" next to the road. The House of Correction itself is located approximately a quarter of a mile beyond the booth. Although three signs along the access road warned that visitors were subject to search, Gadson testified that he failed to notice them. ¹ Shortly after Gadson's truck stopped next to the guard booth, Trooper Charles Prince of the Maryland State Police approached Gadson's truck, identified himself, and informed Gadson that he intended to perform a "canine sniff" of the vehicle using a trained drug detection dog named "Sandy."

Pursuant to state police policy, Trooper Prince ordered Gadson to turn off his vehicle so that he could perform the drug scan. Gadson told Trooper Prince he objected to the canine sniff, and asked for permission to leave the area. The trooper denied Gadson's request. In compliance with the trooper's order, Gadson turned off his truck and waited for the dog to be brought over. The dog "alerted" Trooper Prince that it smelled drugs in the truck, and at that point, Gadson admitted to the trooper that there was marijuana in the truck. ² Gadson's truck was searched and the contraband seized.

At a suppression hearing before Judge Raymond G. Thieme, Jr., Trooper Prince testified that, in 1992 at the governor's request, the Maryland State Police established drug detection "checkpoints" at two state correctional facilities. The purpose of the checkpoints is to prevent transportation of drugs into the prisons. The trooper explained the typical procedure at these checkpoints is for an officer to wait until the visitor's vehicle stops at the guard shack. As the driver explains to the guard his business on the premises, a trooper approaches the vehicle and informs the driver of the required dog sniff. The driver is ordered to turn off the engine and remove the keys from the ignition. The trooper then brings the dog over to the vehicle and the sniff is performed.

Gadson argues that, once informed of the canine sniffing procedure by Trooper Prince, he should have been given the option to turn back rather than submit to further detention and the dog sniff. Judge Thieme ruled against Gadson, and that ruling was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. Gadson v. State, 102 Md.App. 554, 650 A.2d 1354 (1994). We granted certiorari to consider the important question raised in this case.

II.

The narrow issue before us is whether Trooper Prince's detention of Gadson at the guard shack constituted an "unreasonable seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ³ Gadson does not contend that the dog sniff itself implicated his Fourth Amendment rights. ⁴ Nor does Gadson dispute that once Sandy the dog alerted Trooper Prince to the presence of illegal drugs in the vehicle, sufficient probable cause existed to support a warrantless search of the truck. See United States v. Dovali-Avila, 895 F.2d 206, 207 (5th Cir.1990) (a "dog alert" is sufficient to create probable cause to conduct a warrantless vehicle search); In re Montrail M., 87 Md.App. 420, 437, 589 A.2d 1318, 1327 (1991) (trained drug dog's reaction "properly served as probable cause to search the vehicle" without a warrant), aff'd, 325 Md. 527, 601 A.2d 1102 (1992). Nor does Gadson argue that the initial stop at the guard shack was not justified as a way of screening potential visitors to the prison.

Rather, Gadson's theory is that the detention he was required to endure in his truck after being ordered to turn off the engine and wait while Trooper Prince retrieved the dog and conducted the drug sniff constituted an unreasonable "seizure" with the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article 26. If Gadson is correct that the seizure was unreasonable then everything that flowed from it, including the search of Gadson's truck and the contraband that was seized during the search, was tainted and the physical evidence should have been suppressed. See Ott v. State, 325 Md. 206, 225, 600 A.2d 111, 120 (noting that physical evidence obtained as the result of an illegal seizure is suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine), cert. denied, Maryland v. Ott, 506 U.S. 904, 113 S.Ct. 295, 121 L.Ed.2d 219 (1992).

There is no disputing that Trooper Prince's detaining of Gadson was a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. See Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 493, 479 A.2d 903, 907 (1984) ("It is well recognized that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief.") (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979)). The only issue is the reasonableness of that seizure. See Little, 300 Md. at 493, 479 A.2d at 907 (noting that the Fourth Amendment only prohibits seizures that are unreasonable).

III.

As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from detaining an individual, even briefly, absent some "articulable reason" that the person seized is or has been engaged in criminal activity. Little, 300 Md. at 494 n. 4, 479 A.2d at 907 n. 4 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640-41, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 362 (1979)). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236 (1983) (A person "may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968) (holding that even limited seizures must be justified by "specific and articulable facts"); United States v. Torres, 65 F.3d 1241, 1245 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that investigative detention must be supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion). As Chief Justice Burger explained in Brown, when even a limited seizure "is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits." 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. at 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d at 363.

Here, the State does not contend that Trooper Prince possessed any articulable suspicion to justify detaining Gadson to conduct the drug sniff. Instead, the State relies on an exception to the general rule that allows police to briefly detain motorists at "checkpoints" even when there is no individualized suspicion of criminal activity. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (upholding required stop at sobriety checkpoints); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (upholding required stop at checkpoint for illegal immigrants); Little, supra (upholding sobriety checkpoints). These "checkpoint" cases hold that a limited "seizure" of motorists is permissible even without individualized suspicion where the State's interests in conducting the stop outweigh the motorists' interest in avoiding a relatively minor intrusion of their privacy interests. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-55, 110 S.Ct. at 2484-88, 110 L.Ed.2d. at 419-23; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561-62, 96 S.Ct. at 3084-85, 49 L.Ed.2d. at 1130-31; Little, 300 Md. at 504-06, 479 A.2d at 912-14.

In Little, this Court upheld the use of "sobriety checkpoints" where motorists were required to stop on a public highway and submit to a very brief police examination for signs of intoxication. We judged the reasonableness of the checkpoints " 'by balancing [the] intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against [the] promotion of legitimate government interests.' " Little, 300 Md. at 494, 479 A.2d at 907 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396, 59...