Gaffney v. Orland Fire Protection

• Decision Date: 24 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1-09-0046.,1-09-0046.
• Citation: 921 N.E.2d 778,336 Ill. Dec. 922
• Parties: Michael P. GAFFNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the ORLAND FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Patrick Maher, as President of the Board of Trustees, Patricia Corcoran, as Secretary of the Board of Trustees, and the Orland Fire Protection District, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

921 N.E.2d 778

336 Ill. Dec. 922

Michael P. GAFFNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the ORLAND FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Patrick Maher, as President of the Board of Trustees, Patricia Corcoran, as Secretary of the Board of Trustees, and the Orland Fire Protection District, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-09-0046.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

December 24, 2009.

Rehearing Denied January 28, 2010.

Law Offices of Thomas W. Duda, Arlington Heights, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jacob Karaca of Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, Ltd., Chicago, for Defendants-Appellees.

Justice McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Michael J. Gaffney filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, the Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, president Patrick Maher, secretary Patricia Corcoran, and the Orland Fire Protection District (collectively, the District), seeking a declaratory judgment to compel the payment of plaintiff's health coverage benefits in accordance with section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2006)) and in the alternative, for review under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2006)) of the District's denial of his application for health coverage benefits under the Act. The trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment count in June 2008, and later in December 2008, the court considered plaintiff's remaining count under a common law writ of certiorari and affirmed the District's denial of plaintiff's application.

Plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) the District's consideration of plaintiff's request for payment of his health insurance premiums pursuant to section 10 violated the terms of section 20 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/20 (West 2006)), which does not permit a home rule unit to provide benefits in a manner inconsistent with the Act and acts as a limitation on the home rule unit's powers under the Illinois Constitution; and (2) plaintiff's injury during a training exercise fire occurred during his response to what he reasonably believed was an emergency under section 10(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2006)).

Plaintiff was hired by the District as a firefighter and paramedic in May 1994. On July 27, 2005, plaintiff responded to a live-fire training exercise. His superior instructed plaintiff to treat the exercise as though it were an actual emergency call. Plaintiff's crew responded with lights and sirens running on the truck. Plaintiff's crew was told to rescue a "dummy" victim from the fire and to advance the fire hose into the building to contain the fire. Plaintiff donned full fire protection gear, including a breathing apparatus, and entered the building. The building was full of smoke with little to no visibility. Plaintiff found and removed the dummy victim on the second floor. Plaintiff and his crew also worked to advance a hose line through the building. After removing the dummy victim, they continued up to the third floor, where the fire was to be extinguished. The hose became entangled with an unseen object and plaintiff followed the hose line back to the obstruction. The hose was wrapped around a love seat and plaintiff used his dominant left arm to move the love seat to free the hose. When plaintiff moved the love seat, he severely injured his left shoulder. Plaintiff continued to participate in the exercise for a little while, but eventually stopped due to his injury. After plaintiff's injury, the training exercise ended. Plaintiff was later transported to the hospital. Except for light duty, plaintiff has not returned to work for the District since that day.

Following his injury, plaintiff applied for a line-of-duty disability pension from the District, which was granted in April 2007. Also in April 2007, plaintiff applied to the District to receive health coverage benefits under the Act. The Act allows emergency service personnel, including firefighters, and their families to continue receiving health benefits following a catastrophic injury or death that occurred while engaged in specified aspects of their job, such as when the firefighter was responding to what he or she reasonably believed was an emergency. See 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2006). The District passed an ordinance directing the procedure for its firefighters to apply for these benefits under the Act. Plaintiff's application was continued to a special meeting of the District in May 2007. Although the ordinance does not require a hearing, plaintiff was permitted to present his case for benefits under the Act with his attorney at this meeting. After reviewing plaintiff's application and the facts of the case alongside the requirements of the Act, the board of trustees denied plaintiff's application, finding that plaintiff was not responding to what he reasonably believed was an emergency at the time of his injury.

In July 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint against the District in the circuit court for declaratory judgment, and in the alternative, for review of the District's denial of his application under the Administrative Review Law. The District moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006)). In June 2008, the trial court granted the District's motion as to count I (declaratory judgment). The court also held that the Act did not expressly adopt the Administrative Review Law, and therefore, it did not apply. The court stated that it would consider plaintiff's remaining count as a petition for a common law writ of certiorari.

In December 2008, following briefing and arguments, the trial court affirmed the District's denial of plaintiff's application for health coverage benefits under the Act. The court found:

"The plain meaning of the phrase, `response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency,' does not include participation in a training exercise, particularly where, as here, Plaintiff and his crew were given instructions prior to the start of the exercise. Read as a whole, the statute covers situations in which emergency response personnel are injured or killed while performing the very services they are charged with performing. Training exercises, although valuable as an educational tool to prepare officers and firefighters for the types of events they are expected to handle, are not responses to fresh pursuit or to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, under any plain reading of the statute.

There was nothing unexpected about Plaintiff's `response' to the call that began the exercise. Although the exercise was undeniably dangerous and presented certain unknown difficulties (as expected in any such exercise), danger and unknowns are not sufficient to constitute an emergency as that term is used in [the Act.] Plaintiff admits that his crew was instructed to treat the exercise as an actual call. Plaintiff and his crew therefore knew that the exercise was not an emergency, or even a false alarm. As a matter of law, Plaintiff could not have reasonably believed he was responding to an emergency." (Emphasis in original.)

This appeal followed.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that (1) the District was not permitted to pass an ordinance outlining a process for plaintiff to apply for benefits and its consideration of said application was not authorized under the Act; and (2) plaintiff's injury occurred during his response to what he reasonably believed was an emergency.

Initially, we must address the District's argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's first argument because his notice of appeal only indicated that he was appealing from the December 10, 2008, order denying him benefits and did not mention the June 13, 2008, order dismissing the declaratory judgment count of the complaint. Generally, when a final order has been entered in a case, all nonfinal orders previously entered may be reviewed by the appellate court. Reed v. Retirement Board of the Fireman's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 376 Ill.App.3d 259, 267, 315 Ill.Dec. 94, 876 N.E.2d 94 (2007). "An order is final and appealable if it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate part thereof." R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill.2d 153, 159, 229 Ill.Dec. 533, 692 N.E.2d 306 (1998). "An appeal from a final judgment draws into question all earlier nonfinal orders that produced the judgment." Pekin Insurance Co. v. Pulte Home Corp., 344 Ill.App.3d 64, 67-68, 279 Ill.Dec. 398, 800 N.E.2d 466 (2003). Here, the June 13 2008, order was a nonfinal order as it only dismissed one count of plaintiff's complaint and left the remaining count for further action. In contrast, the December 10, 2008, order was a final order in this case and plaintiff filed a timely appeal of that order. Since we may consider nonfinal orders following final judgment, any questions regarding the June 13, 2008, order are properly before this court.

In determining the appropriate standard of review, we need to clarify the procedural posture of this case, including the reviewability of the District's decision. Plaintiff contends that pursuant to section 20 of the Act, the District had no authority to conduct any review of his claim for health coverage benefits under the Act, and thus, the District's decision is not entitled to deference.

"Whether an agency action is reviewable is an issue of statutory construction." Outcom, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 233 Ill.2d 324, 332, 330 Ill.Dec. 784, 909 N.E.2d 806 (2009). "Courts must consider whether the statute which confers power on the agency to act indicates that the legislature intended the agency's decisions to be reviewable. Frequently, the legislature's intent is clear because the agency's enabling statute expressly provides for review under our...