Gaglione v. Cardi

• Citation: 120 R.I. 534,388 A.2d 361
• Decision Date: 21 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-405-A,76-405-A
• Parties: Emily GAGLIONE v. Americo CARDI et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 361

388 A.2d 361

120 R.I. 534

Emily GAGLIONE v. Americo CARDI et al.

No. 76-405-A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 21, 1978.

[120 R.I. 541] Haig Barsamian, Providence, for plaintiff.

Thomas L. Marcaccio, Jr., Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

DORIS, Justice:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered by a justice of the Superior Court, sitting without a jury, denying the plaintiff's claim for specific performance and damages on the grounds of laches. The plaintiff appeals.

On August 5, 1965, plaintiff, Emily Gaglione, entered into a purchase and sale agreement with defendants, Americo and Alfredo Cardi, for the purchase of nine real estate lots located in the city of Warwick. The agreement was recorded in Warwick on November 19, 1965. The plaintiff agreed to pay $20,000 for the property, with $1,000 to be paid as a downpayment, $4,000 due upon delivery of the deed, and the balance to be paid within one year of the date of the closing. The parties agreed that the closing would occur on or before February 1, 1966. They also agreed that defendants would provide plaintiff with the fill necessary to level off the property without cost, although plaintiff agreed to bear all transportation expenses.

It is undisputed that at the time of the execution of the agreement, defendants did not own one of the lots included in the agreement. The plaintiff testified that she had been informed of this fact by defendants' agent, Carl H. Rosati, Jr., at the time the agreement was signed. However, both Rosati and defendant Americo Cardi testified that at the time of the agreement they believed defendants to be the owners of all nine lots.

Upon learning that they were not the owners of one lot, defendant Americo Cardi testified that he entered into an agreement with the record owner of the property on October 29, 1965, to purchase the property for $5,000. The closing date for this sale was also set for February 1, 1966. The sale, however, did not occur until October 28, 1966.

On October 26, 1972, plaintiff commenced this action in the Superior Court seeking specific performance of the August 1965 agreement or, in the alternative, damages for breach of that agreement. The defendants counterclaimed, alleging that plaintiff had recorded the August 1965 agreement which was acting as a cloud on the title, and seeking a discharge of the recording. The defendants also counterclaimed for damages.

At trial, plaintiff testified that she had been ready, willing and able to purchase the property at all times subsequent to the execution of the agreement but had never been contacted by defendants regarding a closing. The plaintiff's husband, Frank Gaglione, who was acting as her agent during this time, testified that he had been informed by a title insurance company in 1968 that defendants did not wish to close the sale. He further testified that, subsequent to this notification, he approached defendant Americo Cardi regarding the sale and was offered the nine-lot parcel and an additional parcel for $40,000, which he declined.

The defendant Americo Cardi admitted that he was unable to give clear title to the nine-lot parcel on February 1, 1966, but testified that he notified plaintiff's husband that he was ready to close after having purchased the ninth lot in October of 1966. The plaintiff's husband, however, told Cardi that he could not complete the purchase because of difficulties with the Internal Revenue Service. Cardi then told plaintiff's husband that "the deal was off."

Carl Rosati, defendant's agent, also testified that plaintiff's husband had informed him that the transaction could not be closed because of tax problems. Thereafter, Rosati returned plaintiff's $1,000 deposit to the office of an attorney with whom plaintiff's husband had consulted regarding the purchase of the parcel. Rosati further testified that in his opinion the value of the property had appreciated to between $110,000 and $115,000 by 1972.

After the close of the evidence, the trial justice found that defendants had in good faith made a contract to sell nine property lots which they believed they owned. He found that Americo Cardi attempted to complete the contract by spending $5,000 to purchase the ninth parcel. The trial justice further found that defendants had prepared a deed and had attempted to perform but that plaintiff refused to close.

With respect to the return of plaintiff's deposit, the trial justice found that Rosati had returned the $1,000 to plaintiff's attorney after defendant Americo Cardi had terminated the agreement. He found no testimony indicating that plaintiff's attorney had not received the deposit.

Finally, the court found that plaintiff was guilty of "gross laches" in view of the long delay in filing suit coupled with the dramatic intervening increase in the value of the property. He further found the recorded purchase and sale agreement to be a cloud on the title and ordered it removed. From this judgment and the subsequent denial of her motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff first argues that the trial justice erred in ruling on three evidentiary questions. We do not agree. Two of the questions at issue were asked by plaintiff's attorney to defendant Americo Cardi. Both questions were objected to by defendants' attorney as immaterial, and both objections were sustained. The initial question sought to ascertain the amount Americo Cardi expected to pay for the one lot in the parcel which defendants did not own. The second question attempted to ascertain the existence of other property owned by defendant Americo Cardi adjoining the nine-lot parcel.

It is well settled in this state that the trial justice must exercise his discretion on the admission of evidence objected to as being irrelevant or immaterial. Atlantic Paint & Coatings, Inc. v. Conti, R.I., 381 A.2d 1034, 1036 (1977); Engelhardt v. Bergeron, 113 R.I. 50, 57-58, 317 A.2d 877, 882 (1974). The exclusion of such evidence is not reversible error unless the trial justice abused his discretion, thereby causing substantial injury to the party seeking the admission of such evidence.

Substantial injury occurs only if such evidence was relevant and material to a crucial issue and if the evidence, if admitted, would have had a controlling influence on a material aspect of the case. Urbani v. Razza, 103 R.I. 445, 449, 238 A.2d 383, 386 (1968). The burden of demonstrating that the proposed evidence was material and that its exclusion had a prejudicial influence on the decision rests upon the party seeking its admission. Atlantic Paint & Coatings, Inc. v. Conti, supra; Mercurio v. Fascitelli, 116 R.I. 237, 244, 354 A.2d 736, 740 (1976).

We find no abuse of discretion by the trial justice in excluding these questions, and in any event, we believe that their exclusion caused no prejudice to plaintiff.

The...