Gagliormella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1954
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 53-738.
• Citation: Gagliormella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 F.Supp. 246 (D. Mass. 1954)
• Parties: GAGLIORMELLA et al. v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

122 F. Supp. 246

GAGLIORMELLA et al. v.METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Civ. No. 53-738.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

June 25, 1954.

Hugh S. Boyd, Newton, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Eugene Lyne, Lyne, Woodworth & Evarts, Boston, Mass., for defendant.

WYZANSKI, District Judge.

This is an action of contract by which plaintiffs seek to recover the additional death benefit payable for death by accidental means, under two policies of life insurance issued by the defendant upon the life of Anthony H. Gagliormella, who designated plaintiffs as his beneficiaries.

It is admitted that the insured died by accidental means, but it is contended that the additional death benefit is not payable because the insured died in the military forces of a "country at war"(to use the language of one of the policies), and as "a result of an act of war"(to use the language of the other policy).

The precise provision of policy number 16 412 317A is that "the company promises to pay * * * an additional sum * * * upon receipt * * * of due proof of violent death of the Insured if such death shall not have occurred * * while the Insured is in the military, naval, or air forces of any country at war"; the double payment provision "shall be suspended during any period while the insured is in the military, naval, or air forces of any country at war".

Policynumber 17 989 790A provided that "the company promises to pay * * an additional sum * * * upon receipt * * * of due proof of the violent death of the insured (provided) that such death shall not have occurred * * as a result of an act of war."

It is agreed that the insured was a private in the Marine Corps, who "was killed in action against the enemy 31 October 1952 in the Korean Area", and that proof of this fact was submitted by the beneficiaries in the form of a document officially prepared by the Department of the Navy.Defendant has paid the single indemnity, but refuses to pay the double indemnity benefits.While admitting that death was the result of bodily injuries caused by external, violent, and accidental means, and hence within the normal scope of the double indemnity clauses, it denies any double liability because in its view the insured's death falls within the just quoted war clause exceptions to those clauses.

With respect to policy 16 412 317A, the issue is whether the United States was "at war" in Korea within the meaning of this policy on October 31, 1952.

With regard to policy 17 989 790A the issue is whether the death of the insured occurred "as a result of an act of war".

The contracts here in issue were made as a result of applications in this Commonwealth.They insured a Massachusetts citizen.And the parties before me agreed that the Massachusetts state courts would hold that such a contract is governed by Massachusetts state law.Since this case is brought in the Federal Court by virtue of its diversity jurisdiction, this Court must follow the local state rules of conflicts of laws.Therefore, as the parties themselves concede, the two issues in this case are to be determined by the rules of substantive law which would be applied by the local courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

The Massachusetts courts have not squarely addressed themselves to the issue whether the Korean hostilities constituted a "war" within the meaning of insurance policies.Yet in Stankus v. New York Life Insurance Co., 312 Mass. 366, 368, 44 N.E.2d 687, 688, there is a plain indication favorable to defendant in the instant case.That 1942 decision held that exclusionary clauses such as are in issue at bar precluded double recovery by beneficiaries of an insured American sailor killed at sea in October 1941 by a German torpedo when Germany was at war with the United Kingdom, but not with the United States.Mr. Justice Ronan in Stankus said that as used in insurance policies "the term `war' * * refers to no particular type or kind of war, but applies in general to every situation that ordinary people would commonly regard as war."

With this Massachusetts doctrine in mind, the Korean situation in 1952 can be rapidly sketched.Full details are matters of common knowledge and need no restatement since they have been so well summarized in Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202andLanglas v. Iowa Life Insurance Co., Iowa, 63 N.W.2d 885.But these are the high points.October 6, 1949Congress authorized the President to furnish military assistance to the Republic of Korea (loosely called South Korea).June 25, 1950 the U. N. Security Council found that North Korean forces had made an unprovoked attack on South Korea.June 27 it recommended that member nations furnish armed assistance; July 7, it recommended that they provide military forces under United States command.By a series of orders, beginning June 27, 1950, the President despatched troops to Korea.Thereafter, Congress with specific reference to the Korean situation made appropriations, caused changes in various veterans and like acts, and imposed taxes.In his testimony before Congress the Secretary of State recognized that "in the usual sense of the word there is a war".Hrgs.Com. on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. part 3, June 6, 1951, pp. 2013-2014.Hundreds of thousands of Americans have served in hostilities in Korea.Over 128,000 casualties, including over 22,000 deaths occurred in the American armed forces in Korea.

Nonetheless, neither as of October 31, 1952 nor thereafter, did Congress declare war.And so plaintiffs argue that the policies' exceptions...