Gagne v. City of Galveston, Civ. A. No. G-84-192.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. G-84-192.
• Citation: 671 F. Supp. 1130
• Parties: Donald GAGNE, Administrator of the Estate of James D. Gagne and Arthur and Pauline Gagne, Individually and as Next Friend of Christine Gagne, a Minor Child v. CITY OF GALVESTON, City of Galveston Police Dept., Jan Coggeshall, Steve Huffman, Mike Putnal.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

671 F. Supp. 1130

Donald GAGNE, Administrator of the Estate of James D. Gagne and Arthur and Pauline Gagne, Individually and as Next Friend of Christine Gagne, a Minor Child v. CITY OF GALVESTON, City of Galveston Police Dept., Jan Coggeshall, Steve Huffman, Mike Putnal.

Civ. A. No. G-84-192.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

October 19, 1987.

Trey Apffel, Alvin, Tex., for plaintiffs.

John Eckel, Galveston, Tex., and Barry Abrams, Houston, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HUGH GIBSON, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment by the defendants City of Galveston and City of Galveston Police Department. Having considered the pleadings, motions and materials attached thereto, and the law applicable thereto, the Court is of the opinion that defendants motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 causes of action should be and hereby is GRANTED.

FACTS

On May 17, 1983, at approximately 3:00 a.m., James Gagne was arrested for public intoxication by Sgt. Rice and Officer Putnal, two uniformed City of Galveston police officers. Gagne was then transported to the Galveston City Jail and booked at approximately 3:10 a.m. During the booking process, Officer Putnal inadvertently violated departmental policy by not removing Gagne's belt. Additionally, no determination was made to establish the suicidal tendencies, if any, of Gagne, nor was such a determination required by departmental policy. Sometime around 5:00 a.m., Mr. Gagne hanged himself in his cell.¹ Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.² The original defendants were the City of Galveston, City of Galveston Police Department, Council Member Jan Coggeshall, City Manager Steve Huffman, and Officer Mike Putnal.³

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

Plaintiffs assert that the City⁴ violated Gagne's civil rights in failing to take appropriate precautions to identify him as a suicidal person and protect him from himself.⁵ More specifically, the plaintiffs believe the defendants were negligent in failing to remove Gagne's belt, failing to properly screen for suicidal tendencies, failing to provide continued visual observation, failing to promulgate a safety policy, and failing to properly train and fund the police officers and jail personnel. The City readily admits that Officer Putnal's failure to remove Gagne's belt was a producing cause of death, but that the plaintiffs have failed to meet the threshold requirements for a section 1983 cause of action and now move for summary judgment.

In the past, the United States Supreme Court took a fairly harsh view toward motions for summary judgment.⁶ However, a recent trilogy of 1986 cases⁷ indicates the Supreme Court has clearly had a change of perspective. In broad language which supports the granting of summary judgments, the Supreme Court stated "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to `secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 276 (1986).

The appropriate starting point for engaging in summary judgment analysis is whether "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An examination of the substantive issues is required only to the extent necessary to determine whether a disputed fact or inference is material to an essential legal element of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986). As the moving party in this case, the defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that there are no actual disputes as to any material facts.⁸ Alternatively, the defendants can meet their burden simply by showing there is an absence of evidence to support the legal elements of the plaintiffs' case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d at 275; Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir.1986). Under Celotex analysis, once this burden has been met, the plaintiffs must set forth specific facts in support of those allegations that are essential to their case and on which they will bear the burden of proof at the time of trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. If the plaintiffs fail in their burden, then the granting of summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that the defendants have met their burden of proof by demonstrating that there is no dispute as to any material fact. Furthermore, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to offer specific evidence which establishes genuine issues of fact concerning all the legal elements of a civil rights cause of action.

CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983 CLAIM

In order to assert a section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiffs must satisfy three threshold requirements. First, they must allege a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution or federal laws. Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019, 101 S.Ct. 3009, 69 L.Ed.2d 391 (1981). Second, they must allege that the deprivation was inflicted pursuant to official policy. Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, per curiam, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.1984). Third, the allegations must state specific facts and not merely conclusory allegations. Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir.1987); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir.1986).

As for the first requirement, the City clearly owed a duty of care to protect Gagne and all other pretrial detainees. Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (5th Cir.1986). Yet, that duty of care was not of a constitutional level. The failure to remove a belt and the failure to implement a screening process that was "suicide specific" was nothing more than mere negligence, and mere negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663, 88 L.Ed.2d 662, 666 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 346, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670, 88 L.Ed.2d 677, 682 (1986). Moreover, it would be a perverse distortion of the law to establish constitutional liability for every mere breach of a departmental policy. See Gagne, 805 F.2d at 560 n. 2.

In light of this fact, the plaintiffs wish to amend their complaint a third time so as to assert that the City's conduct reflects deliberate indifference to Gagne's suicidal tendencies and medical needs, and by analogy thereby establish a section 1983 claim under Estelle v. Gamble⁹ and its progeny. The plaintiffs then suggest three cases that show deliberate indifference to medical needs in circumstances less compelling than in this case: Miranda v. Munoz¹⁰, Robinson v. Moreland,¹¹ and Guglielmoni v. Alexander.¹² Plaintiffs cases, however, can be distinguished from the case at bar in that the key factor in any medical denial case is the issue of detection or recognition of the problem. In Miranda, Robinson, and Guglielmoni, the authorities already recognized, or there was a strong indicia of information for them to recognize, that the pretrial detainee had a serious medical problem requiring special attention.¹³

In this case, the City was without knowledge of Gagne's prior suicide attempt. Nor would a reasonable inspection of Gagne's wrist have revealed sufficient scar tissue to put the City on constructive notice of Gagne's suicidal tendencies.¹⁴ Additionally, Gagne stood quietly during the booking process. He did not engage in any bizarre behavior.¹⁵ In the absence of some sort of behavior that would impute notice of a medical problem, the City cannot be said to have been deliberately indifferent to Gagne's medical needs.¹⁶ Thus, the plaintiffs have failed to establish a constitutional deprivation.

The second major requirement for establishing municipal liability under section 1983 is to show the constitutional deprivation, if any, was inflicted pursuant to official policy. Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir.1984). Official policy is:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority. Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless they execute official policy as above defined.

Id. at 841. It is ironic, however, that even though official policy is an integral prong of a municipal liability claim, the thrust of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint is that the City was deficient in establishing certain official policies, customs, or practices. More specifically, plaintiffs claim there were no departmental rules or regulations for screening suicidal persons, nor were there any rules for regular and continued visual observation.¹⁷ If such is the case, then the plaintiffs have failed to meet the second requirement of a section 1983 claim.

In the alternative, it might be possible to construe the defendants' conduct as an official policy not to...